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ABSTRACT' 
The purpose of this.dissertation is to try to provide a critical 
analysis· of the problem of domestid fina-ncing of the T~kish Firs·t 
Five-Ye~ Developme~t· Plan, i963-1967. More precisely, we shal.i be 
concerned ·with the f~llowing question: .how .the savings/income ratio 
in the Turkish economy could be.ra:i,sed rrom its pre-Plan level to that 
envisaged by the.Plan as an investme~t/income ratto necessary for the 
attainment of the Plan~s :targe·ts. 
The study begins with a detailed introduction of the social and 
. . 
economic framework of Ttirkey in Cl}a.pter 1, in which/~g~hasis is.put 
on the factors which a~e likely -:t;o·be the most effective determinants 
of the saving capacityof·the economy. This is ·followed by a review of 
the P~an's objectives in Chapter 2, which reveals the size of the Plan. 
Whether the financing of·a :plan of that size is within the capability 
of the Turkish economy is examined in Chapter 3 under the heading 
"Strategy for Financing of· the ·Plan" .•. 'Ho~ever, ~ven if the realization 
of the required'finance is. deemed to. be·withi,n the means of the economy, 
it will certainly requir .. e' some efforts by·· the public to raise th~ savings/ 
income ratio a·bove its pre-Plan lev~l· In this c~nnection, j;he performance. 
of the private sector a.nd the obstacles· to a h:i·gher 'propensity to save in 
the private sector are analysed in Chapter 4. We are thus left with the 
major issue of the Public Sector's s~vings~ · All',long the va:dous kinds of 
public revenue, taxation .is .singled out due t.o its relative importance 
and studie~ in detail in Chapter 5. Then follows· in Chapter 6 a sketch 
'of non-tax public ~avenues and publ~c current expenditures and a 
study of the financing of the·deficit of the capital·account of 
the Public Sector. The d.issertation. i's completed with a chapter 
-
summarizing the conclusions of the individual chapters. 
Durham,:·:; 
October, 196'6. 
Mete Durdag 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to try to provide a 
critical analysis of the problem of domestic financing of the 
Turkish First Five-Year Development Plan, 196~-1967. 
MY title is misleading if it is considered as suggesting 
that this dissertation is concerned with the problem of providing 
adequate funds for the investment programme of the Plan. Such a 
study would have involved dealing with the supply of investment 
funds from financial intermediaries as well as with auto-financing. 
I~stead, the attention is focused here on the possibilities of 
increasing real savings so as to match real investments envisaged 
in the Plan. More precisely, we shall be concerned with the 
following question in this dissertation: how the saving/income 
ratio in the Turkish economy could be raised from its pre-Plan 
level to that envisaged by the Plan as an investment/income_ ratio 
necessary for the attainment of the Plan's targets. 
The breaking down of the financing process into two separate 
aspects, namely, (a) the release of real resources from consumption 
for investment, and (b) the transfer of these resources to investing 
units, has become a widely used technique. For example, Gurley and Shaw 
in their American Economic Review article 11Financial Aspects of Economic 
:':X. 
Development", E. Nevin in his "Capital Funds in Underdeveloped 
Countries", E. E. Jucker-Fleetwood in his "Money and Finance in 
Africa", and Placido L. Mapa, Jr., in his \unpublished) Ph.D. 
Dissertation "Development Financing in a Developing Economy" 
concentrate on the role of financial/institutions in providing 
'· 
adequate fUnds for increasing capital formation. On the other 
hand, A. Lewis in the chapter on "Capital" of his "Theory of 
Economic Growth", V. F. Sava~, in his (published) Doctorate Thesis 
"Iktisadi Kalkinma nin Finansma.ni" (Financing of Economic ·Development), 
Y. Hil:my in his lunpublished) Ph.D. Thesis "Domestic Financing of 
Economic Development in Underdeveloped Countries With Special 
Reference to Egypt", and S. R. Datta Gupta in his ~unpublishe~ thesis 
"The Financing of Pla.rmed Economic Development in India" deal almost 
exclusively with the problem of increasing savings as a proportion of 
national income. 
The present study is conducted a·t the macro level. It 
begins with a detailed introduction of the social and economic frame-
work of Turkey in Chapter 1, in which the emphasis is put on the 
factors which are likely to be the most effective determinants of 
the saving capacity of the economy. This is followed by a review 
of the Plan's objectives in Chapter 2, which reveals the size of the 
Plan. Whether the financing of a plan of that size is within the 
xi 
capability of the Turkish economy is examined in Chapter 3 under 
the heading 11 Strategy for Financing of the Plan". However, even 
if the realization of the required finance is deemed to be within 
the means of the economy, it will certainly require, as will be 
seen, some efforts by the public to raise the saving/income ratio 
above its pre-Plan level. In this connection, the performance of 
the private sector and the obstacles to a higher propensity to 
save in the private sector are analysed in mhapter 4. We are thus 
left with the major issue of the public sector's savings. Among 
the various kinds of public revenue, taxation is singled out due 
to its relative importance and studied in detail in Chapter 5. 
Then follows in Chapter 6 a sketch of non-tax public revenues and 
public current expenditures and a study of the financing of the 
deficit of capital account of the public sector. The dissertation 
is completed with a chapter summarizing the conclusions of the 
individual chapters. 
In order to avoid the likelihood of getting involved in 
speculating upon the Plan's projections in relation to the financing, 
I have been careful to observe, as far as the scarce data have 
permitted, this method. .H:stimates of the Development Plan and 
Annual Programmes are set against the relevant performance of the 
economy in the recent past and during the implementation period so 
far; the determining factors of the past performance are analysed; 
the measures envisaged in the Plan and taken in the course of 
implementation are assessed in the light of the analysis of the 
past performance as well as of the actual outcome of the Plan 
implementation so far. 
The materials I refer to in this dissertation may be 
classified into three groups: {a) Theoretical works, (b) Statis-
tical data about Turkey, (c) Works on those aspects of the Turkish 
econo~ which are relevant to ~ topic. Various aspects of the 
financing of capital formation in underdeveloped countries have 
attracted, particularly since the late 1940's, interests of many 
research workers, resulting in an accumulation of theoretical works 
on the issue. Therefore, I have met no difficulty in preparing 
the theoretical background of this dissertation. __ But-the-under-
Q,_evelo;p~d l¥1-ture.-.. of_ .. the Turkish s ta tis tics_ has_b_een. a_limi ting 
factor. As will be seen in the text, the Turkish statistics have 
three important defects: (1) Their coverage is very limited; 
(ii) There is inconsistency between the data of the State Planning 
Organisation and those of the State Institute of Statistics which 
have been the basis of the official estimates until recently and 
are still used by many Government Departments; (iii) The data of 
the S.P.O., which are utilised in this dissertation, are lacking in 
clarity. For instance, it sometimes requires one to spend 
xiii 
considerable time and care to find out.}-lhether a table in an S.P.O. 
publication shows the actual or planned data. It is not unusual 
to meet a table comprising data expressed at different years' 
prices. As regards (c), it is disappointing that although a good 
many Turkish scholars trained in the Western Universities are 
holding posts in universities as well as in official and private 
institutions there are barely any published researches of academic 
value on the problems of the Turkish economy. MOst of the articles 
in the few learned periodicals are concerned with those theoretical 
aspects which hardly have any relation to the realities of the . 
Turkish economy. I could therefore scarcely have dispensed with 
the works on the Turkish economy made available in mimeographed 
form by the S.P.O., even though they are restricted to the use of 
the s.P.O. starr. 
I have received great help from my supervisor Mr. M. K. 
Chowdhury. He has been most helpful to me in clarifying the 
various issues that have been encountered in the preparation of 
this work. He also has patiently kept instructing me about the 
methodology of my work. If there are any errors in my work, they 
remain my sole responsibility. 
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CHAPI'ER 1. 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF TURKEY 
ment between the ~~~b_ers of_ the wo~~~ societ~,-~hatev~~ the measure 
of development, we have to name those towards :the lower end of the 
s~ale as _''underdeve~~ped 11 • The diff!renc~~ betwe~~--~eveloped and 
~eir social and economic systems that to pi~~ -~p_ only_ ~e 
difference ~none aspect as t~~ criterio~_o~~evelopment would be 
an undervaluation of a host of ~~~~~~gni-~i~~t differences. 
Therefore, the introduction to the Turkish econo~ is made here in 
terms of a combination of its various characteristics rather than 
in terms of a single factor such as the level of real national income, 
which is the most widely admitted criterion of the degree of develop-
ment. This will serve the purpose of acquainting us not only with 
an outline of the Turkish econo~ but also with the main determinants 
of the level of savings. For the social and economic structures of 
a country, w1 th its value judgements, behaviour patterns, and 
institutions, are as effective determinants of the level of saving 
as the level of its real national income. 
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This chapter is composed of two sections. Section I deals 
with the social characteristics of Turkey, and Section II with the 
economic features within the context of the economic developments in 
the recent past. 
1. Population. 
I 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
The size of population, its composition, and its rate of 
growth have been of great concern in the economics of underdevelop-
ment. The size of the population of a country has significance for 
its economic development with respect to its relation to the natural 
resources of the country. The well-known advantages of specializa-
tion and of the economies of large-scale production are materialized 
to a greater extent the greater the internal market, which is 
limited, among other things, by the size of population. On the 
other hand, the relation of the size of population to the natural 
resources may be such that it might resul ~ in the diseconomies of 
more intensive and extensive use of these resources. Viewed from 
this angle, it seems at first glance that Turkey, with an area of 
780,600 km2 and 31"4 million population in 1965, does not confront 
yet a population pressure on its natural resources. Table I shows 
the density of population in Turkey and in some other countries. 
- 3 -
TABLE I. 
DENSITY OF POPULATION IN TURKEY AND IN OTHER COUUTRIES. 
Country 
."Turkey 
Density (Per 1an2) Country 2 Density (Per km ) 
40 1 Brazil 7 
Greece 61 India. 118 
Yugoslavia 10 United Kingdom 211 
Ireland 41 France ••• 79 
Sources: U.N., Demographic Yearbook 1957, New York 1958, -~.--· 
pp.98-99~ 
For Turkey, O.E.C.D. "Turkey 1965/66" Paris 1966. 
The figures given in Table 1 cannot have much meaning in t.'le 
assessment of population pressure, if any, facing any of these 
countries. The size of population which creates the problem of 
overpopulation, changes from country to country according to the 
structure of their economies. The diseconomies of scale arising 
from a. large population in relation to the natural resources show up 
most quickly in agriculture and in mining, whereas, industries, 
especially those making metal-products and basic chemicals, benefit 
most from a large market supported by a large population.1 Being 
predominantly an agricultural country, ~Y.: actually: is under the 
In fact, the relationship between the 
1. W. A. Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth, G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. , 
London 1963, p.324. 
.. ... -
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rural population and the arable land is not as favourable as the 
overall density figure given in Table 1. Table 2 shows this 
relationship in Turkey in comparison with some other countries. 
TABLE 2. 
THE AMOUNT OF ARABLE LAND PER FARMER IN TURKEY 
AND IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. 
Country Hectar Per Farmer 
Turkey 2"41 
United Kingdom • 4"56 
France 4"26 
Italy 2"48 
Greece 2"70 
United States •• 25"68 
Note: The figures for the countries other than Turkey were calculated 
from the figures in U.N., F.A.0., Production Yearbook 1960, 
pp. 3-5; 20-24. 
Source: . Prof. Dr. H. Cillov, Econo~of Turkey (Turkish Text), 
Istanbul 1962, p. 78. 
Furthermore, when account is taken of the fact that about 
one-third of the arable land in Turkey is left fallow1 each year, 
1. The land is left fallow to regain heart due to the lack of adequate 
organic fertilisers and the inability of the farmers to afford it. 
This fact is a good indicator of the underdeveloped character of 
~e Turkish econo~. 
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this relationship deteriorates further, decreasing to an average of 
only 1•6 hectare per farmer. This is too small a size of land per 
farmer to work with modern equipments and methods. However, it 
would not be a valid argument to assert the existence of the over-
population problem in a countr.y only on the basis of the situation 
prevailing in one sector. This brings us to the question of the 
occupational structure of population in Turkey. _): 
The major part of the population derive their livelihood from 
agricultural activities. The ratio of the population engaged in 
agriculture to the total active population was 77•4.%. in 1962 while 
the relevant ratio for industr.y was only 9·~. 1 A substantial part 
of the population active in agriculture adds little or nothing to 
output. In other words, disguised unemployment in agriculture is 
an important problem for the Turkish economy. According to the 
·' 
estimates of the State Planning Organisation the surplus or dispensable 
manpower in agriculture was 8•3 million out of a 9·86 million total 
agricultural active population in January, the month of lowest 
activity, though only 0·8 million in July, peak activity month, 
during 1962.2 
1. S.P.O., "Development Plan, First-Five-Year, 1963-1967", Ankara 
1963, p. 420. 
2. Ibid, p. 420. The surplus manpower has been estimated as the 
difference between the total manpower supply and the supply which 
would suffice to perform the various agricultural tasks of culti-
vation, etc., with current techniques. ·Therefore, unless the 
agricultural techniques change the absolutely dispensable labour 
force is about 1 million in the agricultural sector. 
- 6 -
The most striking aspect of the population issue is the 
relationship between the rate of population growth and the rate 
of growth of per capita income. The rate of population growth, 
together with the capital/output ratio, determines how much capital, 
or what rate of growth of national income, is necessary for 
preventing the standard of living from falling in spite of 
population growth. 
Turkey's population was growing at an average rate of 
2•81% p.a. during 1950-1955, 2·9~ p.a. during 1955-1960 and 
2·4~ p.a. during 1960-1965.1 This very high rate of population 
growth aggravates the problems of unemployment, external balance 
and low standard of living. 
Even if it is assumed that the agricultural population 
can be kept at its present level which in fact contains a 
substantial degree of disguised unemployment, it would be necessary 
to create every year about 400,000 new jobs for new hands. 2 This 
would mean a 14% growth p.a. in the non-agricultural sectors, 
1. For the amount of total population since 1950, see p. 2~ Table 9. 
2. Prof. B. C. Sar9, Population Trends in Turkey and their Economic 
Consequences, in the "Capital Formation and Investment in Industry". 
A report of the international conference on capital formation held 
at Istanbul August 1962, Istanbul 1963, p. 71. 
- 7 -
which is too high a rate in comparison with the past performance 
of 6•4% p.a. on average during 1950-62.1 As a matter of fact, 
- -
th~ ~ount of n9!'_.non-agric~ tura.l_ ~~bs -~eq,uire~ will P?~~ib~~e 
much greater than 400·,000 per year because of the likely transfer 
._o.f_),ab~~ force from agricultural to non-agricultural activities. 
----- - - . -
The present rate of population increase requires an increase in 
the agricultural output of about 2•5 per cent per annum to feed 
the population at the prevailing standards. Since no more land, 
as will be seen later, can be brought under cultivation, increasing 
capital investment in agriculture will be required which is likely 
to result in displacing some farmers every year. 
The chronic current account deficit of Turkish balance of 
payments is one of the chief obstacles to her economic development. 
Yet, the rapid increase of population eliminates any possibility of 
reducing this deficit by curbing the internal demand. 
with _the _lo_!l~st p_~r _capita income (¢192 _irl: __ lJ61). The other members _ 
_ . - -·-- --- -
of the Organization aim at a ~ annual growth of per capita income 
1. 14% is the outcome of a rough estimate, that is, (0•4 million x 
100)/2·75 million in which 2·75 million is the non-agricultural 
labour force in 1961 (See Table 3). The implicit and rather 
unreasonable assumption here is that productivit,y of labour is 
constant as the econo~ grows. 6·4% rate is calculated from 
Table 6 in p. 2l as the growth rate of non-agricultural N.N.P. 
- 8 -
in the 1960's.1 In order to prevent a widening of the relative gap 
in per capita income, Turkey must achieve an average rate of 5·~ 
growth per annum in her national income. This target cOliJ,.d have 
been lower had the population grown at a slower pace. 
2. Distribution of Income. 
According to G. Myrdal' s explanation of underdevelopment in 
terms of circular and cumulative causation, inequalities in the 
distribution of income by regions and economic sectors are the main 
' ------ ... -- - ------------- --- ------
cause of underdevelopment of a country. 
- ---- -- - -- . -
However, without getting 
involved in a particular theory, the present essay takes it for 
granted that a close relationship exists between the state of 
distribution of income and the level and composition of consumption, 
savings, investment, and, hence, economic growth. In addition, the 
nature of the distribution of income in a country has a great bearing 
on the psychological and political climate in which the economic 
development \..rill take place. 
No statistical data are available to show directly the 
distributional situation in Turkey. Nevertheless, some more or 
less sound judgements can be reached indirectly through using the 
1. O.E.C.D., "Turkey, 1962/63", Paris Ma.y 1963, p. 12. 
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available data. It has already been shown that agriculture 
provides occupations for about 77% of the active population in 
Turkey. The contribution by the agricultural population to the 
national income, however, is too far from being commensurate with 
its share in the total active population. As shown by Table 3, 
the share of the agricultural sector in the net national income 
is around 40Jb· There exists a considerable disparity between the 
average remuneration in the agriculture and that in the non-
agricultural sectors. The average agricultural income ~~~roughly, 
21•3 per cent of the average income in the industry, 18•6% of that 
"-------' . - -
in the services sector and 18·1~ o~ that in the construction sector. 
TABLE 3. 
SHARES OF ECONOMIC SECTORS IN LABOUR FORCE AND NATIONAL INCOME, 1961. 
Labour Force Income Average 
Sector Annual. Amount Income per Amount %Share (million TL) fo Share person (TL) 
Agriculture 9,800,000 78•0 18,245 41 
Industry 920,000 7"3 8,010 18 
Construction 260,000 2·0 2,670 6 
Services 1,570,000 12"7 15,575 35 
TOTAL 12,550,000 100•0 44,500 100 
Source: O.E.C.'D., Turkey 1962/63, p. 51 and inside of 
the front cover. 
1,860 
---
8,706 
10,270 
9,920 
3,560 
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Accord~~~o~he S.P.O~, the per c~pita_~ncome outside agriculture 
is approximately three times that of the peasant (T.L 2,740_p.a. 
versus TL 950 p.a.). 1 
Within the sphere of agriculture, the average peasant's 
condition is far worse than is implied by the above figures because 
of a substantially uneven distribution of land. Table 4 shows 
that close to 2~ of the total cultivated area is operated by 1·~ 
of the families. One half of the cultivated area is worked b,y 
1~ of the farming families, while the other half is shared among 
the rest of the families. For about 85% of the families, the 
average farm unit per family is smaller than 10 hectares, which may 
not always support a family under the present conditions of the 
Turkish agriculture. 2 
The great inequality in the distribution of the cultivated 
land, which can better be seen with the help of a Lorenz curve as 
given in Diagram 1, results in a similar inequality in the 
distribution of agricultural income. According to an estimate 
made b,y Dr. Eva Hirsch, the first five percentiles of the agricul-
1. S.P.O., The Interim Programme for the Year 1962, .Ankara 1961, 
mimeographed, p. The average agricultural income is in 
fact even smaller than 950 T.L p.a., because of the overestimate 
of the agricultural income which is explained in page 28-30 below. 
2. H. Cillov, op.cit., p. 106. 
- 11 -
tural population altogether receive less than 1~ of the total 
agricultural income while the top percentile alone captures more 
TABLE 4• 
DISTRIBUTION OF CULTIVATED LAND. 
Families Cultivated Area Average 
Farm Area size of 
(Decares) Farm Unit 000 % 000 ha. % (ha). 
1 - 20 113 30•6 836 4•3 1•1 
21 - 50 797 31•5 2,790 14•3 3•5 
51 - 75 336 13"3 2,097 10•8 6·2 
76 - 100 216 8·6 1,915 9•9 8•9 
101 - 150 168 6·7 2,018 10•8 12•4 
151 - 200 92 3·6 1,648 8•5 18•2 
201 - 300 68 2·7 1,712 8·8 25"1 
301 - 500 39 1·5 1,520 7•8 39·9 
501 - 700 17 0"7 1,015 5•2 59·5 
701 and over 21 0•8 3,811 19•6 181·6 
TOTAL 2,527 100·0 19,452 100•0 7•7 
Source: O.E.C.E., Etudes sur les Politiques Agricoles, 
Paris 1960, Vol. 1, p. 298, as quoted in H. Cillov, 
op.cit., p. 107. 
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than half of the total agricultural income1 (see Table 5). 
DIAGRAM 1. 
LAND SIZE DISTRIBUTION IN TURKEY. 
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Source: Drawn on the basis of the data given in Table 4· 
1. According to the Enos Report, a 34% of the total agricultural 
income goes to the 4% of the agricul tura1 population. (Quoted in 
H. Kizilyalli, Economic Effects of the Turkish Taxation System, 
mimeographed by S.P.O. in January 1965, in Turkish, p. 124). 
Prof. J. L. Enos' Report was published in the periodical ''Yon", 
No. 59, dated 20/1/1963. 
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Today in Turkey, agricultural incomes are largely affected 
by the weather conditions and the State's agricultural price policy. 
However, the favourable weather and price conditions do not bring 
much betterment to the peasant without land or with land of 
subsistence size, but to the big landowner only. 
TAELE 5· 
DISTRIBUTION OF INC0!>1E IN AGRICULTURE. 
Percentile of Share in Percentile of Share in 
Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural 
Population. Income (%). Population. Income 
1 0•98 6 5•33 
2 1•42 7 6•83 
3 2•18 8 9·21 
4 3•07 9 13·60 
5 4·11 10 53·23 
Source: Dr. E. Hirsch, Income Distribution in Turkish 
Agriculture,Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Columbia Univ. ,-·1960, quoted in H. Kizilyalli, 
op.cit. 
(%). 
In addition to the sectoral inequalities, one can easily 
observe the existence of regional inequalities in Turkey. In 
general, the coastal areas are better-off as compared with the 
hinterland because of the favourable conditions for growing hign 
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value crops and the tendency of the private industry to concentrate 
in the coastal areas. The private enterprises working in the North-
West Turkey and in Izmir region represent 74% of the total private 
t . 1 en erprJ.ses. 
Reduction of the distributional inequalities through the 
State's welfare measures is of insignificant degree in Turkey as in 
all the underdeveloped countries, since the egalitarian policies of 
a modern welfare state are too expensive for underdeveloped countries, 
while the need for social security is much more pressing in these 
countries than in the advanced ones. Beyond the medical assistance 
granted to the needy by the State, there are three outstanding 
institutions performing social security functions in Turkey~ (a) The 
Workers Insurance, (b) The Pension FUnd which grants (old-age) pension 
to civil servants and (c) The Army's Mutual Fund. Of these only The 
Workers Insurance performs social security work in its broadest sense, 
though it also has considerable limitations such as the absence of 
insurance against unemployment and as being unable to extend its 
activities to agricultural workers, non-manual ,,orkers and members 
of some other activities. (Social security institutions are also 
of great significance as sources of investible funds. We shall 
turn to this point later). 
1. Dr. Rufilen Kele~, "The Rush to the Cities in Turkey" (Turkish) in 
PlBnlama (periodical of the S.P.O.), No. 2, p. 
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3. Sociocultural Aspects. 
Values and institutions prevailing in a country affect 
economic life through various channels such as consumption 
attitudes, labour efficiency, economic organization, attitude 
toward entrepreneurship, the general outlook on life, and the like. 
The values and institutions of the Turkish society have been for 
long, and still are, though to a much less degree, characterized by 
their traditional and conservative features. The wrong inter-
pretation of Islam belittled the material and the present. 
Division of time between work and leisure in a way favouring the 
latter has become a way of life. Trade and manual works have long 
been, and still are in some quarters, considered degrading activi-
ties. The extended family system still constitutes the centre of 
social, economic and political life in Turkey. Its unfavourable 
effects on incentives to work and on the mobility of productive 
factors are common problems of all the underdeveloped countries. 
Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 much has 
been done to clear away the institutional barriers in the way of 
social and economic progress. Among many reforms the gradual 
spread of education has been most effective in breaking the tradi-
tional value patterns. But there is still much to be done in this 
field. The degree of literacy is far from being at a satisfactory 
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level. (In 1955 the percentage of illiterates was 43•6 among 
male population, and 75•6 among female population, aged 6 years 
and over). There is also an imbalance between various kinds of 
trained manpower supplied by the educational institutions and the 
demand for them. In breaking through the traditional cultural 
patterns a special role has been played by improved transportation 
and by more frequent commercial contact with urban centres. 
The striking features of the Turkish society of our own 
day seem to me as follows: (a) The great majority is tied tightly 
to the land and most of them cultivate their own land, though there 
is considerable inequality in the distribution of land. This 
group is characterized with the conservatism in its value patterns. 
(b) One can easily observe the emergence of an organised labour 
force as a social and political power. There are, however, still 
many factors impeding the development of trade unions, such as the 
difficulties caused by the structure of the economy and labour force, 
and by the working class itself, not to speak of the antagonism of 
employers towards labour organisations. (c) The middle class is 
of great importance with regard to its control over social and 
.economic life. This class is, however, grouped into two camps: 
the one being liberal in its attitudes but in favour of etatism in 
economic life, the other conservative in attitude but liberal in 
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economic policy. td) Finally, there is a small group of traders, 
larger farmers and craftsmen that constitutes the wealthiest class. 
This group has also been serving as a source of recruitment of 
industrialists. 
II 
A REVIEW OF THE TURKISH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1950-62.1 
1. National Income. 
The general trend of growth of the Turkish national income 
in the period 1950-1962 has not been a steadily increasing one but 
has followed a path with considerable fluctuations. This is 
readily observable in Diagrams 2 and 3. The level of G.N.P. was 
8~ higher in 1962 than in 1950 (see Table 7), representing an 
average rate of growth of 5"1% p.a. This average rate of growth, 
however, is influenced to a great extent by the exceptionally higb 
rates attained during the early years of the period in question. 
The 1950-53 sub-period witnessed an exceptionally brisk 
economic activity. The average annual rate of growth in this 
1. The main sources of informs. tion referred to for this section are 
these: S.P.O. Development Plan 1963-67; and, the Annual 
Programmes for 1963 and 1964. O.E.C .D., Turkey 1962/63, Paris 
1963. I.B.R.D., Development Performance and Prospects of Turkey, 
mimeographed, November 1965. Prof. Anders 6stlind, Scope for 
Non-inflationary Expansion in Turkey, mimeographed b,y the S.P.O., 
Ankara 1962. 
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period was 11·6%. This very high rate of growth was achieved, it 
is interesting to note, without a significant rise in the general 
price level (see Table 8). Successive good crops during 1950-53 
and the rapid extension of the cultivated area as a result of 
mechanization resulted in agricultural surpluses which were easily 
disposed of in foreign markets thanks to the Korean boom in inter-
national trade. Export proceeds increased sharply from 
~197 million in 1948 to ~363 million in 1952. The exchange rate 
was TL2•80 to the u.s. dollar, and net exchange reserves stood at 
~153 million in 1952. The greatly increased effective demand 
stemming from the expansionist investment policy was thus matched 
by the rapidly increasing agricultural production and by the 
increased imports of both capital and consumption goods. 
The potential inflationary pressure of the expansionary 
policy burst into the open as from the late 1953 when the foreign 
trade lost its function as a brake on domestic inflationary forces. 
The depletion of the foreign balances and the return of unfavour-
able trade conditions for the export of primary commodities led to 
the severe reductions in the imports of consumption goods as from 
1953 on. Exports over the five-year period of 1954-59 were 
stagnant at or around ~300 to ~350 million annually. During 
1954-58 severe shortages were prevailing in the supply of not only 
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foreign consumer goods but also raw materials, fertilisers, half-
processed goods, spare parts, etc., of foreign origin. Bottle-
necks were confronting producers, with resulting low productivity 
and high production costs. The agricultural production also 
entered a period of stagnation as the limit of cultivable land was 
reached in the mid-fifties. T.he growing deficits of the State 
Economic Enterprises (S.E.E.)1 were being financed largely by the 
Central and commercial bank credit. Between 1954 and 1959 money 
supply expanded by 16o%. T.he country was pushed into an increas-
ingly severe and complicated system of price regulations, but to 
no avail. Domestic prices more than doubled between 1954 and 
1959; net gold and foreign exchange reserves fell to $26 million 
by the end of 1959 and the exchange rate was T.L9·00 to the u.s. 
dollar. 
T.he average annual rate of growth in the period 1953-58 
fell sharply to 3·8% from an average rate of 11·6% achieved in 
the period of 1950-53· If we use three-year averages for the 
beginning and end of the period, the average annual rate of growth 
appears to be still as low as 4•3%- T.he level of per capita 
1. From now on the abbreviation "S.E.E." will be used to denote 
the State Economic Enterprises. 
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income fell from T.L. 1,507 in 1953 to T.L. 1,332 in 1954 and 
could not regain its 1953 level until 1958 (see Table 7)1 • 
In August 1958, the Government reversed its inflationary 
policies. A comprehensive stabilization programme was drawn up 
with the help of the I.M.F. and the O.E.C.D., involving devalua-
tion of the Turkish Lira, domestic credit controls, and consolida-
tion and funding of the external debts2• But inflationary price 
rises could not be brought to a halt before 1960. The revolu"j;ion 
in May 1960 led to some hesitation on the part of producers and 
consumers which had a depressing effect on economic activity. 
The annual rate of growth of G.N.P., on average, was 3"/o during the 
period 1958-62. If the year 1962, which may be considered as 
marking the beginning of a new active period, is excluded, the 
annual rate of growth in 1958-61 appears to be 2·1%, which is even 
lower than the rate of population growth, 2·9%, prevailing in that 
period. T.he per capita real income had risen by less than ~ 
through 1959 and 1960, and dropped by 4·~ in 1961. 
1. The "per capita income" figures refer to the Net National 
Product per capita (at factor costs). If we had considered 
G.N.P. per capita at market prices during 1953-58 we would have 
found that the per capita G.N.P. was growing as G.N.P. grew on 
average 3·8% p.a. while the rate of population increase was 
below 3"/o p.a. The discrepanc~ between the growth rates of per 
capita ~.N.P. at factor costs~~t of per capita G.N.P. at 
market prices shows that indirect tax proceeds and depreciation 
allowances in National Income Statistics together grew at a rate 
higher than the rate of population growth during 1953-1958. 
2. At the end of 1952, external public debt was ¢188 million. At 
the end of 1960 it amounted to $931 million, including the 1958 
consolidation of commercial arrears and suppliers' credits, and 
the new stabilization credits. 
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TABLE 6 
TURKISH NATIONAL INCOME AT C~TSTANT PRICES (at 1961 factor prices) 
(Million T.L.) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Agriculture 12,106.8 14,613.4 15,557.2 17,033.8 13,675.6 14,916.6 16,212.6 16,621.2 16,621.6 17,618.5 18,376.4 17,420.9 18,275.8 
Industry 4,051. 3 4,390.1 4,756.1 5,238.0 5,486.9 5,706.3 6,078.3 6,519.8 6,976.0 7' 321.6 7,302.0 7,220.4 7,815.2 
Construction 1,322.0 1,375.2 1,658.4 2,299·9 1,904.8 2,000.5 2,029.6 2 ,511. 7 2,700.2 2,739.2 2,260.6 2,364.7 2,485.3 
Services 7,407.6 8,256.7 9,106.9 10,010.9 12,320.6 11,087.9 11,677.6 12,613.8 13,612.7 13,914.4 15,143.6 15,266.0 16,519.6 
Domestic, Income 24,887.7 28,635·4 31,078.-6 34,582.6 31,387.9 33,711.3 35,998.1 38,226.5 39,910.1 41,593.7 43,080.6 42,272.0 45,105.9 
Income From Abroad 
- 143·5 - 165.8 - 179.8 - 200.1 - 181.3 - 195.3 - 208.6 - 221.2 - 249.2 - 250.6 - 245·7 - 250.0 - 304.0 
N.N.P. (at factor 
cost) 24,744.2 28,469.6 30,898.8 34,382.5 31,206.6 33,516.0 35,789.5 38,045·3 39,660.9 41,343.1 42,834·9 42,022.0 44,801.9 
Indirect Taxes 2,738.3 3,170.5 3,440.6 3,826.1 3,452.0 3,714.9 3,966.5 4,213.4 4,72f3.J; 4,779.0 4,998.0 4,998.0 4,927.7 
N.N.P. (at market 
prices) 27,482.5 31,640.1 34,339·4 38,208.6 34,658.6 37,230.9 39,756.0 42,258.7 44,389.6 46,122.1 47,832.9 47,020.0 49,729.6 
Depreciation 1,008.5 1,127.1 1,252.8 1,362.7 1,394·5 1, 511.5 1,625.4 1,765.7 1,891. 7 2,023.9 2,108~3 2,193.0 2,290.6 
G.N.P. 28,491.0 32,767.2 35,592.2 39,571.3 36,053.1 38,742.4 41,381.4 44,024.4 46,281. 3" 48.146.0 49,941.2 49,213.0 52,020.2 
Sources: S.P.O., First Five-Year Development Plan, 1963-1967; Ankara 1963, p. 14-15. 
For 1962 figures: S.P.O., 1964 Annual Program; Ankara 1963; p. 10. 
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TABLE 7 
INDEXES OF G.N.P. AND PER CAPITA INCONE, 1950-1962 .· 
. ·" 
Per Capita Index of Per Annual Rate Index of Annual Rate 
Years N.N.P. at Capita Income of Increase Total Income of Increase 1961 Factor 1950 = 100 in Per Cap- (G.N.P.) in Total 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Cost (T.L.) ita Income 1950 = 100 Income 
1,181 100 
-
100 
-
1,316 111 11 115 15 
1,391 118 6·3 125 8·7 
1,507 128 8·5 139 11·2 
1,332 113 -11•7 126 
- 9·"3 
1,393 118 4·4 135 7·1 
1,445 122 3·4 145 7·4 
1,492 126 3•3 154 6•2 
1,511 128 1•6 160 3•9 
1,530 130 1•5 167 4•4 
1,539 130 0•0 173 3•5 
1,469 124 - !4·6 170 
- 1•7 
182 6•0 
Source: S.P.O., First Five-Year Development Plan 1963-1967, 
p.l5. 
Note: In this table the per capita national income is shown in 
terms of N.N.P. at factor prices while the national 
income shewn in terms of G.N.P. at market prices. The 
(continued at foot of page 24). 
; 
Years 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
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TilLE 8 
GENERAL PRICE LEVEL (1950 = 100). 
Wholesale Price Chain Index of Ankara Cost of 
Index (Ministry Wholesale Living Index 
of Commerce) Prices (Central Statis-
tical 
............ 100 . ........... 100 . ........... 
............ 107 . ........... 107 . ........... 
............ 108 oooooooooooo"rl00•9 . .......... 
............ 110 . ........... 101·8 . .......... 
............ 121 . ........... 110 . .......... 
............ 131 . ........... 108 . .......... 
............ 153 . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 . .......... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 181 ............ 118 . .......... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 208 ............ 115 . .......... 
. . • .......... 250 ............ 120 . .......... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 263 . ........... 105 ........... 
............ 271 . ........... 103 . .......... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 286 ............ 105 
Source: S.P.O., First Five-Year Development 
Plan 1963-1967, p. 19. 
Office). 
100 
103 
107 
110 
119 
141 
151 
174 
208 
258 
264 
264 
(Continued from foot of page 23). 
Note on Table 8 (contd.). 
reason for this is this: the per capita national 
income is usually used as a measure of economic welfare 
while the national income is a measure of output or 
production. For the former purpose N.N.P. at factor 
costs is more appropriate whereas for the latter purpose 
G.N.P. at market prices is preferable. {For the use of 
various national income concepts for different purposes, 
see U.N., E.C.A.F.E., Analysis of National Income in 
Selected Asian Countries, Econ. Bull., Vol. III; 
Nos. 1-2; 1952). 
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2. Product, Employment, and Productivity in Major Sectors: 
A. AGRICULTURE: The dominant place of agriculture in the 
Turkish economy has already been revealed, particularly by the 
section on the population issue (see Table 3 in p. 9). 
The agricultural production increased at a slower pace than 
G.N.P. during 1950-1962, 3·~ p.a. versus 5·1% p.a. This average 
of 3·~, however, is heavily influenced by the performance of the 
agricultural sector through the period 1950-53, during which the 
average rate of increase in the agricultural production was 12•1% 
p.a. In the following sub-periods of 1953-58 and 1958-1961 the 
average rate of growth fell to 1•9 and 2·4% p.a., respectively. 
The agricultural production in Turkey is greatly influenced 
by cl.ima te. In the years of good weather, .for example, in 1951, 
1953 and 1956 agricultural production increased by as much as 21, 
10, and 9%, but in the bad years of 1954 and 1961 fell by 20 and 
~- The influence of climate is intensified by the fact that much 
of the land brought under cul tivati·on in this period was of marginal 
character and that the introduction of modern technology was not 
well-conditioned1 • 
l. These two factors are examined in :s.ome detail in pp. 30-34 
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In a study of the development of Turkish agriculture, one 
of the vital issues is of course the relationship between the 
gTowth rate of the population and that of agricultural production. 
As calculated on the basis of the data given in Table 9, the per 
capita agricultural produce has increased by 1"4% p.a. during 
1950-55 and by 1"3% during 1955-60. As a matter of fact, the 
increase in the latter period possibly may be due in part to an 
overestimation of the agricultural income1 This is indeed 
disappointing in view of the fact that agriculture is the principal 
means of' support for some three-quarters of' the people, most of' 
whom subsist on a deficient diet. 
The data on employment in the agricultural sector are so 
scanty and undependable that no firm conclusions can be drawn from 
them. The average agricultural income shown in Table 3 is far 
from being a meaningful measure of productivity in the agricUltural 
sector. Aside from the fact that it includes absentee landlords' 
income, the existence of a substantial degree of' disguised 
unemployment and the large share of' unpaid workers in the total 
labour force (5~ in 1955) render it an unsatisfactory means for 
the measurement of' productivity per person in the agricultural 
1. See PP• 2.8-30. 
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sector. Since the supply of labour as such does not create a 
bottleneck in the agricultural production, it would be more 
significant to consider the productivity per unit of cultivated 
land or per unit of capital input which are ;:.:·apart. fi•om· t·he__;· 
improved techniques, the use of better seeds, etc., the real limiting 
TABLE 9 
INCREASES IN POPULATION, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND CULTIVATED 
AREA DURING 195~ - 61. 
Years 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Population Agricultural Cultivated Area Average Production (including fallows) Produc-
tivity 
Index 
Total Index Index Annual Total In- 1950. (000) of In- (000 ha) crease 100 
Total crease % (III/VI) 
1950= % 
100 
I II III IV v In~x VII VIII 
20,947 100 100·0 - 14,542 100 - 100 
120·7 20·7 15,272 105 5•0 115 
128·5 6·4 17,361 119 13·7 108 
140·7 9·5 18,812 129 8·3 109 
113•0 -19·7 19,616 135 4·2 84 
24,065 114·9 123·2 9·0 20,998 144 1·0 85 
134·0 8·8 22,453 154 7·0 87 
131•3 2•4 22,161 152 - 1·3 90 
137·3 O·O 22,765 156 2•7 88 
145•6 6·0 22,940 158 0•8 92 
27,830 132·8 151·9 4•3 23,264 160 1·4 95 
144•0 - 5•2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
151•0 5•0 25,348 174 - 87 
Sources: The figures for the population and cultivated 
area were taken from S.P.O., Development Plan 
1963-67, pages 12 and 24. 
The Index of the agricultural production was 
calculated on the basis of the data given in 
Table 6. 
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factors in the Turkish agriculture. Formidable statistical and 
conceptual difficulties, however, are involved in the measurement 
of productivity per unit of capital1 • As regards the measurement 
of productivity per unit of cultivated land, Table 9 may be 
considered as having the necessary data for a rough estimation. 
The agricultural production in 1960 was about 5o% higher than in 
1950, while the cultivated area expanded more than 6o% during the 
same period. This means tha. t the average agricultural yield has 
not increased but probably experienced some decline since 1950. 
Actually, the average productivity per hectare throughout the 
period 1954-1969 did not attain its 1950 level. 
As a matter of fact, the estimation of the productivity per 
hectare as made in Table 9 is nothing but the calculation of the 
average yield per hectare used in the official estimates of the 
total agricultural income. The State Institute of Statistics 
estimates the total agricultural income from an estimate of the 
total agricultural output, which in turn is based on the estimates 
of the area sown under each kind of crops and that of yields per 
hectare for each kind of crop. It has been established that the 
1. There are no statistics about the capital formation in the 
agricultural sector during the period 1950-1962. (O.E.C.D., 
Turkey 1962/63, Paris May 1963, pp. 39-40.) 
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estimates about the agricultural yields are quite reliable whereas 
those concerning the areas sown to various crops suffer from a 
substantial degree of overestimation1• According to the State 
Institute of Statistics the total cultivated area was 24 million 
hectares in 1963. On the other hand, the preliminary tables of 
the 1963 Agricul~xral Census show the cultivated area as 15 million 
hectares. Still another estimate, made by Dr. G. Kazgan of the 
Istanbul University, mentions an area of something between 18 and 
20 million hectares. The overestimation of cultivated area gives 
rise to three important points: (a) 'Ihe national income estimates 
by the S.I.S. are influenced by the overestimation of the 
agricultural income. T.he State Planning Organization has there-
fore been adjusting downward the national income estimates of the 
S.I.S. as from 1958. But Dr. Kazgan' s estii!Ia.te indicates that the 
overestimation begins at an earlier date, particularly as from 1955. 
Moreover, if the 1963 Agricultural census' results are somewhere 
near the truth, the downward adjustments in the S.I.S. estimates 
should be made by a greater degree than made by the S.P.O. 
(b) T.he inequality in the income distribution between the sectors 
is possibly greater than is suggested by the available statistics. 
1. Dr. G{il ten Kazgan, The Agricultural Income and the Land Reform, 
(in Turkish), published in the newspaper Cumhuriyet, 17/VII/1965. 
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(c) The excessive estimation is of the highest degree particularly 
in relation to the area sown under wheat, which is the subsistence 
crop for the major part of the agricultural population. This 
means that the income dist~bution within the agricultural sector 
is in fact worse than is indicated by the estimates based on the 
available figures for cultivated area. 
There is no more surplus land which can be brought under 
cultivation; and, the ploughing of the poor steppe pasture has 
far exceeded safe limits1 • The sown plus fallow area varied arou~d 
13 million hectares during the 1940's but stood at 2~ million in 
1956. B,y 1960 the crop area was 42.% larger than that estimated 
as suitable for cultivation, that is, 16•4 million hectares, by 
2 Harvey Oakes, the U.S. soil management expert • Deprived of the 
possibility of increasing the agricultural production by bringing 
ne\v lands under plough, Turkey has to achieve a st.leady .. · ..~: 
improvement in productivity in agricultural production. T.he 
immense importance of the issue calls for an analysis at some 
length of the factors Y.thich have hindered the improvement of 
productivity in the agricultural sector during 1950's. The low 
productivity of the Turkish agriculture is caused by the factors 
1. U.N. , F .A. 0. , ''Mediterranean Country Report ; , TURKEY~ Rome 19 59, 
mimeographed, p. 1-3. (It is known in Turkey as Baade Report). 
2. Eva and Abraham Hirsch, "Changes in Agricultural Output per 
capita of Rural Population in Turkey", 1927-1960, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, July 1963. 
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which can be classified into two broad groups: structural and 
technical factors. 
Among the structural factors, the first to be considered 
is the adverse effects on productivity of excessive population in 
the agricultural sector. Since the limit was reached in extending 
the crop area, the increase in population, on the one hand, and the 
mechanization of farming, on the other, brought about an excess 
population problem in the agriculture. This excess population 
prevents the productivity from rising by hindering the extensive 
use of new methods and by reducing the size of farm units to an 
uneconomic extent. Furthermore, the population pressure has 
resulted in the cultivation of those lands which should not have 
been cultivated from the economic point of view1 . 
Secondly, the present system of land ownership can also be 
counted on in explaining the low productivity. In Turkey, 
different types of ownership exist in combination. About three 
quarters of the total families in the agricultural sector are 
landowners (Table 10). The most of them are small landowners 
(Table 5), and could not afford the expenses of soil conservation, 
while there is no thought on the part of large landowners of 
1. S.P.O., 1964 Annual Program, p. 39· This point is particu-
larly stressed by E. & A. Hirsch, op. cit. They show that the 
extension of cultivated area at the expense of pastures resulted 
in the overgrazing and, hence, a decrease in the output per animal. 
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enhancing the value of land. Moreover, small landowners have not 
been able to unite by forming co-operatives and syndicates which 
could handle production more productively1 • About 4 per cent of 
the total families work on the land belonging to others. In the 
face of the fact that the sharecropping and tenancy rights have not 
2 been based on precise contracts , the cultivator without securit,y 
of tenure has no incentive to conserve land resources, improve the 
land with long term investments, and raise productivit,y3. 
TA13LE 10 
DISTRIBUTION OF PEASANT FAMILIES BY THE TYPES OF LANDOWNERSHIP • 
Number of families 
.L 
Landowners 1,686,143 72o6 
Semi-landowners 498,838 2lo5 
Tenant f~rs 14°815 Qo6 
Sharecroppers 57•161 2°5 
Labourers 9•734 Oo4 
Miscellaneous 7o984 Oo3 
Livestock breeders 47·716 2ol 
Total 2,322,391 100°0 
Source: Dr o H. Cillov, Economy of Turkey (in Turkish) , p. 172 o 
1. S.P.O., Program for the Year 1962, p. 
2. S.P.O., Development Plan, First Five Year, 1963-67, pol82. 
3o Me"ier & Baldwin, Economic;: pevelopment, John Wiley&Sons,Inc., 
New York 1957. 
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Regarding the technical factors accounting for the low 
productivity we can in the first place count the lack of modern 
technology. Despite the great emphasis put on mechanization of 
the farming by the agricultural development policy in the early 
1950's, plough is still the most widely used tool of farming1 • 
The modernization of agricultural technique in Turkey has been 
understood as the introduction of more and more tractors to the 
/famil~ 
agriculture. In fact, the typical Turkish peasant has orily ten 
to fifteen acres of land, which is far too small to make 
mechanization economically feasible, and, even on larger holdings, 
fragmentation often offers a further deterrent to mechanization2• 
Besides in countries like Turkey, where labour is abundant relative 
to capital, the objective should be to increase output per acre, 
not output per worker3. Investment in machinery to increase 
output per worker must be rather regulated to the availability of 
alternative employment opportunities for the workers displaced by 
the laboUr-saving innovations. To this end, the application of 
improved techniques which are not labour-saving but could raise 
productivity when applied to small-scale operations must have the 
1. Dr. H. Cillov, op.cit., p. 187. 
2. W. H. Nicholls, Investment in Agriculture in Underdeveloped 
Countries, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
May 1955, p. 
3. Meier & Baldwin, op.cit., p. 376. 
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priority over the capital-intensive mechanization. On the contrary, 
in Turkey, in the regions having the greatest numbers of relatively 
large farms, machinery investment per acre approximated that of 
medium to large commercial .farms in the United States, where 
capital is relatively much more abundant and where machinery and 
fuel do not require foreign exchange1 • 
The introduction of increasing amounts of tractors to the 
farming may, if not on the productivity ground, be justified, if 
it becomes an independent factor in increasing the total cultivated 
land. However, even this possible positive effect of mechaniza-
tion was counteracted in Turkey by three facts: First, .the 
expansion of cultivated area saon reached the marginal land. 
Secondly, the displaced tenants and sharecroppers2 had to take land 
of poor quality because of lack of any other and of the absence of 
better empla,yment opportunities. Finally, it destroyed part of 
the communal pastures and contributed to the decline in the output 
of animal products. 
Apart from lack of modern farming equipment and unbalanced 
mechanization, ·the unsatisfactory condition of irrigation facilities 
1. W. H. Nicholls, op.cit., p. 
2. According to Prof. Brandon the one-third of the land brought 
under cultivation by tractors during 1948-52 was previously 
cultivated land. See: W. H. Nicholls, op.cit., p. 
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and inadequate use of fertilizers must also be counted among the 
technical reasons for the present low productivity of the Turkish 
agriculture. Approximately two-thirds of the Turkish territory 
is sub-arid. There are wide variations in rainfall from one year 
to another, and drought is a constant threat1 • Under these 
conditions the development of irrigation facilities appears as a 
substantial problem. But, today, most of the cereal production 
is carried out without irrigation. However, the problem facing 
Turkey at present is not the lack of primary irrigation facilities, 
but how to benefit most from an unbalanced irrigation development 
which took place during 1950's. In 1957 the area under irrigation 
lagged about 54,000 hectares behind the area commanded in the 
Department of Hydraulic Works projects. It is therefore necessary 
to increase investment in the facilities such as land levelling and 
drainage for assuring that lands are actually irrigated2• 
·The amount of fertilizers used in the Turkish agriculture 
is very low. There are many reasons for it. 
fertilizers are mostly used for other purposes. 
First, natural 
Secondly, the 
prices of artificial fertilizers are high compared to crop prices. 
Thirdly, the necessary technical knowledge and personnel are not 
available to carry out an extensive programme for increasing use 
of fertilizers. 
1. U.N., F.A.O., op.cit., p~ 
2. F.A.O., op.cit., p. 
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B. INDUSTRY: With agriculture growing at a slower rate 
than G.N.P., the share of all the non-agricultural sectors in 
G.N.P. obviously increased. 
TABLE 11 
CONTRIBUTION OF NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS AND OF INDUSTRY TO 
N.N.P. IN 1959-62 AND CHANGE FROM 1950-53· 
(percentage of aggregate product) 
Sectors 1950-53 1959-62 
All Non-agricultural 50·0 58•1 
Industry1 15·5 17~3 
Other Non-agricultural 34•5 40•8 
1. Industry = Manufacturing + mining. 
Source: Table 6. 
Change 
+ 8•1 
+ 1·8 
+ 6·3 
It is seen from Table 11 that as the share of agricultural 
production in N.N.P. diminished from 50•0 per cent, on average, in 
1950/53 to 41•9 per cent in 1959/62, the contribution of industry 
and other non-agricultural sectors went up b,y 8•1 per cent in that 
period. Table 11 also demonstrates that non-agricUltural pursuits 
other than industry increased their shares b,y 6•3 per cent against 
a small increase of 1•8 per cent in industry. N9n-agricultural 
sectors other than industry comprise small-scale and unorganized 
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units in trading, transport, construction, and services exceptions 
are a few large-scale State enterprises in·public services and the 
government employment of civil servants. So long as labour supply 
remains abundant and capital scarce, a shift from agriculture is 
likely to move into these activities because of high employment 
potentials and low capital requirements there. In fact, economic 
development in Japan and Latin American countries has been 
accompanied by a shift from agriculture, first, to these sectors, 
and, then, to industry. Even though productivity in these sectors 
may be lower than in industry, they have no doubt helped greatly to 
contain the social unrest that might have developed if large-scale 
unemployment instead of the underemployment today prevailingc had 
occurred, as a result of the failure of industry to absorb.all the 
new labour force plus the overflow from agriculture. Actually, 
over the past decade, the services sector has shown the highest rate 
of absorption of the new labour force with 5•6 per cent per annum 
as against 5 per cent in industry and 3"9 per cent in agriculture1 . 
Although industry has not increased its share in G.N.P. 
significantly, it has obviously attained a considerable increase in 
its total output. There is no industrial production index covering 
1. O.E.C.D., "Turkey, Economic Surveys by the O.E.C.D., 196311 , 
Paris 1963, pp. 9-10. 
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the country's entire production1, but according to national income 
estimates, industrial production -- including mining but excluding 
construction -- almost doubled in real terms in the course of the 
period 1950-1962 (see Table 12 and Diagram 3). The average rate 
of increase in that period was 5•7 per cent per annum, which is 
higher than 3"5 per cent and 5•1 per cent rates attained by 
agriculture and the total output, respectively. 
TABLE 12 
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
(At 1961 prices) 
Years Index 
1950 100·0 
1951 108·4 
1952 117·4 
1953 129·3 
1954 135·5 
1955 140•9 
1956 150·0 
1957 161·0 
1958 172•2 
1959 180•8 
1960 180•3 
1961 178·~ 
1962 193•0 
Source: Table 6 
1950 = 100 
Changes over 
previous year ( % ) 
8·4 
8·3 
10·1 
4-7 
4·2 
6·5 
7•2 
7•0 
5"0 
- 0•2 
- 1•.1 
8·2 
1. Ministry of Commerce and c.s.o. publish industrial production 
indices covering partial production. 
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The expansion of industrial production. attained the 
greatest rate in the early fifties. Its average rate of growth 
in 1950-53 was 9 per cent per annum against a rate of 5•9 per 
cent in 1954-58 and only 2•9 per cent in 1959-62. Comparing 
industry with agriculture, the first sub-period witnessed a 
greater increase in the agricultural production, while the 
industrial sector's performance was better in the other two sub-
periods. 
Available employment statistics cover only the insured 
workers, who comprise little more than one-quarter of the total 
employed outside agriculture. Moreover, changes in the basis of 
these statistics make any clear conclusions difficult. \17e, there-
fore, have to content ourselves with some round figures with regard 
to such issues as employment and productivity in industry. About 
10 per cent of the active population are employed in industry 
(mining, manufacturing, public utilities and construction) (see 
P· 5) • Of these, 850,000 persons are engaged in manufacturing. 
Employment in industry has been growing over the last decade at 
an annual rate of 5 per cent, whilst output was increasing 
1 7•5 - 8 per cent per annum • From this we can deduce that 
productivity per worker in industry has been increasing over the 
1. O.E.C.D., op.cit., p. 10. 
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last decade. Assuming that employment in the industry defined 
as manufacturing plus mining has also grown at an average rate o:f 
5 per cent per annum, productivity per worker appears to be about 
10 per cent higher in 1960 than in 1950 according to the index of 
industrial production in Table 12. In view of the scarcity of 
capital in Turkey, changes in productivity per unit of capital in 
industry may be considered a better indicator of economic progress. 
The lack of data about the distribution of capital formation 
amongst various productive sectors, unfortunately, deprives us of 
such an indicator. 
The performance of the industrial sector has undoubtedly 
been hindered by such structural factors as the dominance of small-
scale production, the lack of diversification of production, and 
the absence of an active enterpreneurial class. 
The industrial production outside the public sector is 
dominated by small enterprises using primitive techniques. 
550,000 persons out of a total of 850,000 persons, who are engaged 
in manUfacturing (both public and private), work in establishments 
employj.ng less than 10 people. But the value added to the 
national income by the workshops employing less than ten workers 
is only as large as that created by the private enterprises 
employing ten or more workers. This situation is one of the main 
causes of the prevalence of low productivit.y and high production 
costs. 
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The d~velopment ·of production of a range of simple consumer 
goods has been a feature of recent years. The establishment of 
plants engaging in the assembly of imported parts has also been 
an attractive field of investment, particularly for foreign private 
capital. The production of intermediate and capital goods has been 
relatively a small portion of the total industrial production. 
In 1962, two-thirds of the total value of production in manufactur-
ing industry were created in enterprises engaged in the production 
of foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco and textiles. The production 
of metallic products (including basic metal products) , machinery, 
transport equipment, electrical machinery and agricultural equipment 
1 
altogether amounted to only about 12 percent of the total produc-
tion of the manufacturing industry. The lack of an adequate diver~.:::·~·: 
sifacation of the industrial production renders the Turkish economy 
particularly the industrial sector, vulnerable to the balance of 
payments difficulties. The deve~opment of bottlenecks is therefore 
a constant threat to the industrial production. 
Enterprises in the private sector, even including corpora-
tiona, are mostly family concerns. The management is held within 
the family, with a consequence· that ownership and the functions of 
1. Calculated from Table 36 of the 1964 Annual Programme. 
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administration become inseparable. Pri~ate enterpreneurs are also 
reluctant to admit capital from outside their families. 
The absence of an active enterpreneurialclass and of an 
adequate pooling of private capital necessitated the government's 
participation in production as from the early thirties. At 
present, about 40% of total industrial production is supplied b,y 
the State Economic Enterprises (S.E.E.~. T.he group of the S.E.E. 
also includes important public utilities and various financial 
institutions. More than 60% of financial services, such as 
banking, insurance, etc., are carried out by official institutions. 
During the 1950's, an important expansion took place in the 
productive capacity of the S.E.E., but this was accompanied by an 
economic and financial disorder because of interferences with price, 
output and personnel policies of the enterprises by the political 
authorities. 
;. Product Allocation and Consumption Level: 
An important result of economic development, as well as 
being a contributing factor to it, is the change in the allocation 
of resources between consumption and investment. There are no 
reliable figures showing the allocation of the-Turkish national 
income between consumption and investment expenditures. The 
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Turkish National Income is estimated only from the production 
side. The State Institute of Statistics has recently published 
its estimates of National Expenditure for the period 1950-1963. 
But we avoid using these estimates here because neither their 
G.N .E. figures nor the comprising items of them correspond!;,; to 
the data supplied by the S.P.O. which are used throughout this 
1 
essay • The S.P.O. gave in the Interim Programme for the Year 
1962 its own estimates of National Expenditure during 1959-19622• 
However, the 1961 figures in the S.P.O. estimates are provisional 
and the 1962 figures are the programmed figures. As regards the 
1959 and 1960 figures of the S.P.O. estimates, there are some 
contradictions between them and the data given in the later 
publications of the S.P.O. Therefore, an attempt is made in 
Table 13 to estimate National Ex:pendi ture on the basis of data 
made, either directly or indirectly, available by the S.P.O. (see 
Note on Table 13). 
1. The presence of an overestimation of agricultural income in 
the S.I.S. National Income Statistics has already been 
revealed in Pages 28-30. 
2. S.P.O., Programme for the year 1962, Ankara 1961, mimeographed, 
p. 34b. 
TABLE 13 
GROSS NATIONAL EXPENDITURES, 1950-1962. 
(Million T.L. at current prices) 
I I INVESTMENT CONSTJMPIIION 
G.N.P. + X - M = G.N.E. = Total Private Public Total Public Private 
1950 10,384 140 10,524 1,000 673 327 9,524 1,785 1,139 
1951 12,270 263 12,533 1,260 772 488 11,273 1,928 9,345 
1952 14,320 554 14,874 1,836 1,088 748 13,038 2,404 10,634 
1953 16,821 460 17,281 2,088 1,077 1,011 15,193 2,163 13,030 
1954 17,114 499 17,613 2,518 1,462 1,056 15,095 2,337 12,758 t 
1955 21,060 503 21,563 3,007 1,518 1,489 18,556 2,954 15,602 
1956 24,334 217 24,551 3,260 1,423 1,837 21,291 3,152 18,139 
1957 30,528 224 30,752 4,017 1,718 2,299 26,735 3,403 .23,332 
1958 36,108 349 36,457 5,042 2,005 3,037 31 '415 4,187 27,228 ' 
1959 44,703 1,356 46,059 6,989 3,446 3,543 40,070 5,712 34,358 
1960 48,963 1,224 50,187 7,779 3,749 4,030 42,408 6,153 36,255 
1961 49,081 1,575 50,656 7,368 3,305 4,063 43,288 6,370 36,918 
1962 55,248 2,178 57,426 8,096 3,860 4,236 49,330 6,751 42,579 
1950-2 100 2•59 102·59 11·08 6-87 4•21 91•51 16•54 74·97 
I 
1960-2 100 3•25 103·25 .15•17 
I 
7•12 8•05 88•08 12·57 75· 51 1 
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Note on Table 13: 
The G.N.P. figures for 1950-1960 have been taken 
from S.P.O., Development Plan 1963-1967, p. 13; for 
1961 and 1962 from O.E.C.D., Turkey 1963/64, Paris, 
August 1964, P• 43· 
The figures for Net Exports of goods and services 
for 1950-1960 h8ve been taken from K. Kurda~, "Basic 
Factors Impeding a Rapid Growth of the Turkish Economy", 
in the Capital Formation and •.••• , op.cit., p. 36, 
Table 1. They had been estimated on the basis of the 
official rate of exchange and by taking into considera-
tion actual devaluations such as the Treasury Tax at 
this rate. T.he figures for the 1961 and"l962 Current 
Account Deficits have been taken from the O.E.C.D. 
Turkey 1963/64, p. 24; and Turkey 1965/66, p. 22. 
T.he official rate of exchange was TL.-2·80 until 1959 
and TL. 9 • 00 thereafter to the U.S. ·dollar. 
The Gross National Expenditure figures have been 
found by a.dding the Current Account Deficit figures to 
the G.N.P. figures. 
The Total Investment Figures for 1950-1960 have 
been taken from S.P.O., Development Plan, p. 15; for 
the d.iv-~::;·sion of the total investment between Public 
and Private Sectors, ~tt. Kurda~'s data were used. 
Mr. Kurda~ arrives at the private sec.tor' s investment 
figures by subtracting the public investment from the 
total investment. His ·public investment figures cover 
the whole public sector's investments, excluding those 
of the enterprises in which the State's share is lese 
than 51% of the capital. T.he 1961 investment figures 
have been taken from the O.E.C.D., Turkey 1962/63, p. 38, 
and the 1962 figures from the O.E.C.D., Turkey 1962/63, 
p. 38 and Turkey 1965/66, p. 34· · 
Total consumption figures are the residuals of 
G.N.E.'s minus Investment. 
T.he current expenditures of the Public Sector, 
excluding Local Authorities, for 1950-1960 are given in 
the S.P.O., Development Plan, p. 17. According to the 
data given in the S.P.O., Programme for the Year 1962, 
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Note on Table 13 (contd.): 
p. 346, and The Progress Report on the Implementation 
of the 1963 Annual Programme, p. 32, the current 
expenditures of Local Authorities are about l/7th of 
the total public current expenditure. Assuming that 
the same relationship held good during 1950's as well, 
we could estimate the total current expenditures for 
the public sector as a whole for 1950-1960. The 1961 
and 1962 current expenditure figures have been taken 
from S.P.O., The Progress Report, ibid, p. 32. 
The figures for private consumption are found 
as residuals. 
Mr. Kurda~ expresses that the data in his 
Table 1 have been compiled by the S.P.O., The O.E.C.D.'s 
above-mentioned Reports about Turkey also make use of the 
statistics submitted by the s.~.o. 
As seen from Table 13, the share of consumption expenditures 
in G.N.P. fell from 91•51% in 1950/52 to 88•08% in 1960/62, dropping 
by 3•43% of G.N.P. No part of this fall, however, has been 
allotted to the improvement of the external balance. On the 
contrary, the Table shows that the share of foreign sources in the 
total resources rose by 0•66% of G.N.P. between 1950/52 and 
1960/62. The drop in the share of consumption together with the 
_increase in the foreign resources accounted for the increasing of 
the share of total investment from 11·0~ of G.N.P. in 1950/52 to 
15"17% in 1960/62. 
The arithmetic mean of the share of investment in G.N.P. 
in 1950/52 and 1960/62, that is, 13•1% of G.N.P., could be regarded 
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as a rough estimate of the average rate of gross capital formation 
during the 1950-1962 period. Relating this to the average rate of 
growth of G.N.P. in the same period, that is, 4·~ p.a. as calculated 
from Table 7, gives us an incremental capital-output ratio of 2·79. 
Apart from its changing share, the investment expenditure has 
undergone a significant change also in its composition. While the 
private sector provided a larger proportion of total investment in 
the beginning of the period, the Government's share has become larger 
towards the end of the period. The share of the private sector's 
investments seems to have almost stagnated around ~ of G.N.P. 
whereas the Government's share has almost doubled by rising from 
4·21% in 1950/52 to 8·0~ in 1960/62. 
Despite the increase in the share of public investment, the 
proportion of total resources used by the public sector did not 
change in terms of the percentage of G.N.P., remaining at about 2~. 
in 1960/62 as it was in 1950/52. This means a decline in the share 
of public current expenditure in G.N.P. from 1950/52 to 1960/62 has 
taken place. It does not of course follow from this that the 
absolute level of public current expenditUre has not increased. 
Actually, it has, in money terms, increased at an average rate of 
11·~ p.a. during 1950-1962. However, if allowance is made for a 
~ p.a. increase in prices, it is hardly likely that the increase in 
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public current expenditure in real terms has kept pace with a 
of population growthi\close to :1/o p.a. The political and economic 
difficulties encountered in raising the share of public revenue in 
G.N.P., together with the Government policy of investment drive, 
have certainly been the main factors limiting the growth of the 
share of public current expenditure. 
Judging from the constancy in the share of the public 
sector in G.N.P. as indicated above, it~ be estimated that the 
total real expenditure of Public Sector has increased at about the 
same rate with the real G.N.P., that is, 4·~ p.a. during 1950/52-
1960/62. This reveals the fact that the per capita Government 
spending1 has risen somewhat during the fifties, since the rate of 
population growth was about 2·~ p.a. 
The part of G.N.P. left to the private sector increased 
slightly from 81•84% in 1950/52 to 82·6:1/o in 1960/62. This increase 
was made possible by the increasing share of foreign sources in total 
resources as well as a slight decline in the share of the ~ublic 
sector. Of the increase in the share of the private sector, some-
thing less than l/3rd was devoted to increasing the share __ of private 
1. The likelihood is that the rate of growth of Government expenditure 
as a whole is likely to be faster than that of population. (A. R. 
Prest, Public Finance in Underdeveloped Countries, London 1962, 
P• 15.). 
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investments while the rest was used for raising the share of 
private consumption in G.N.P. 
The higher share of private consumption in 1960/62 than 
in 1950/52 reflects the fact that private consumption expenditures 
have grown at a greater pace than G.N.P. Actually the rate of 
growth of G.N.P. in money terms was on average 15·1% p.a. during 
1950/52 - 1960/62 whereas that of consumption was 15·~ p.a. in the 
same period. This appears disappointing in view of the fact that 
the Turkish economy ha~ to base its first Development Plan, which 
requires an immense saving effort from public, on such a record of 
high consumption propensity in the period immediately preceding the 
plan. If one allows for changes in the cost of living and in 
population, it can be estimated that per capita real consumption, 
excluding such collective consumption expenditures made by the 
Government as education, health, etc., rose from TL.430 , in 
1950/52 to TL.528 ' in 1960/62, increasing by 2•1% p.a. as 
compared with a rate of growth of 1·~ p.a. in per capita G.N.P. 1 • 
1. The cost of living deflator used here is calculated from Table 8 
as 103 for 1950/52 and 264 for 1960/62. The population. 
is calculated from Table 9 as 21,472,000 for 1950/52 and 
28,503,000 for 1960/62. The G.N.P. figures are from Table 6. 
The rate of growth of per capita G.N.P. and that of per capita 
consumption, however, is not strictly comparable; ~ we would 
have had a more accurate comparison had we had the estimate of 
the G.N.E. at constant prices as well. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN 
In Chapter 1 the social characteristics and economic 
development in the recent past of Turkey have been reviewed with 
a view to preparing the background for a study of the method of 
financing of the "First Five-Year Development Plan, 1963-1967"· 
The background information will be completed with this Chapter 
by setting out the targets envisaged by the Plan. (The resource 
requirements of the Plan 'Will not be dealt with in the present 
Chapter since the discussion of that will occupy us throughout 
the remaining part of my dissertation. In the next Chapter, 
however, when we study the cumulative nature of the Plan within 
the Financing Strategy, we shall have an opportunity to observe 
the specifications of the Plan with regard to the resource 
requirements). In the first section we shall have a look at the 
objectives of the long-ter.m plan. In Section II, the objectives 
of the First Five-Year Plan will be viewed, the emphasis being 
put on the conflict between them and on the extent to which they 
have hitherto been fulfilled. 
- 51 -
I 
OBJH!CTIVES OF THE PERSPEC'l'IVE PLAN 
The objectives of the First Five-Year Plan have been 
determined within the context of the objectives of a Fifteen-Year 
Perspective Plan. It is therefore illuminating to outline the 
objectives of the Perspective Plan before we discuss those of 
the First Five-Year Plan. 
The basic long-term objectives are to attain the highest 
possible level of employment at satisfactory income levels, to 
achieve balance in external payments, and to establish social 
justice. 
The G.N.P. is expected to increase by 175 per cent in 
1977 above its 1962 level, growing at an annual compound';'r~te of:·7: 
percent. But a population growth of 3 per cent per annum, which is 
assumed to prevail during that period, will allow an increase only 
by 78 per cent in per capita gross income. This increase in total 
production will be accompanied by a change in the structure of 
production. The share of agricultural production in G.N.P. will 
go down from around 44 per cent in 1962 to about 30 per cent in 
1977. This will also be reflected in the changing distribution 
of active population among the sectors, agriculture's share falling 
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from 77 per cent in 1962 to 58 per cent in 1977. 
Even an expansion of that scale of production will not 
suffice to provide employment for the new labour force plus the 
existing unemployed and underemployed. It is estimated that, 
during the Perspective Plan period, 6·8 mill~on new jobs will 
be available while the amount of new workers seeking employment 
will amount to 7·5 million. 
Achievement of an egalitarian distribution of income is 
one of the major objectives. In this connection, the needs of 
the masses have guided the distribution of both investments and 
public current expenditures. The stress has been laid on 
distributing the burden of development more equitably. An 
extensive system of social security has also been proposed to 
contribute to the establishment of social justice. 
Financing of the realization of these targets would not 
be possible only from domestic sources. External resources are 
therefore expected to continue accommodating the savings gap until 
the end of the second five-year plan in 1973. It is planned that 
the external deficit of an order of 4 per cent. of G.N.P. in 1962 
will gradually diminish and the economy will attain a self-
sustained character by 1973. 
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We are thus confronted with a multiplicity of objectives. 
This is, however, a common feature of all social and economic 
problems, distinguishing them from technical problems. It is 
the search for a balance between limited means and various ends 
that gives rise to an economic problem. Where there is a 
multiplicity of ends, various ends~ not be harmonious but may 
be in conflict with each other. This is indeed the case faced 
by the planners in every country. In the case of Turkey, the 
above-mentioned objectives -- to secure a 7 per cent. rate of 
growth against a rate of 4•7 per cent: realized in the last 
decade, to achieve external balance,to approach the full-
employment and to secure an egalitarian distribution of income.--
are clearly in conflict with each other, particularly in the short-
run. To achieve more of one end ~ be possible only at the 
expense of achieving less of another end. A rapid growth, for 
example, will be easier to achieve if concentration in some 
industrial sectors and in already developed regions is permitted. 
To get out of this dilemma the Turkish planners have 
rightly decided to sacrifice relatively in all objectives but a 
1. This is the average rate of growth achieved during the period 
1950/52 - 1960/62 which represents better the trend of the 
growth of G.N.P. during the last decade than the rate of 
5•1% belonging to the period 1950 - 1962. 
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7 per cent. rate of growth of G.N.P. in the First Five-Year Plan 
period. Let us now consider the implications, conflicts and the 
degree of fulfillment attained of the objectives of the First 
Five-Year Plan. 
II 
OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
The main objectives of the Plan can be stated under four 
headings in parallel to those of the Perspective Plan. 
1. To Secure a 7 per cent. Rate of Growth:-
The central objective is to attain a 40 per cent. growth 
of G.N.P. in the end of the first five-year. On average, this 
means a 7 per cent. year-to-year increase in G.N.P. This rate 
has been considered by the planners as the necessar.y rate of 
growth for the follovring reasons: (a) Assuming that the population 
would grow ~ annually during the Plan period, the ~ growth rate 
would enable Turkey to increase its per capita income by ~bout 4% 
annually. This would allow Turkey to narrow the gap between her 
per capita income and that in the O.E.C.D. countries which aim at 
increasing their per capita incomes by ~per annum during the 
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1 1960's • (b) A lower rate of growth would render the problem of 
unemployment insoluble in the near future2• An international 
comparison may also show that the Turkish target rate of growth 
of G.N.P. is not very high: Israel aimed at 9·~ in her 1962 -
1966 Plan, Japan at 7·~ during 1958 - 1970, Yugoslavia at 
11·~ during 1962-65, Egypt at 6·~ during 1961 - 1966. However, 
whether a 7% target rate of growth is too high or not can better 
be considered in relation to the performance of the economy in 
the recent past. As already seen, the Turkish economy grew at 
an average rate of 4•7% p.a., during the period 1950/52- 1960/62. 
But if the actual year-to-year changes are observed from Table 7, 
it can be seen that the years with a growth rate, say, above &fo 
are not exceptional but account for more than half of the thirteen 
years period of 1950 - 1962. The conspicuous element behind the 
high growth rates, however, was always the effect of a good harvest. 
Since a favourable projection of good harvests for the whole Plan 
period could not be a basis for the choice of a 7% target rate, 
the decision must have been based on more feasible assumptions. 
Actually the determinants of a 7% target rate of growth 
have been the estimates that the incremental capital-output ratio 
1. O.E.C.D., Turkey 196~/64, p.12 
2. See page 64-68. 
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would on average be 2·6 during the Plan period and that an 18,% 
of G.N.P. would on average be invested annually in that period. 
Although in Chapter 1 the incremental capital-output ratio for 
the period 1950/52 - 1960/62 was roughly calculated as 2·8, the 
estimate of an average capital-output ratio of 2•6 seems to be of 
the right order in view of the presence of underemployed and idle 
resources by the beginning of the Plan period1 • As regards the 
investment ratio, the planned average rate of investment, that is, 
18·~ of G.N.P. per annum, rising from 17,% of G.N.P. in 1963 to 
19·~~ in 1967, seems to be quite high as compared with thel3•1% 
attained in 1950/52 - 1960/62. But it must be remembered that 
the investment/income ratio alrea~ exceeded 1~ of G.N.P. in the 
immediate pre-plan years. In this connection, one can also argue 
that the economic planning is not merely a process of extrapola-
ting the prevailing trends, but is to be utilized for effecting 
changes in the trends of the strategic aggregates in the economy. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the postulated investment/income 
ratio should not be beyond the possibility of the economy's 
mobilizing the adequate resources. The Plan has not actually 
1. See Chapter 3, page 80-81 
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seen it possible to raise all the required resources from 
domestic sources1• 
The growth of G.N.P. is planned to be accompanied by a 
change in the structure of production. The share of the 
agricultural sector in G.N.P. is estimated to decline from 
43·~ in 1962 to 38·~ in 1967. On the other hand, the share 
of the industrial sector will rise from 16·~ in 1962 to 21•4% 
in 1967. The extent of the proposed structural change appears 
to be considerable when it is compared with the corresponding 
change in the last decade or so. The Plan envisages a fall of 
12·~ in the share of agriculture during the Plan period as 
against a 16% drop during a period of about ten years in 
1950/53 - 1959/62 and a 27·4% increase in the share of industry 
during the first five-year Development Plan against a 11·6% 
increase in the 1950/53- 1959/62 period2• It is envisaged in 
the Plan that the agricultural sector would grow at an average 
rate of 4·~ p.a. and industry at 1~ p.a. It has been shown 
in Chapter 1 (pp. 2.5 and38 ) that agriculture and industry have 
grown at the rates of 3·~ p.a. and 5·1.% p.a., respectively, 
during 1950 - 1962. It is thus seen that the target rate 
1. The specifications of the Plan with respect to the financing 
is examined in detail in Chapter 3. 
2. The ratios for the period 1950/53 - 1959/62 are based on 
Table 6 in Chapter 1. 
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of growth for industry has been set very high in comparison with that 
attained in the pre-Plan period whereas that for agriculture has been 
set at a relatively low rate. 
How far has the objective of a 1.% rate of growth of G.N.P. 
hitherto been fulfilled ? Table 14 provides a bird's-eye view of 
the fulfilment of the main objective of the Plan, that is, 1.% growth 
per annum of G.N.P., together with the changes in its composition. 
During the first four years of the Plan period, including the 
preliminary year of 1962, the average rate of growth of G.N.P. has 
been 5·~ p.a. Only in 1963 the target was attained, even exceeded. 
The second best year was 1962, with a growth rate of 6•1%. It was 
however very good harvests that made it possible to achieve high 
growth rates in 1962 and 1963. The agricultural production has 
stagnated at its 1963 level during 1964 and 1965. For the whole 
period of 1961-65, the average rate of growth of·the agricultural 
production is 3·~ p.a., which is not too much below the target rate 
of 4·~. However, if the relatively important share of agriculture 
in G.N.P. is taken into account, the shortfall becomes significant. 
The industrial sector has been growing at a much higher rate than in 
the pre-Plan decade -- 7·~ versus 5·1.% -- and has been steadily 
stepping up its growth rate. But the shortfall between the realized 
and target growth rates of industry is· considerable and has been 
TABLE 14 
RATES OF GROWTH OF GoNoPo AND CHANGES IN ITS STRUC~VRE, l96l-65o 
(at 1961 prices) 
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Agriculture 7°3 40°6 18°2 40o6 5•6 19·6 40•5 7"4 19•6 39•1 -0·2 19•8 37•4 l 3•4 
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Income 42•5 100•0 45•0 100•0 5•9 48•4 100·0 7•5 50•4 100·0 4•1 52•9 100•0 5 5·5 
G.N.P. 49·1 - 52·1 - 6ol 56·0 - 7·5 58o4 - 4·3 61·5 - 5·3 5·8 
Sources: The figures for 1961-1964 inclusive are from S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 
Annual Programme, (First Draft), mimeographed, p. 43, Tables land 2. 
The 1965 growth rates have been taken from O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, . 
p. 6, Table l, and other data have been caculated by applying these rates 
to the 1964 figures. The target figures are from S.P.O., Development 
Plan, p. 136. 
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responsible for a good part of the failure of G.N •. P. to attain the 
7% target rate of growth. 
2. To Reduce the Balance of Payments Deficit:-
Turkey entered the Plan period suffering from a chronic 
external deficit, which averaged 1,300 million TL or 2·~ of the 
G.N.P. in 1959 - 1961. With the reactivation of the econo~ in 
1962 it rose to 2,100 million TL (about ~of G.N.P.). According 
to the Plan, it should reach 4·1% of G.N.P. in 1964 and then decline 
to 2·~ of G.N.P. by 1967. 
The foreign assistance to underdeveloped countries has a 
two-sided effect for the aid-receiving country: it supplements 
domestic resources and contributes to foreign exchange balances. 
In the case of Turkey, in which the demand for her exports of primary 
commodities is not very elastic and considerable efforts will be 
needed to develop significant amounts of new exports, the contribu-
tion of foreign aid to exchange reserves is more important than to 
total investment resources. In other words, the target rate of 
growth in Turkey would have to be reduced by considerably more than 
the share of aid in the total investment, i.e., 1~ on average during 
the Plan period, if aid were eliminated, since the productivity of 
domestic investment would then be considerably less. 
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The fulfilment of the second objective in the early years 
of the Plan implementation can be seen from Table 15. In the 
transitional year 1962, the deficit on the balance of current 
acc01mts reached 4•4% of G.N.P., exceeding the target by 0·4% of 
G.N.P. A divergence of the same order from the target took place 
in 1963, i.e., an actual deficit of 4·~ against a planned deficit 
of · · 
·4•1% of G.N.P. The main 
TABLE 15 
PLANNED .Alli1) ACTUAL DEFICIT ON THE BALANCE OF 
CURRENT ACCOUNT, 1962 - 1964. 
1962 1963 
Plan Actual Plan Actual 
Imports (c.i.f.) 560 622 567 687 
Exports (f.o.b.) 325 381 348 368 
Balance of Trade 
-235 -241 -219 -319 
Invisible Items (net) - 78 - 41 - 79 - 9 
Infra-a true ture and 
Off-shore* 45 40 47 49 
Balance of Current 
Account -268 -242 -251 -279 
Deficit/G.N.P. (%) 4·0 4•4 4·1 4·5 
¢ million 
1964 
Plan Actual 
627 542 
374 411 
-253 -131 
- 69 - 45 
49 40 
-273 -136 
4•1 2·3 
* This is the official label used for the foreign currency 
earnings from the establishments and activities of N.A.T.O. 
in Turkey. 
Sources: S.P.O., "Development Plan, 1963-1967", and Annual 
Programme for 1963, 1964 and 1965. 
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reason of the divergencies from the targets both in 1962. and 1963 
lies in the fact that the actual imports exceeded considerably the 
estimates in those years. 
With reactivation of the economy, the value of "normal" 
imports i.e. excluding U.S. surplus commodities -- increased 
sharply in 1962. Imports of capital goods rose considerably, but 
the largest increase was in raw materials. The strong measures 
taken progressively since the beginning of 1963 to curb imports 
started showing their effects in the second half of 1963. Contrary 
to imports, exports in both 1962 and 1963 exceeded the forecasts in 
the Plan. They reached an exceptionally high level in 1962, but 
dropped slightly in 1963. The decline was smaller than that fore-
seen in the Plan, largely because of higher prices obtained for 
tobacco and of satisfactory cotton exports. 
Since additional measures were taken in 1964 to curb imports 
more and since neither the increase of industrial production nor the 
volume of investment attained the forecasts of the Plan, the imports 
in 1964 stood at well below the level foreseen in the Plan. On the 
other hand, the steps taken in 1963 to encourage the growth of exports 
and the bumper tobacco crop of 1963 were reflected in export earnings 
of 1964, making these earnings reach a record level at ~411 million. 
The relatively small volume of the deficit in 1964 (2•3 per cent of 
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G.N.P.) was therefore due to the factors of a temporary character 
rather than to the favourable changes in the structure of the 
foreign trade of Turkey. As a matter of fact, given the present 
small share of manufactures in Turkish exports - in 1963, "indus-
trial products" accounted for 2o% of total exports, the more 
important items of this group being petroleum products, copper and 
food items -- it is unlikely that a:rzy increase in this group's 
share will have a large total effect in the next few years before 
the end of the Plan period. Thus, an expansion in exports in the 
rest of the period will require improvements in agricultural 
productivity and in the corresponding processing and marketing 
facilities. As regards the trend of imports in the coming years 
of the First Five-Year Plan, it must be pointed out that the bulk 
of imports now represents essential commodities. To achieve still 
some more reductions in imports through the import-substituting 
projects depends'· on the speed of new productive investment; but 
this, in tur.n, will necessitate a heavy dependence on the imports 
of capital equipment in the rest of the Plan period. 
Apart from the formidable difficulties in improving the 
balance of current accounts, the accommodation of its deficit is 
also made more difficult by the rep~ents of foreign debt falling 
due in the Plan period. The servicing of the external debt, 
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excluding interest payments which are included in the "Invisible 
Items (Net)" in Table 15, have followed a trend rising·from 
~97 million in 1962 to ~114 million in 1963 and to ~140 million 
(34% of the total export earnings) in 1964, a trend which is most 
likely to continue rising in the coming years as we111 • In view 
of the foregoing facts, it seems rather safe to assume that even 
the maintenance of the external deficit at its level in the 
beginning of the period will be difficult,'not to mention the 
reduction foreseen in the Plan. 
3. To Secure a Progressive Reduction of Unemployment:-
The planned rate of growth of G.N.P. and the change in the 
structure of production which is expected to take place over the 
future will not be sufficient to solve the employment problem of 
the Turkish econo~ even by the end of the Fifteen Year Perspective 
Plan. The unemployment in Turkey as in all underdeveloped countries 
is a structural problem, arising mainly from the shortage of capital 
in indus try. Recognizing this, the Turkish planners have given 
priority to projects tending to create employment and to the explora-
tion of the intensive application of labour-using and capital-saving 
1. O.E.C.D., "Economic Surveys, Turkey, 196411 , Paris, August 1964, 
pp. 35 and 40. 
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technology in agriculture, construction and handicrafts1 • More 
labour-intensive but less efficient methods of production can, 
however, increase employment ted~ at the expense of producing less 
surplus which provides investible funds for more output and employ-
ment tomorrow. The First Five-Year Plan, considering the conflict 
between "maximum output" and "maximum employment" in the short-run, 
has rightly aimed at the reduction of unemployment so far as it does 
not hinder the achievement of a 7 per cent. growth of G.N.P. per annum. 
Structural condi tiona in Turkey, which have been explained 
in Chapter 1, necessitates the creation of employment in non-
agricultural sectors if the problem of unemployment· is to be solved; 
but this, in turn, under the present structure of production, requires 
a heavy dependence on imported capital goods and raw materials. Thus 
once more there is a conflict between the objectives of the Plan; this 
time between the second and the third objectives. 
Lack of statistical data on employment, which has alrea~ 
been pointed out in Chapter 1, makes difficult the observation of the 
actual developments in the state of employment. The S.P.O. estimated 
the total labour force in the three major sectors in 1961 according to 
the information from the 1955 census concerning the active population 
1. S.P.O., 1964 Annual Program, p. ,o. 
- 66 -
of 15 years of age and above, and from the 1 per cent. sample results 
of the 1960 census. From this estimation the S.P.O. arrived at the 
labour force projections by major sectors for the Plan period, which 
are shown in Table 16~, It is estimated that the opening up of new 
employments would not be on a scale sufficient to absorb all the 
increases in the labour force, though the numbers of those unemployed 
would decline from 1•5 million in 1962 to 1•18 million -in 1964. 
As the industrial production in 1962-64 failed to expand as 
much as anticipated by the Plan and as it is unlikely that real wages 
fell in those years1 , it seems quite safe to assume that the actual 
figures for industry in 1962-1964 remained below the levels shown by 
Table 16. Accordingly, since it is unlikely that there will be any 
slowing down in the rate of population growth in such a short time, 
either the actual figures for the unemployed or the actual figures 
for the active population in the agricultural and services sectors 
must have turned out to be greater than those given in Table 16. 
In the absence of an unemployed p~ent system in Turkey, it is more 
reasonable to suppose that the increases in the total- labour force 
have somehow squeezed themselves into employment in either agricul-
tural or services sectors to earn their living rather than assuming 
that they have st~ed as unemployed. This means that the active 
1. O.E.C.D., "Turkey 1963/64", p. 13; and, seep. of this work. 
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TABLE 16 
EMPLOYllnENT PROJECTIONS OF THE PLAN 
(In Millions) 
.. -
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Agriculture 9•80 9•86 10•00 10•14 10·28 10•42 10•56 
Industry 1•18 1·25 1·34 1·44 1·54 1·65 1·77 
Services 1"57 1•63 1•78 1•94 2•12 2•31 2•52 
TOTAL ACTIVE 
POPULATION 12•55 12•74 13•12 13•52 13•94 14•38 14•85 
Unemployment and 
Underemploynient 1·5 1·3 1·18 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 14·24 14·42 14·7 
Sources: S.P.O., "Development Plan, 1963-1967", pp. 419-20. 
S.P.O., "1963 Yili Program~", p. 59. 
S.P.O., "1964 Yili Progmm-1", P• 46. 
Note on the methods of projections: For the calculation of the 
total labour to be employed in industry and serVices during 
the Plan period the S.P.O. relied on the estimated produotion 
increases and the labour force elasticity coefficient based 
on production-employment series of previous years. Employ-
ment in construction, which is included in the item "industry", 
was calculated on the basis of investment targets, the 
estimated share of construction in investment and the labour 
coefficients in construction. In projecting the manpower 
req_ui remen ts of the agricultural sec tor, the labour require-
ments of the main crops under both irrigated and dry farming 
were first determined and additional requirements were found 
according to the increase in irrigated areas. /contd. 
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Note on Table 16 contd. 
The above projections were revised in 1963. , 
Unfortunately, I do not have all the revised data but 
only.for 1964. According to the revised estimates, the 
total labour force in 1964 was 13•8 million while the 
total employment reached only 12·4 million, leaving a 
remainder of 1•4 million underemployed and unemployed. 
population in these sectors has grown bigger than that foreseen in 
the Plan. On the other hand, the production of these sectors 
remained below the targets set for them in the Plan. It follows 
from these developments that the existing problem of disguised 
unemployment in the ag.ricul tural and services sectors has been 
aggravated during the early years of the Plan implementation • 
• 4 .. To Secure an Income Distribution in Conformity with 
Social Justice:-
It has been shown in Chapter 1 that the per capita income in 
Turkey is very low in comparison with that in the advanced countries, 
and that the average rate of increase in the per capita income had 
been slow during 1950-1962. It has been also pointed out that 
considerable disparities exist in the distribution of income and 
wealth. The studies made by the S.P.O. have revealed that the 
economic and social policies of the 19501 s, particularly inflation, 
have worked towards widening the disparities in both interpersonal 
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and interregional distribution of income1 • 
The conflict between raising the output and achieving a 
more equal distribution of income made it impossible to adopt the 
latter as an objective of the'First Five-Year Plan. However, 
since economic planning pan both shorten the interval before a 
satisfactory standard of living for all is reached and indicate the 
selection of some welfare measures which do not prolong the interval 
greatly, the Plan has adopted it as a long-term objective but to be 
approached in the First Five-Year period only as far as it does not 
hamper the attainment of the first objective. Consequently, the 
elimination of the inequalities, in the sense that everybody will 
benefit by a fair distribution of income, a social security system 
and the equality of opportunity, is proposed to be realized by 1977 
through the measures checking inflationary forces, redistributive 
financial policy and providing the individual with facilities such 
as education and health services to develop his own abilities. 
It is very difficult to assess at this stage of the Plan 
implementation the effectiveness of the measures concerning the 
present objective. But there are some indicators which may give us 
a rough idea about the fulfilment of the obj.~ctive. 
1. S.P.O., Development Plan 1963-1967, PP• 45-51. 
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In 1963 only 83 per cent. of the funds allocated for 
investment in education and 30 per cent. of the investments in 
agricultural education were realized. Although the educational 
investment in 1964 is expected to mark an improvement over 1963, it 
is still expected to fall short of the programme targets. 
A programme of socialization of health services is in progress, 
but because of delays in investments in health the programme targets 
are not being realized within the time limits envisaged by the Annual 
Progr~es. Moreover, in the regions where health services were 
already socialized the programme loses some effectiveness because of 
the lack of co-ordination with such activities as road construction, 
water, telephone, school and transport services. 
There is an improving trend in the developments of social 
security institutions. Those falling within the scope of various 
social security institutions constituted 29 per cent. of 2•5 million 
people employed in the non-agricultural, wage-earning and salaried 
occupations in 1963. This ratio was 34 per cent. in 1964, and today 
38•4 per cent. of 2·9 million people employed in the non-agricultural 
occupations are covered by the social security institutions. 
As regards the elimination of the disparities in income 
distribution, various measures were introduced to that effect during 
the early years of the Plan period. The amendments to the Law on 
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Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lookouts and the Social Insurance 
Law, are the new measures which protect the low income classes. 
The amendments to the taxation of private cars and to the 
Inheritance and Devolution Laws, and the taxation of real estate 
and agricultural incomes can be considered as measures reducing the 
disparities in the income distribution. On the other hand, the 
A.a.x 
difficulty of preventing evasion continues to be a drawback for 
an equitable income distribution. Also, the taxation of agri-
cultural incomes, which was first introduced in 1963, ·has not been 
effective to mitigate the unequal income distribution in the agri-
cultural sector. In effect, tax measures must be supplementary 
to a comprehensive land reform if the great income inequality in 
this sector is to be eliminated. But the frustration of the 
efforts put into that effect since the May 1961 Revolution proves 
that the realization of any significant land reform in the near 
future is out of question unless the power structure of the country 
changes. 
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CHAP.rER 3. 
THE STRATEGY FOR FINANCING THE PLAN 
In the prec.eding chapters we have made an introduction to 
the main economic problems of·Turkey and reviewed the basi~ objec-
tives of the First Five-Year Development Plan. The present 
chapter discusses the strategy adopted by the Plan with respect 
to the financing of economic development during the period 1963 -
1967. This discussion will consist of the following points, each 
of which being taken up in a separate section below:-
1. The breaking down of the total saving requirements 
between domestic and foreign savings; 
2. The cumulative nature of the process of domestic 
financing; 
3· The breaking down of the domestic financing between 
private and public sectors; 
4· The attitude of the Plan towards deficit financing. 
I 
As seen in the last chapter, the basic objective of the 
Turkish Development Plan is the attainment of a 1 per cent. 
compound rate of growth in G.N.P. per annum. The rate of invest-
ment required to attain this rate of growth has been calculated as 
- 13 -
18·3 per cent. of G.N.P. on average on the basis of the assumption 
that the incremental capital-output ratio during the plan period 
would be 2•6 on average, rising from 2•43 at the beginning to 
2•77 at the end of the period (see Table 18). It is taken for 
granted that the rate of investment envisaged by the Plan is of 
the right order in order to realize the Plan's objectives. 
Accordingly, the main problem of the financing policy ~ppeaxs to 
be how to raise the rate of total saving so as to match the rate 
of investment envi~aged by the Plan1 , as the rate of total saving 
in the Turkish economy has always been below the rate proposed by 
the Plan2• 
The extent of the increase required in the domestic 
savings, which is what matters from the point of view of our 
dissertation, depends in the first place on the volume of foreign 
savings which is likely to be available to the economy in the 
course of the plan period. But, since the calculation of foreign 
saving requirements of the Turkish Plan has been made on a residual 
basis, the determining factor of the burden to be placed on the 
1. This follows from the fact that real investments can be 
financed only by real savings as the aggregate realized 
investment is always equal to the aggregate realized savings. 
in a national economy. 
2. The trend of savings in the Turkish economy in 1950-62 is 
examined in p.~?,-8"Jbelow. 
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domestic financing of the investment progi·amme has not directly 
been the availability of foreign savings. On the contrary, the 
policy decision on the rate ~t which domestic savings could feas~ 
ibly be increased during the plan period has been the determining 
factor of the volume of foreign savings required: The difference 
between required savings and domestically feasible savings 
constituted the required foreign savings. To this, the debt service 
obligations of the pre-plan debts have been added; and from this, 
the expected inflow of private foreign investment and P.L.480 aid2 
have been deducted in order to arrive at the foreign aid that must 
be obtained. This current account deficit has also been checked 
for its consistency with the estimated imbalances in the supply 
(i.e. imports + domestic production) of and demand (i.e. final+ 
intermediate) for commodities and services3• 
1. Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, o.g.c.D. consulta:q.t, "Some Reflec-
tions on the Critigues of the Turkish Plan", a confidential 
report to the S.P.O., May 1964, mimeographed. 
2. The United States Congress passed in 1954 the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act which came to be known by its 
serial number, Public Law 480. The fundamental idea behind the 
law, as laid down in its preamble, is to make most efficient use 
of the U.S. surplus agricultural commodities. 
3. This check has been made according to Tinbergen's method of 
successive stages and iteration through a sectoral breakdown of 
the production and value added levels (This method is explained 
in J.Tinbergen & C.B.Hendricus, Mathematical Models of Economic 
Growth,McGraw-Hill Book Comp.,Inc., New York 1962). A different 
technique is used by H.B.Chenery and M.Bruno in their article on 
the Israeli economy in the Economic Journal,March 1962. They 
simultaneously calculate and match the current account deficit 
from both the savings and the structural aspeuts. 
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In an- international comparison, the share of the foreign 
savings in the tota.J. savings in the Turkish Plan appears to be on 
the low side with the result that a relatively greater burden is 
placed on domestic financing in Turkey than in many other under-
developed countries. It is, on average, •18 for the Turkish Plan 
as against ·39 for Israel, •30 for Greece, •30 for Nigeria, •22 for 
India, and ·56 for Korea1 • The foreign saving requirements of the 
Plan cannot be reduced by increasing the export earnings and 
private foreign investments. Increasing export earnings cannot 
give additional resources to Turkey which foreign aid can do. As 
regards the private foreign investments, the Turkish regulations 
for attracting such investments are ver,y generous and, according 
to Professor Bhagwati, if anything, these regulations need to be 
tightened to prevent an excessive burden building up on the balance 
of payments in the future through profit repatriation2• 
The rate of domestic saving foreseen in the Plan cannot be 
claimed to be too low either on the ground of the economy's p~st 
performance or in comparison to the efforts of other underdeveloped 
countries in this respect. The ~ate of domestic saving to be 
1. H. B. Chenery, "Foreign Assistance and Development Planning" 
in the Capital ~ormation and Investment in Industry, a repo~t 
of an international conference held at Istanbul in August 1962, 
Istanbul Matbasi, Istanbul 1963, pp. 305-20. 
2. J. Bhagwati, ibid. 
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attained in 1967, namely, 16·5% of G.N.P., is almost twice as high 
as the average rate of domestic seving obtained in 1950-52, that 
is, 8·5%. This means that the Turkish public in 1967 will have 
increased its average propensity to save by approximately 10~ in 
a decade and a. half. If we compare the 1963-67 average rate of 
domestic saving aimed at in the Plan, i.e., 14·8% of G.N.P., with 
the average rate in the immediate past, e.g. 12.% of G.N.P. in 
1960-62, it is seen that about a 2'.% increase in the average pro-
pensity to save is to take place during the plan period. This is 
not a modest target in terms of the sacrifice required from a 
nation with a low standard of living and a high rate of population 
growth. In fact, the average domestic saving ratio of •148 in 
the Turkish Plan comperes favourably with •159 of Greece, ·154 of 
Chile, •150 of Israel, ·139 of Philippines, •108 of Nigeria, 
•162 of India, •071 of Pakistan, ·092 of Korea1 • In order to 
obtain the above-mentioned increase in the domestic saving ratio 
the Plan envisages a marginal propensity to save of "21, which 
compares yet more favourably with that in other countries: •176 in 
Nigeria, ·165 in Pakistan, "246 in Greece, ·266 in the Philippines, 
•29 in Israel, •325 in Chile2• 
1. These figures were calculated from the Table 1, H. B. Chenery, 
ibid. 
2. These figures were taken from J. Bhagwati, ibid, who had quoted 
them from H. Chenery, Approaches to Development Planning, a 
paper presented to the Congress of the International Economic 
Association, Vienna, Sept. 1962. 
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From the angle of the strategy for financing the Plan, the 
most significant point with the foreign component of the total 
saving requirements is its trend as foreseen in the Plan. As 
shown in Table lS, the share of the foreign in the total saving is 
planned to contract as from 19651 . This is another way of 
expressing the fact that, since Turkey cannot rely in the long run 
on foreign aid to realize her economic development, it is necessary 
for her to increase the share of the domestic saving in the total 
saving so as to achieve a self-sustained economic development in 
the near future2• 
II 
The method of calculation of investment (saving) require-
menta of the Turkish Plan can be summed up in this formulation:-
~y 
y ..-;· ....L • ....L y v 
where Y denotes the national income, I total investment and v incre-
mental capital/output ratio. The Plan uses this formulation to 
! gross calculate not only the total amount Q investments that is likely to 
1. It is proposed that this contraction will continue until the 
foreign aid requirement becomes nil at the end of the Second 
Five-Year Plan. 
2. Here we are implicitly assuming that a 7% rate of growth in 
G.N.P. will continue to be the target and that the capital/ 
output ratio will not show any decline. 
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be needed during the Plan period but also the amount of annualgro$ 
investment requirements to achieve a 7% growth in G.N.P. per annum. 
Table 50 of the Development Plan summarizes the yearly pro-
jections of G.N.P.,consumption, investment and current account 
deficit. That table is reproduced here as Table 17, which serves 
as a hypothesis for our explanation of saving requirements of the 
Plan. According to the Plan, in order to raise the level of G.N.P. 
from 52,700 million T.L. in 1962 to 73,900 million T.L. in 1967, 
the amount of total investment must be raised from 8,600 million T.L. 
in 1962 to 14,300 million T.L. in 1967. In other words, the 
attainment of a 4o.% increase in G.N.P. during the Plan period 
requires a 60% increase in the amount of total investments. Conse-
quently, while the G.N.P. would be increasing at an average rate of 
7% p.a., investments would be increasing at an average rate of 
10·7% p.a. The planning of a higher rate of increase in invest-
ment than in G.N.P. implies that the productivity of the additional 
investments would be declining. If the productivity of additional 
in~estments could be maintained constant, the total investment 
would then be required to increase at the same rate with G.N.P. 
The declining productivity of the additional investments is 
reflected in the rising trend of incremental-capital-output ratios 
shown in Table 18. It is not intended here to enter into the 
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TABLE 17 
GROSS NATIONAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 
(000 million T.L. at 1961 prices) 
Private Current Private Public Current Total Invest-
Years G.N.P. Consump- Pu.blic Inves~ Invest- Account Invest- ment tion. Expen- Deficit financed 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
diture ment ment ment by 
Domestic 
Saving 
I II III IV v VI VII * VIII 
52·7 = 38·6+ 7·6+ 3•5+ 5·1- 2•1 8·6 6•5 
56·4 40·5 8·6 3·8 5"8 2·3 9·6 7"3 
60·3 43·0 9·0 4"2 6·6 2·5 10•8 8·3 
64•5 45"4 9•5 4"7 7"1 2•2 11•8 9·6 
69·0 47·6 10•5 5·3 7·8 2·2 13·1 11•9 
73•9 50·2 11·5 5"9 8•4 2·1 .14•3 12·2 
Average Annual Increase (%) 
7•0 5"4 8•7 11•0 10·6 - 10·7 13•4 
Source: S.P.O., Development Plan, 1963-1967, Table 50, p. 116. 
* This column does not exist in Table 50 of the Plan. 
discussion of the feasibility of these ratios but to make some 
remarks only. In Chapter 1 the incremental capital-output ratio 
during the pre-Plan decade or so has been calculated as 2·81, which 
is higher than that envisaged by the Plan to prevail in the Plan period, 
1. See Chapter 1, p.l\-7 
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TABLE 18 
CffiVlULATIVE NATURE OF SA VIl'TG REQUIREMENTS 
G.N.P. Implied Percentag-e of G.N.P. 
Years (000 mil- Capital- Total lion T.L.) Output Invest-Ratio 
ment = Foreign Domestic Saving total Saving (A.P.S.) 
saving 
I II III IV v 
1962 52•7 2·33 16·3 4"0 12"3 
1963 56·4 2•43 17•0 4•1 12•9 
1964 60"3 2·56 17"9 4"1 13•8 
1965 64•5 2•61 18•3 3·4 14"9 
1966 69·0 2·71 19·0 3•2 15·8 
1967 73"9 2·77 19•4 2•8 16·6 
Average 2•59 18·1 3•3 14•8 
Source: calculated on the basis of data given in 
Table 17 on page 79. 
!'JI".arginal 
Rate 
of 
Saving 
VI 
-
·23 
·253 
"30 
·294 
·255 
·27 
that is, 2·6. However, the bottlenecks and shortages caused by 
the balance of payments difficulties and the direction of invest-
ments to socially unproductive ventures by inflation, particularly 
since 1954, may be considered to have made for a relatively high 
capital-output ratio during the 1950's. The Plan envisages, in 
addition to avoiding the bottlenecks and shortages and the infla-
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tionary policy, to make use of such existing potential sources of 
savings as underemployment of labour and capital that tend to lower 
the incremental capital-output ratio1 • As the potential sources 
of savings are gradually exhausted and the capital intensity of the 
whole economy gradually grows with the intensification of capital 
formation, it is very likely that the productivity of additional 
investments will diminish over the plan period. 
As the incremental capital-output ratio (v) increases over 
the Plan period, the maintenance of a constant rate of growth 
(~ Y/Y), that is, 7% p.a., would require that a growing proportion 
of G.N.P. is invested each year. Table 18 shows that, with the 
incremental capital-output ratios as given in Column II, the 
increase of G.N.P. as envisaged in the Plan from 52,700 million T.L. 
in 1962 to 60,300 million T.L. in 1964 and to 73,900 million T.L. 
in 1967 would require the proportion of G.N.P. invested to be 
raised from 16"~ in 1962 to 17•9% in 1964 and to 19•4% in 1967. 
The proportion of G.N.P. saved must of course be equal to that 
1. The Turkish First Five-Year plan has faced a remarkable para-
doxical situation in which underemployment of labour and under-
utilization of scarce factor "capital" have been existing 
simultaneously in the economy. The extent of the underemploy-
ment has already been pointed out in Chapter 1, p.S. To 
give some examples of the underutilization of capital, in 1960 
the percentage capacity utilization in the woollen industry was 
32 for yarn and 10 for fabric, about 60 in the rubber industry, 
and 40 in the structural steel industry (S.P.O., Development 
Plan 1963 .. 1967, p. ~245; 252, and 293). 
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invested if the investment/income ratio of the Plan is to be 
realized, since real investments can be financed only with 
real savings. 
The cumulative nature of total savings requirements, 
as percentage of G.N.P. , of the plan is reflected as enhanced 
in domestic savings ratios of the Plan as shown in Column IV 
of Table 18. This is due to the fact that the foreign 
component of_ the total savinp/income ratio is planned to 
decline over the Plan period. Consequently, while the total 
savings/income ratio by 1967 is required to be 1~ above its 
1962 level, the increase in the domestic savings/income ratio 
is expected to be 3~ during the same period. This entails 
the requirement of a greater rate of increase in domes-tic 
savings than in total savings as shown in Table 17 -- 13·· p.a. 
versus lO•?J' p.a., on average. 
The planning of a 13·· rate of increase in domestic 
savings against a ~ rate of growth of G.N.P. implies that the 
Plan expects an income elasticity of 1•9 to be realized in 
relation to domestic savings. This high income-elasticity of 
savings is expected to be realized by holding the rate of growth 
- 83 -
of aggregate consumption at 5·~ p.a.1 In other words, the 
proportion of the incremental G.N.P. saved is envisaged to be 
bigger than that of the aggregate G.N.P. saved during the Plan 
period. This is shown by the last two columns of Table 18 which 
give the marginal and average rates of savings as i.mplie~ by the 
Plan. 
In the past, the domestic saving,/income ratio has neither 
reached the average ratio envisaged by the Plan nor attained a 
cumulative ~ture except during 1951-55· Table 19 below shows the 
trend of total savings, domestic savings and foreign savings, as 
percentages of G.N.P., during the period 1950-62. In spite of its 
deficiencies, Table 19 enables us to have an idea of the trend of 
savings in the Turkish econOJQ". As seen from the table the ratio 
of total saving has shown a rising trend throughout the period 
1950-62. While the average rate of total saving was 11·~ of 
G.N.P. in the period 1950-53, it attained au average rate of 14·· . 
1. This is calculated as compo1md rate of growth of aggregate 
consumption (private plus pu.blic) given in Columns II and III 
of Table 17 above. The rate of growth of private consumption 
is plaJJDed to be even lower, that is, 5·· p.a. Recalling 
our estimate of the rate of growth of private consumption during 
1950/52 - 1960/62 in page49 , which has shown that the rate of 
growth in pri~te consumption had been greater than that in 
G.N.P., it is readily seen that the Plan calls forth a substan-
tial change in the saving behaviour of the Turkish people. 
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of G.N.P. for the 1950-62 period. The rising trend becomes more 
conspicuous as the 1959-62 average reaches 15·~ against the 13•9% 
of 1954-58 and 11·5.% of 1950-53· When we look at the foreign 
component of the total saving, we at first glance notice that the 
foreign saving ratio had kept rather a high level until the mid-
fifties and then sharply declined, rising again by the end of the 
fifties. It is significant that the period with low level of 
foreign assistance, that is, the 1956-58 period, is also the period 
in which the level of total savings has somewhat declined after the 
high level of the year 1955, recovering again in 1959. We cannot, 
however, explain the rising trend of the total saving ratio b,y 
relying merely on the trend of foreign saving ratio, since the 
average rate of foreign savings has shown a decline from 2·6% of 
G.N.P. in 1950-53 to 2"4% in 1950-62. The high average rate of 
total savings in 1950-62 as compared with that in 1950-53 can be 
explained with the increase in the domestic saving ratio as it 
averaged to l~fo in 1950-62 but was only 8•9% of G.N.P. in 1950-53· 
Nevertheless, the foreign component of the total saving, which 
has stood at 3•1% of G.N.P. in 1959-62 and reached the record level 
of 4•1% in 1962, has been the main factor accounting for the rising 
trend of the total saving ratio during the final quarter of the 
period 1950-62 as the domestic saving ratio has almost stagnated 
since 1955· 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
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TABLE 19 
TOTAL, DOMESTIC ANTI FOREIGN SAVINGS IN THE 
TURKISH ECONOMY, 1950-62. (As% of G.N.P.) 
Total Foreign Domestic Average rates of Savings 
Saving Saving Saving 
Total Foreign Domestic 
9•6 1·3 8•3 
10•2_ 2·1 8·1 . ;-;: 
12•8 3"8 9•0 j nc,, 2·6 8"9 
12•4 2·7 9·7 
14•7 2·9 11·8 .... 
15·0 2•5 12·5 
13•4 0•9 12·5 13"9 1•4 12•5 
13•1 0·7 12·4 
14•0 1•0 13·0 
15"7 3"1 12•6 
15·9 2•4 13•5 
15·2 2·8 12·4 >15·5 3•1 12•4 
15·6 4•1 11•5 I/ 
Average 14•4 I 2•4 12·0 
Source: See note about the preparation and shortcomings 
of the Table. 
Note on Table 19:-
Preparation of the Table: Table 19 was prepared on 
the basis of figures given in Table 13 in Chapter 1. 
Table 13 gives the figures for G.N.P., total invest-
ment and current account deficit at current prices 
for the period 1950-62. From these figures, we have 
calculated the total saving ratios and foreign saving 
ratios of Table 19 as equal to the rate of capital 
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Note on Table 19 (contd.). 
Preparation of the Table (contd.):-
for.mation and to the ratio of the current account 
deficit to the G.N.P., respectively. Domestic saving 
ratios are the residual of the total saving ratios minus 
the foreign saving ratios. The average rates for each 
category of savings have been arrived at by relating the 
total of that category saving in a particular period to 
the total of ·(G.N.P.)s in that period. 
Shortcomings of the Table:-
1. The table gives us the gross saving as equal to the 
gross capital formation. The inclusi.on of depre-
ciation charges in the saving figures makes them less 
representative of the net saving behaviour of the 
econo~ since the decisions with respect to the 
depreciation charges reflect the composition of the 
existing real capital rather than the current saving 
behaviour. It is very much likely that the ratio of 
net to gross saving has not been constant over the 
period 1950-62 as the composition of fixed assets has 
changed. In fact, while the ratio of gross invest-
ments in machinery and equipment to that in construc-
tion was 2/3 in 1950-52, it fell to 1/2 in 1958-60. 
Accordingly, the rate of depreciation has gone up from 
3•8% of G.N.P. in 1950-52 to 4•2% in 1958-601 •2• That 
the rate of depreciation allowances in 1962-65 is, on 
average, 4•4% of G.N.P.3 must be taken into account in 
a comparison of the net saving behaviour of the plan 
period with'that of the past if it is made in terms of 
the gross saving figures. 
2. The rates of saving in Table 19 correspond to the 
rates of fixed capital formation and do not cover 
those savings used in financing the changes in stocks. 
In vievt of the fact that investment in inventories has 
probably been considerably higher during the brisk 
activity years - the inflationary period - of 1953-58 
than the periods 1950-52 and 1958-62, the above rates 
somewhat underestimate the actual rates of saving in 
the sub-period 1953-58, relatively speaking. 
1. These calculations were made on the basis of figures given in 
Tables 6 & 9 of the S.P.O., "Development Plan, 1963-67". 
(Footnotes contd. at foot of p. 87.) 
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DIAGBAJvl 4 
TOTAL, DO!-lESTIC, AND FOREIGN SAVINGS IN THE 
TURKISH ECONOMY, 1950-62. 
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Source: Table 19 on page 85. 
(Footnotes contd. from page 86). 
.!. 
1956 ·1958 1953-1 61 
2. The average rate of depreciation in the Turkish economy for the 
period 1950-59 is shown as 4% of gross domestic product in the 
U.N.'s publication, "World Economic Survey, 196011 , pp. 61. 
3. This was calculated on the basis of Tables 17 & 2 in the Annual 
Programmes for 1963 a.nd 1965, respectively. 
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The ratio of domestic saving to the G.N.P. in 1955 was 5Q% 
above the 1950 ratio. This means that the Turkish public increased 
its average propensity to save out of gross national product by 5o% 
in a six year period. This is well above the target envisaged by 
the Plan with respect to the increase in the domestic saving ratio, 
i.e., 3~ increase in the period 1962-67. But, it is undoubtedly 
more difficult to achieve a given percentage increase in the 
domestic saving ratio when it is already high than when it is low. 
Iri fact, while the 50,% increase in the ratio of domestic saving to 
G.N.P. in 1950-55 was attained with a marginal propensity to save 
of 24•5%1 , the 37fo increase in the domestic savings/income ratio 
during the Plan period would require a marginal_propensity to save 
of 27% (see Table 18). 
Since 1955 the rate of domestic savings remained around 
12·~. The average ratio of domestic savings to G.N.P. in 1961-62 
was slightly lower.than that in 1955-56, though the level of G.N.P. 
increased by 2~ in the same period. This means that the Turkish 
public increased its consumption at the same pace with the national 
income during 1955/56 - 1961/62. 
1. This was calculated on the basis of the following data given in 
Table 7 of Chapter 1 and Table 19 of this chapter: the index 
of G.N.P. in 1955 was 135, the base year being 1950; the domes-
tic savings/income ratio was 8•3% in 1950 and 12·~ in 1955. 
The implicit assumption behind this calculation is that the 
savings/income ratio at current prices corresppnds to that at 
constant prices, neglecting the likelihood of changes in 
relative prices. 
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T.he stagnation in the domestic saving ratio can better be 
observed from the last column of Table 19 in which the rates of 
domestic saving are shown as averages of the three sub-periods, 
that is, 1950-53, 1954-58 and 1958-62. These periods are marked 
by the contrasts in the general economic conditions which prevailed 
in each of them as already explained in Chapter 1. During the 
stable growth years from 1950 until 1954 the domestic saving ratio, 
after a pause in 1951, steadily increased and attained an average 
rate of about 9% of G.N.P. During the inflationary years from 
1954 until the mid-1958, it first went up in 1954 and 1955 and then 
stagnated,· giving an average of 12·5% of G.N.P. which is consider-
ably higher than the average rate of the period 1950-53· In the 
stabilization years from the mid-1958 until the begi~~ing of the 
plan period, the domestic saving ratio followed a very unsteady 
path, and, on average, remained slightly below the average rate of 
the period 1954-58. 
The above review of savings in relation to the national 
income manifests that the realization of the Plan's Targets is 
dependent upon the taking place of substantial changes in the saving 
behaviour of the economy. In the following chapters, \·Te shall 
study in detail the effectiveness of the measures taken to increase 
savings. 
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III 
The Development Plan foresees no significant transfers of 
savings in either direction between the public and private sectors1 • 
Therefore, the savings problems of the two sectors can be treated 
separately. In the private sector the proportion of private 
investment financed by foreign capital was assumed to remain 
unchanged through the Plan period2• Private savings are therefore 
expected to grow proportionately with private investment3. This 
means that private savings are envisaged to increase at the rate of 
11% p.a., which· is the target rate of increase of private invest-
ment as shown in Table 17 above. In the public sector, total 
public savings should increase at a greater pace than public invest-
ment so that a reduction in dependence on foreign aid as foreseen 
by the Plan could be achieved. 
The Plan does not specify particular targets for savings of 
the private and public sectors. There are some serious problems 
which make it impossible to allocate the Plan's estimate of domestic 
1. I.B.R.D., Development Performance and Prospects of Turkey, 
mimeographed report, No. EA-153a, November 1965, paragraph 376. 
2. Ibid. 
3· This is sometimes misinterpreted as if the Plan foresaw an 
equality between private savings and investment. For instance, 
O.E.C.D., Turkey 1962/63, makes this mistake in pages 16 and 17, 
and in Table 16. 
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saving requirements between the public and private sectors1 • The 
requirements of the Plan with respect to savings of the public and 
private sectors from domestic sources could have been estimated from 
investment targets had we had the data on the proposed allocation of 
foreign aid between the two sectors and on the transfer of savings 
between them. 
The Plan gives projections about the public revenue and 
expenditure during the Plan period. The difference between the 
public revenue and public current expenditure is to be equal to the 
public savings. But this method also is rendered inaccurate by 
the following factors. First, there are inconsistencies in the 
data on the public revenue and current expenditure estimates which 
are given in Tables 50, 51, 52 and 53 of the Plan. Secondly, at 
the time the Plan was prepared Central Government expenditures were 
classified under the heads of only current and investment. This 
means that both headings contained important financi~l transfers 
such as internal and external debt servicing, allocations to the 
S.E.E. and grants to municipal and local governments. 
1. The I.B.R.D. mission to Turkey in 1965 found itself unable to 
obtain a breakdown of the Plan's saving requirements between 
the two sectors. (I.B.R.D., op.cit., paragraph 376 and 377). 
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A1 though an accurate breakdown of the domestic saving 
estimate 9f t~e Plan between the public and private sectors is not 
possible, Table 20 below may be useful to observe, even if roughly, 
the relative order of the public and private savings from domestic 
sources as foreseen by the Plan. Savings of the private sector in 
the table are calculated as residuals of total domestic savings 
less savings of the public sector. The Plan expects savings o£ 
the Private sector to grow at the same rate with the private 
investment1 , that is, 11% p.a. But the corresponding rate in 
TABLE 20 
TARGETS FOR THE PU13LIC AND PRIVATE SAVINGS IN THE PLAN, 
1963-67. (At 1961 prices, 000 million T.L.) 
Years Total Public jPublic Public Private ~ Percentage Domestic RevenuE Current Saving Sector Public Saving Expen- Saving 
diture Saving 
1962 6·5 11·02 7·96 3·06 2·90 5•8 
1963 7··3 13•46 9•07 4•39 2•91 7•8 
1964 8•3 14•38 9·35 5•03 3·27 8·4 
1965 9•6 15•72 10·01 5•71 3•89 8·8 
1966 10·9 17·31 11•00 6·31 4·59 9·2 
1967 12•2 18·91 11·90 7·01 5·19 9·5 
Sources: S.P.O., 11First Five-Year Development Plan, 
1963-196( 11 , Tables 50, 52 and 53· 
1. S.P~O., Development Plan 1963-1967, p.456. 
of G.N.P. 
Private 
Saving 
5•5 
5·1 
5·4 
6·0 
6·6 
1·0 
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Table 20 is 12•3%. This shows that the breakdown of domestic 
saving estimates of the Plan between the public and private sectors 
as revealed in Table 20 is not exactly what the Plan aims at. As 
percentages of G.N.P., the public and private savings are expected 
to be about of the same order in 1962, but thereafter public savings 
are getting larger. 
As for the public savings, the Plan specifies the targets 
for the public revenues and expenditures for each year of the plan 
period, which have already been shown in Table 20. In this disser-
tation we shall not deal with the saving of the local administrations 
because of the lack of adequate information about their revenues and 
expenditures, on the one hand, and of their relatively small share 
in the total savings, on the other hand. The revenues by sources 
1 
and current expenditures of the central Government , as foreseen Qy 
the Plan, are shown in Table 21. The difficulties and possibili-
ties with respect to the attainment of these targets will be 
discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. We shall here confine 
ourselves to some overall remarks. As seen from the table, the 
major part, i.e., around three quarters, of the total government 
revenue is to· come from taxation. The share of the tax revenue in 
l. All revenues and expenditures of the central government are 
included in the General and Annex Budgets. From now on the 
word "government11 will refer to the central government and 
will not include local administrations. 
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th~ total revenue is planned to remain almost unchanged during the 
1963-67 period. But the share of the tax revenue in G.N.P., 
parallel to the share of the total government revenue in G.N.P., 
is proposed to increase from 14•61% in 1962 to 17·3~ in 1967. 
This requires an averas~ rate of increase of 10·~ per annum 
against a 7% targe~ rate of growth in G.N.P. In other words, 
the income elasticity of the tax system during the plan period is 
envisaged to be 1·5· 
During the period 1950-62 the government's share in G.N.P. 
was, on average, about 14% against about 2~ of G.N.P. which is 
envisaged by the Plan. Thus, the average share of government 
revenues in G.N.P. during 1963-1967 is expected to record an 
increase of more than 5Q% over the 1950-62 average (or over the 
1959-62 average, see Table 22). The tax system, providing the 
largest part of the public rev.enue, stands as the main instrument 
for the attainment of this increase. In fact, the Plan proposes 
many reforms in the tax system, which will be studied in Chapter 5, 
in order to gain the control of an increasing share of G.N.P. 
According to the Plan, the share of the tax revenue in G.N.P. 
will, on average, be 17% during the period 1963-67, which is more 
than 40% above the 1959-62 average. The scope of the required 
reforms in the tax system \~ll be more conspicuous when we notice 
t~~t the share of the tax revenue in G.N.P. during the 1950-58 
- 95 -
period stagnated at 11% and, after the 1958 devaluation, reached 
only 12% in 1959-62. This points out the .fact that during most 
of the fifties the income elasticity o.f the Turkish tax system had 
been around unity and only in 1959-62 was slightly greater than 
unity against the Plan's proposal of an income elasticity equal 
to 1·5· 
Although the share of tax revenue in G.N.P. has almost stag-
nated in the 1950-62 period, the proportion of the government revenue 
coming from taxation has grown from 7~ in 1950-53 to 8~ in 1959-62. 
This was due to the failure of the public revenues other than taxes 
to keep pace with the growth in G.N.P. In fact, while the Turkish 
government had been appropriating 1~ of G.N.P. through the General 
and Annexed Budget revenues in the period 1950-53, this proportion 
fell to 13•4% in 1954-58 and then slightly rose to 14"1% in 1959-62. 
In order to reduce the share of tax revenue in the total revenue 
from 85% in 1959-62 to about 7~ in the plan period, the public 
revenues other than taxes must increase at a greater rate than the 
tax revenue. The tax revenue index is envisaged to reach 166 in 
1967 while the index for other revenues is expected to hit 213 in 
1967, the base year for these indexes being 1962. 
The public revenues other than taxes are composed mainly of 
the surplus funds of the state economic enterprises (S.E.E.), fees 
TABLE 21 -TARGETS FOR THE PUBLIC REVENUES, CURRENT EXPENDITURE & SAVING IN THE PLAN, 1962-67. 
(General & Annexed Budgets). (000 million T.L. at 1961 prices). 
Percentages of G.N.P. 
Funds Total 'l'otal 
Surplus From Public Public 
Other Funds Uniden- Total Current Total Current 
Tax Public Saving of the tified Public Expen- Public Tax Public Expendi-
Years Revenue Revenues Bonds S.E.E. Sources Revenue diture Saving Revenue Revenue ture 
I II III IV v VI VII VIII IX X XI 
1962 7·70 0·93 0·50 0·55 - 9·68 7·00 2·68 14·61 18·36 13·30 
1963 9·00 0·98 0·53 0·67 0•84 12·02 8·10 3·82 15·95 21·34 14·36 
1964 10·10 1·03 0·57 0·96 0•18 12•84 8•30 4•54 16·74 21·30 13·76 
1965 10•92 1•08 0·61 1•01 0~45 14•07 8•86 5•21 16•93 21•82 13•74 
1966 11·80 1•13 0•65 1·08 0•89 15•55 9•75 5•80 17•10 22•54 14•13 
1967 12•80 1•19 0•70 1•23 1•11 17•03 10•50 6·53 17•32 23"04 14•21 
.. 
-- --- ---------
--~-~ ---~-----
Sources: The S.P.O., First Five-Year Development Plan 1963-1967. Columns I to VI are from 
Table 53, excluding revenues from counterpart funds and from Local Administrations; 
Column VII from Table 52 excluding current expenditures of the Local Administrations. 
Column VIII is the difference between Columns VI and VII. G.N.P. figures used in the 
calculations in columns IX to XI are from Table 50. 
TABLE 22 - SOME INDICATORS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVENUE, CURRENT EXPENDITURE & SAVING IN ~RE 
GENERAL AND ANNEXED BUDGETS. 
Tax Revenue Percentages of G.N.P. Average 
Total Total Propensity 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Year % of % of Total Total Current Public to save of the 
G.N. P. Revenue Revenue Expenditure Saving Government 
1950-53 11•0 73 15•0 13•2 1•8 12 
1954-58 11•2 84 13•4 10•6 2·8 21 
1959-62 12•0 85 14•1 10•9 3•2 23 
1963-67 16·8 76 22•0 14•0 8•0 36 
L..., _______ 
Sources: 1. The S.P.O., First Five-Year Development Plan 1963-1967. 
2. The Ministry of Finance, Budget Revenues Bulletin, No. 14, pp. 14 and 15. 
3. '.Phe S.P.O., A Summary of the Progress Report on the Implementation of the 1963 
Annual Program, p. 32. 
Note on the Preparation of Table: G.N.P. figures were taken from Table 6 of the Plan; The tax 
revenue figures for 1950-61 from Table 12, the current expenditure figures for 1950-1961 
from Table 13 of the Plan. The total revenue figures were taken from Table 12 of the 
Plan with the additions of Petroleum Import Treasury share from 1957 on and Saving Bonds 
from 1961 on, which were taken from the Revenue Bulletin. These additions were made in 
order to make the total revenue figures of Table 22 comparable with those of Table 21 
which appears to have included these two items. Tax revenue figures and Total Revenue 
figures for 1962 were taken from the Revenue Bulletin. ·Total current expenditure figures 
for 1962 were from the Source No. 3 above. F'or 1963-67 figures, which are the estimates 
of the Plan, see Table 21 of the present chapter. 
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collected by agencies included in the Annexed Budget, the revenue 
on ·.~state property which is not in the nature of taxes and revenue 
from savings bonds. The fees collected by the annexed budget 
agencies and the revenue on state property-have increased at an 
1 
average rate of 5% per annum in the past and are expected to 
continue increasing at the same rate during the plan period also. 
Savings bonds were first issued in 1961 and, therefore, the revenue 
from them could not be estimated on the basis of past trends. It 
has been assumed that a 7% annual increase, similar to the rate of 
grov1th, could be obtained in the revenue from this source. Among 
the public revenues other than taxes, the surplus funds of the 
S.E.E. are expected to attain the highest rate of increase, 
reaching an index of 244 in 1967 if the surplus funds in 1962 is 
taken as 100. 
I~ order to gain a complete perspective of the. Plan's 
strategy with respect to the public savings we have to consider 
public current expenditures as well, since the public saving is 
the surplus of the public revenue over the public current expenditure. 
Table 21 shows the estimates by the Plan of the current public expen-
ditures both as absolute amounts and as percentages of G.N.P. T.he 
1. S.P.O., Development Plan, p. 123. 
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total of current expenditures from the General and Annexed Budgets 
is expected to increase b,y 5Q% in 1967 compared with 1962, growing 
at a rate just above a% per annum. This would result in increasing 
the share of total public current expenditures in G.N.P. from, on 
average, about 11% in 1959-62 to 14% in the plan period. 
The plan envisag~s that the ratio of total public savings 
out of the General and Annexed Budgets to G.N.P. will increase, on 
average, from 3"~fo in 1959-62 to 8% in 1963-67, recording a 15o% 
increase. This could be achieved with an increase in the average 
propensity to save of the government from ·23 in 1959-62 to •36 in 
1963-67. Taking into account that in the pre-plan period the 
total public saving ratio has increased only by 77% in a decade or 
so -- from 1•9% of G.N.P. in 1950-53 to 3·2.% in 1959-62 -- the 
degree of the effort and skill required from the fiscal authorities 
in order to realize the financial targets of the plan should no 
doubt be regarded as quite difficult to achieve. 
IV 
The chapter on financing in Section IX of the Plan starts 
with an introduction of the principles which would govern the 
financing of the Plan. These principles are as follows:-
a. "Non-inflationary financing. 
Investments will be financed from real savings and deficit 
- 99 -
financing will not be resorted to during the Plan period. 
There will be equality between annual saving and annual 
investments 11 • 
b. "Physical Equilibrium in Financing. 
The volume and pattern of savings was determined in the 
light of the physical resources required for the realization 
of the proposed inyestments. Consideration was further 
given to the action to be taken in order to prevent the 
emergence of bottlenecks due to the likely demand for these 
physical resources during the Plan period11 • 
c. "Monetary equilibrium bet\•leen total volume of savings and 
financing needs 11 • 
Although enumerated as three separate principles, they in 
effect emerge as a single principle: non-inflationary financing. 
However, it seems that the Plan does not have a clear-cut view on 
the relationship between deficit financing-and inflation. 
Inflation is generated at three points of the economy. 
This may be expressed through a formula as this1 :-
(X-M) + (I-S) + (G-R) = 0 
where X stands for exports; M for imports; I and S for investment. 
1. UNITED NATIONS, E.C.A.F.E., Economic Bulletin for Asia and the 
Far East, Vol. III, Nos. 1-2, p. 5. 
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and savings respectively, of the private sector; G and R for 
expenditure and revenue respectively, of the public sector. One 
cannot argue that the inflationary pressure exists simply by 
looking at, say, the budget alone but at the three points simul-
taneously. X, M, G, R may be known in advance. I is kno\>m with 
greater or lesser accuracy after it has taken place, whereas, from 
the policy point of view, it ought to be known in advance. S is 
not known at all because S represents the total which people expect 
to save. 
Considering that G = I + E and R - E = S , where Ig g g 
and S denote the public sector's investment and savings,respectively, g 
and E public consumption (current expenditure), the public sector's 
budget (G-R) may be stated as I - S • g g 
becomes as follows:-
Thus, the above formula 
(X-M) + (IP - S ) + (I - S ) = 0 , where p and g p g g 
indicate the private and public sectors, respectively. 
The three sectors of the economy, namely, the foreign trade, 
the private and public sectors, may individually show an excess or 
deficit. But as long as they cancel each other in total, no infla-
tionary or deflationary pressures would develop in the econo~. 
Putting it differently, a non-inflationary financing of economic 
development in a country requires that the excess of the total 
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(public plus private) expected investment over the total expected 
savings must not be larger than the expected current account 
deficit1 • 
The first of the above-mentioned three principles of 
financing of the Plan states that there will be equality between 
annual savings and annual investments. Since, in the national 
· t · 1' d · /arle 1 t 1 · d · t 1ncoma accoun 1ng, rea 1ze saV1ngs· a ways equa o rea 1ze 1nves -
menta, it is reasonable to assume that the Plan aims at.an equality 
between expected savings and investments. 
The other two principles seem rather to be connected with 
the realization of expected investments. The emergence of bottle-
necks and the failure of the monetary and fiscal institutions to 
provide funds for investment to the extent of expected savings 
would cause investors to alter their investment plans, thus leading 
to a discrepancy between expected savings and investments. 
The inclusion in the first principle of the clause that 
deficit financing will not be resorted to during the Plan period 
1. See, R. F. Harrod, Economic Planning and Capital Investment, in 
Capital·Formation, op.cit., p. 313; H. W. Singer, 11Deficit 
Financing of Public Capital Formation", Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. VII, No. 3, PP• 65-96. _ UNITED NATIONS, "Some 
Financial Aspects of Development Programmes in Asian Countries 11 , 
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. III, Nos. 1-?, 
p. 5· 
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suggests that the Plan considers deficit financing as always 
inflationary. As a matter of fact, deficit financing in the 
public or private or in the both sectors may take place without 
resulting in inflation, provided that the ex-ante equilibrium 
condition is fulfilled and that bottlenecks do not emerge in the 
supply of goods and services and of investible funds. 
\v.hether the method of deficit financing always leads 
to inflation and whether some justification may exist for the use 
of deficit financing in the public sector will be studied in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPrER 4 
SAVINGS OF TEE PRIVATE SECTOR 
It has been shown in the last chapter that the Plan's 
strategy for domestic financing envisages that a considerable 
part of total saving requirements will be met by the private 
sector. It is therefore of the utmost importance to examine 
carefully the saving behaviour of the private sector and to 
search for methods of increasing and mobilizing private savings. 
Accordingly, in the first section of the present chapter, an 
estimate of the rate of private savings will be made, and this 
rate will be compared with those in the advanced and under-
developed countries. Section II will survey the factors 
accounting for the low rate of private savings in Turkey rela-
tive to the advanced countries. Finally, in section III, we 
shall have a look at the financial assets which are available 
as saving means to the private sector. 
I 
ESTIMATE OF THE PRIVATE SAVINGS 
Domestic savings originate at three levels: households, 
businesses, and government. In this chapter we shall be con-
cerned in savings arising from the first two sources. It is 
desirable to estimate savings through their sectoral forms as 
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this would provide a deeper insight for the policy measures. Unfor-
tunately, no work has hitherto been done in this field in Turkey. 
Although Dr. Oktay Yenal of the University of Istanbul, has come 
out with an estimation of sectoral savings on the basis of his 
investigation of the development of a capital market in Turkey, his 
underlying assumptions are too arbitrary to deduce the saving 
1 behaviour by sectors of the econo~. 
Estimates of savings through their sectoral forms could be 
derived from such data as income tax returns, balance sheets of 
1. Dr. Yenal has divided the economy into six sectors particularly 
from the viewpoint of investments. These are Agriculture, 
Households, Businesses, Public, Commercial Banks and the Cental 
Bank. The Public Sector makes all the public investments and 
receives all the credit classified as official credit. The 
Agricultural sector makes all the investments in rural housing 
and in other agricultural buildings and receives all the credit 
classified as agricultural credit. The Business Sector under-
takes all the investment in industrial and commercial construc-
tion and machinery and equipment and receives all the industrial 
and commercial credits. The household sector invests in urban 
housing and receives all housing credit from the financial 
institutions. All saving deposits have been assumed as coming 
from the household sector, all commercial deposits from the 
business sector, and official deposits from the Public sector. 
Further, all the increases in the currency have been assumed as 
being held by the household sector. Under these assumptions, 
he estimated sectoral savings as a residual of the sector's 
investment plus increase in financial assets (deposits, and 
currency as well in the case of household sector) minus increase 
in financial liabilities (credit).. He used the investment 
figures of the 11Report About the Project Studies on the Correc-
tion and Integration of Investment figures" submitted to the 
S.P.O. by Dr. Kenan Gllrtan, of the Istanbul University. 
Dr. Yenal's study covers the 1950-1960 period and was published 
in the '~ecessary Measures for the development of Capital Market 
in Turkey" edited by the Committee conducting the seminar on 
Capital-~rket, Ankara 1964, pp. 7-38. 
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companies, changes in funds of financial institutions, and consumer 
expenditure1 • These statistics .either are not available in Turkey 
or are available in such forms that they could not be of much use 
to a study of savings. It is therefore attempted here to estimate 
private savings as a whole without any regard to the division of it 
between households and businesses. 
Savings of an economic unit, whether a household, a firm, 
a sector or a whole economy, can be calculated either from its 
income account by subtracting current expenditures from current 
income or through its balance sheet by subtracting changes in 
liabilities from changes in assets. The former approach will be 
2 
used here in estimating the saving of private sector in Turkey • 
In Table 23 the private current income (disposable income) for 
1. 
2. 
For the use of such data in the estimation of savings in a 
country with advanced statistics, see, for instance, 
R. W. Goldsmith, A Study of Savings in the U.S., Princeton 
1955; and Bank of Japan & Rissho University, "Savings in 
the Economic Growth of Postwar Japan" in the U.N., Econ. 
Bull. for Asia & the F. East, September 1960, pp. 1-43· On 
the other hand, Saving of the Federation of Malaya, 1954-1958 
in the U.N., Econ. Bull. for Asia & the F. East, June 1962, 
pp. 17-34, constitutes an example of the limited use of those 
data as supplemented by some presumptive methods. 
This approach has been used by B. Hansen in studying income-
consumption behaviour of the private sector in his report to 
the S.P.O., "Some Comments on the 1965 Program and the Policy 
Problems 1964 and 1965", Sept. 1964, mimeographed, pp. 7-9. 
His work covered 1963-1965, of which only for 1963 he had the 
figures of actual outcome, while Table 23 in this work is 
based on the figures for actual outcome of the years 1962-1964. 
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1962-1964 is calculated as the difference between the G.N.P. at 
current prices and net income transfers to the Public Sector. 
The latter is computed as total taxes and government revenue 
proper minus income transfers from the General and ;~exed Budgets 
to the private sector and the government interest payments abroad. 
The reason for the deduction of the interest payments is that these 
payments have been deducted from G.D.P. to reach G.N.P., while 
obviously they do not reduce domestic private income. The private 
saving in the table is the retained income found as the difference 
between the private disposable income and private consumption. The 
figures on private consumption as such are not available. Although 
the Annual Programmes· have the tables of balance of resources, they 
include the private consumption into the residual item called "Other 
Expenditures" which is defined as private consumption plus stock 
changes in the public and private sectors minus capital and income 
1 transfers from the General .and Annexed Budgets • Consequently, we 
-i~l-so:·b.:~v.eto estimate private consumption. This is done for 1962-
1964 in Table 24 in which private consumption is estimated as a 
residual2• 
1. S.P.O.,- 1965 Annual Programme, Ankara 1964, PP• 12. 
2. In both Table 23 and Table 24, recourse has been had to a good 
many sources for statistical data. But the heterogeneity in 
sources has been avoided by confining ourselves to the S.P.O. 
figures. O.E.C.D. and Hansen rel,Y:;."! on the S.P.O. figures. 
The tax figures are undisputed. Only for the government interest 
payments abroad in 1964 ·•o~ 1965 has recourse been had to the 
State Institute of Statistics, whose figures in almost every field 
differ from those of the S.P.O. 
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TABLE 2) 
ESTI~~T.ES OF PRIVATE SAVINGS, 1962-1964 
(000 million T.L. at current prices) 
G.N".P. 
Taxes & Government Revenue Proper: 
···,·:. G.eneral. Budget: 
:·:: ... : Di:re.ct··, Taxes 
:·· · .. Indi;rec.t.~~Taxes 
Annexed Budget Revenue 
Revolving Funds 
S.E.E. Resources Proper 
Local Administrations 
Total Taxes & Government Revenue 
Proper 
Minus Income Transfers from General 
& Annexed Budgets to Private 
Sector 
Minus Government Interest Payments 
Abroad 
Net Income Transfers to Public Sector 
Private Disposable Income 
Private Consumption 
Private Savil)g 
Ratios: (as percentages) 
SPrivatefG.N.P. 
5Private/YPrivate 
~ ~ivatefA YPrivate 
(APS) 
(MPS) 
1962 196) 
55·24 62·76 66·82 
2•)3 
5·52 
0·36 
0·12 
0•33 
1•27 
9"93 
0•24 
9··39 
45•85 
42•60 
3·25 
2·75 
6·95 
0·39 
0•24 
0·87 
1"22 
12·42 
0·24 
11·62 
51•14 
46•89 
4·25 
6•7 
8·3 
19·0 
3·02 
7·50 
0•40 
0·21 
1•03 
1·47 
0•.73 
0·24 
12·66 
54·16 
49·10 
5·0G 
7·4 
9·) 
27·0 
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No~e on the sources of Table 23. 
The G.N.P. figure for 1962 was taken from 
O.E.C.D., Turkey, Paris 1964, p. 43; those for 1963-
65· were from S.P.O. A Summary of 1966 Annual Pro-
gramme, p. 64. 
For the sources of data about the General and 
Annexed Budgets revenues see Table 35, and for the 
S.E.E •. Resources Table 37 of this essay. The data 
for Revolving FUnds and Local Administrations were 
taken from S.P.O. A Summary of 1966 Annual 
Programme, p. 10. 
I have been unable to trace the part of the 
total transfers from the consolidated budget going 
to the private sector. The figures of the income 
transfers to the private sector for 1963 and 1964 
were taken from Prof. Bent Hansen, op. cit., p. 8 
Table 4," the 1963 figure being actual outcome and 
1964 figure expected outcome. The 1962 figure 
was estimated as follows: Transfers to local 
authorities and-private sector together in 1961-
1963 are shown in O.E.C.D., op. cit., p. 27. 
Transfers to the local authorities in 1960-1963 
are·given in S.P.O., 1964 Annual Programme, p. 278, 
Table 158. F.rom these data, the income transfers 
to the private sector in 1962 have been found to 
be about 300 million T.L. The same estimation 
for 1963 gives a figure corresponding to the 
Hansen figure for 1963. 
The figures of government interest payments 
abroad for 1962 and 1963 have been taken from 
O.E.C.D., op. cit., p. 43, Table 1; and that for 
1964 from the Budget Preamble for the 1966 Fiscal 
Year, p. 54, Table 1, which .quotes the State 
Institute of Statistics. 
The basis of the estimation of private 
consumption are explained in the note on Table 24. 
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TABLE 24 
UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN 1962-1964. 
(000 million T.L. at current prices) 
1962 1963 1964 
G.N.P. 55·25 62·76 66·82 
Foreign Deficit 2"18 2·70 0•95 
Available Resources 57•43 65·46 67•77 
Private Consumption 42"60 46•89 49·10 
Public Current Expenditure 6·50 7•34 7•79 
Public Fixed Investment 4·23 5·14 5·66 
Private Fixed Investment 3•60 4•69 4·72 
Stock Changes 0•50 1·40 0·50 
Total Uses 57"43 65-46 67•77 
Note on Table 24:-
The G.N.P. figures have been taken from Table 23 
above. 
The data on the current account deficit have been 
taken from O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, p. 22, Table 8, 
where they are expressed in terms of u.s.~. The con-
version to the Turkish Lira in Table 24 has been made 
according to that per u.s.~= T.L. 9. 
The figurer: for Public Current Expenditures in 1964 
ha:s ·:~:· ·:~ · ___ .-;; been taken from S.P.O., op. cit., pp. 69, 
Table 11, and the figure for that in 1962 has been 
arrived at by adding the current expenditures of the 
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Note on Table 24 (contd.):-
local authorities given in S.P.O., 1965 Annual Programme, 
pp. 310, Table 224, to the current expenditure from the 
General and Annexed Budgets given in O.E.C.D., Turkey 
1963/64, p. 27. 
For the sources of the data about the public invest-
ment, see Table 3 9 of this essay. 
The 1962 Private Investment figure was taken from 
O.E.C.D., Turkey 1963/64, p. 38, Table 10. The Private 
Investment figures for 1963 and 1964 are arrived at 
thus: 1963 and 1964 private investments can be calculated 
as 4,400 million ~.L. and 4,264 million T.L. at 1961 
prices respectively from the data given in S.P.O., A 
Summary of 1966 Annual Programme, pp. 48-49, Tables 5 and 
6. These figures can be converted to those at current 
prices by means of a special price index for investment 
goods which I have arranged according to the information 
given in S.P.O., 1964 Annual Programme, p. 35; 1965 
Annual Programme, p. 10; A Summary of 1966 .Annual Pro-
gramme, p. 2. The index is this: 1961 = 100; 1962 = 
104•4; 1963 = 106·7; 1964 = 110•7. 
There are no official data on stock changes in;the 
Turkish econo~. Those given in the table are the 
estimates by B. Hansen in his report. 
As seen from Table 23, private savings have increased from 
3,250 million T.L. in 1962 to 5,060 million T.L. in 1964. Its 
share in G.N.P. has gone up from 5·9% in 1962 to 7•4% in 1964. 
The per capita private saving in real terms increased from 111 T.L. 
in 1962 to 160 T.L. in 1964, i.e. a 44% increase during three years1• 
1. The saving figure for 1964 in Table 23 v1as deflated to 1962 
constant prices according to the wholesale price index, given in 
the r-'T.inistry of Finance, Budget Preamble for 1966 Fiscal Year, 
p. 86, which is this: 1953 = 100; 1961 = 246; 1962 = 260; 
1963 = 271; 1964 = 269; 1965 = 290. The population of Turkey 
has been estimated as 29•18 million in 1962 and 31·39 million in 
1964 by means of interpolation of the results of the 1960 and 
1965 population census. 
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The considerable increase in private savings reflects the 
fact that private consumption has increased at a much slower pace 
than private disposable income, i.e., 7·~ p.a. versus 8·6% p.a. 1 • 
The average propensity-to-save (A.P.S.) of the private sector rose 
from 7·1% in 1962 to 8•3% in 1963 and 9·~ in 1964. The increasing 
A.P.S. has been achieved through maintaining a marginal propensity-
to-save (M.P.S.) well above the A.P.S. (see Table 23). 
It is significant to note that the average as well as the 
marginal propensity-to-save in 1964 were higher than in 1963 in 
spite of the fact that G.N.P. in real terms grew by only 4·2% in 
1964 against by 7•5% in 1963. This may be taken as an indicator 
that there is no immediate relationship between the rate of growth 
of national income and the saving behaviour of the private sector 
in the very short-run. 
Despite the above-mentioned favourable developments, the 
rate of private saving in Turkey is still much lower than in the 
advanced countries and many underdeveloped countries. Although 
the statistical shortcomings lessen the accuracy of the comparison 
1. The discrepancy between the average rate of growth of G.N.P. in 
money terms during ~962-1964, that is, about 10,% p.a. and that 
of private disposable income, that is, a·&,% p.a., reflects the 
fact that net income transfers to Public Sector have increased 
at a greater rate than G.N.P. during that period. 
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TABLE 25 
RATE OF GROSS PRIVATE SAVING IN SELECTED COUNTRIESa 
(percentage of gross domestic product) 
Advanced Gross Private Underdeveloped Gross Domestic Domestic Countries Saving Saving Countries Saving 
Australia 26·1 19·6 Burma. 14 
Japan 28·7 21•0 South Africa 14 
Canada 22•5 18·2 Morocco 11 
l(etherland.s 25·7 17•0 Brazil 10 
United States 18·6 15·2 Ceylon 9 
:Belgium 17·6 17·3 Turkey 14 
United Kingdom 15•2 11·5 India 1 
Spain 8 
Greece 4 
Portugal 6 
Privateb 
Saving 
11 
10 
1 
1 
1 
7•5 
6 
6 
3 
3 
a. The data refer to the averages for 1950-59, except for 
:Belgium and Turkey for which the data refer to the 
averages for 1950-58 and 1962-64 respectively • 
. b. Public corporations included, except in Turkey. 
Sources: For Turkey, G.D.P. figures have been calculated from 
Table 23 as G.N.P. minus indirect taxes plus income 
from rest of the world which equals to the government 
interest payments abroad in the case of Turkey. 
Private saving figures have been taken from Table 23. 
Domestic saving figures have been calculated from 
Table 24 as total capital formation minus foreign 
deficit. With these information the ratios given 
in the above table have been computed. 
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For other countries; U.N., World Economic Survey 
1960, New York 1961, pp. 20 & 62. 
provided by Table 25, it no doubt gives an idea about the relative 
position of the countries with respect to the rate of private 
saving. The rate of private saving in Turkey compares favourably 
with that in other underdeveloped countries1 But \'Then compared 
with the private saving ratios in advanced countries, the extent 
of the task confronting the Turkish private sector in increasing 
the share of its saving in G.D.P. can be envisaged better~ Indeed, 
the plan projects that the share of the private sector in the 
increasing total investment would grow bigger in the course of the 
fifteen-year perspective plan and that the private savings would 
grow at the same rate as the private investment. This means that 
not only the share of private savings in G.D.P. but that in total 
domestic saving must also approach towards those observed in 
advanced countries. The share of the private sector in the total 
domestic savings in Turkey is smaller than in all the countries 
included in Table 25, except Portugal. This might at first sight 
give the impression that the efforts to maintain a large share of 
domestic savings by the government must have been responsible for 
1. It must be noted that the private saving ratios in the under-
developed countries other than Turkey shown in the table include 
the saving of public enterprises. In the advanced countries of 
the table, the level of saving of public enterprises, which is 
not included in the private saving, differs between 0·8% and 
1"5% of G.D.P. 
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the low rate of private saving. This is, however, contradicted 
by the fact that both public and private savings have increased 
substantially in the period 1962-1965. 
II 
OBSTACLES TO A HIGHER RATE OF PRIVATE SAVINGS 
The relatively low level of private saving in Turkey as 
compared with advanced countries is usually explained by the low 
level of per capita incomes in Turkey1 . A generalization of what 
might be correct for an individual when applied to a group may 
lead to such an incorrect deduction. Various studies have shown 
that there is no systematic relationship between the proportion 
of national income saved and the level of per capita national 
. 2 1ncome • A similar argument can be put forward with respect to 
the relationship between the private disposable income ·and the 
rate of private saving. As for the private corporate saving, 
the fiscal policies of governments and dividend and depreciation 
policies of corporations are as effective determinants of the 
level of corporate saving as their current revenues3. Therefore, 
the bigger the share of corporations in total private saving the 
1. For example, K. Kurda9, op. cit., p. 25; and B. fistttnel, 
op. cit., p. 16. 
2. s. Kuznets, "International Differences in Capital Formation 
and Financing" in Six Lectures on Economic Growth, New York 
1955, pp. ; and "Economic Growth and Income Inequality11 
in American Economic Review, March 1955; also, various U.N. 
publications referred to in this chapter. 
3. U.N., World Economic Survey 1960, New York 1961, pp. 
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weaker the relation between private disposable income and private 
saving. No statistical data are available in relation to the 
size of revenues and savings of the corporation sector in Turkey. It 
is, nevertheless, possible to have a rough idea of them by means of 
some relevant indicators. According to the Corporation Tax 
statistics, the net revenue after direct taxes of the corporations 
subject to the Corporation Tax was 2 per cent of G.N.P. and 2·5% of 
the private disposable income in 19621• Of this, however, only a 
little more ·than i was the net revenue after taxes of the Turkish 
1. These ratios have been calculated on the basis of the data 
given in Institut National de la Statistique, Annuaire 
Statistique 1960-62, Pub. N9. 460, pp. 397-404, and Table 23 
of this essay. 
Turkish Corporations:-
A total of 2,692 corporations declared a net 
revenue of 
121 S.E.E., 
Corporation Tax . • • • • 
Total 310 million T.L. 
S.E.E.s 128 II II 
m II II 
20% withholding Income Tax 
II II 
1400 corporations declared a net loss of 
II 
.. -
A total of 1,523 corporations 565 million T.L. 
123 S.E.E. - 179 II II 
1,400 corporations 386 II II 
Net Revenue after·Taxes 
1,323 million T.L. 
348 II II 
977 II II 
192 II II 
785 
157 
628 
386 
million T.L. 
II II 
II II 
242 million T.L. 
(contd. on p. 116). 
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corporations and the remaining belonged to the foreign corporations1 • 
Dr. Ibrahim Bn@lt has estimated that the ratio of undistributed 
profits to total profits after taxes in Turkish corporate enter-
prise~ has increased from 44% in 1952 to 71% in 19602• Assuming 
1. In order not to cause an exaggerated impression of the role of 
private foreign capital in the Turkish economy the following 
clarification seems to be helpful: The Corporation Tax 
classifies the co~~orations into two groups: those which are 
subject to the tax with their whole income, and those which have 
their headquarters abroad and which are subject to the tax with 
their earnings in Turkey. It is these latter corporations 
t~At have been considered foreign corporations in this text. 
According to a recent survey made by the S.P.O. about the 
private foreign investment in Turkey, private foreign capital 
uses domestic credit facilities and colloborates with domestic 
capital to such an extent that it practically loses its foreign 
charac.ter, though maintains its status of foreign corporation. 
For example, the foreign corporations included in the survey 
altogether have brought in a foreign capital of 271 million T.L. 
but they obtained the collaboration of 468 million T.L. domestic 
capital; ;a of them have altogether obtained a total domestic 
credit equal to 116% of their total capital. 
2. Dr. :i:. B~t, "The Development of a Capital ]ir.arket in Turkey11 
in Capital Formation •••• , op. cit., pp. 142. He only mentions 
of a few results of his estimation and does not give details 
about it. However, he states that he has based his estimate 
on the tax returns by the corporations and stockholders. 
The ratio of net corporate saving to corporate disposable 
income is, as 1950-59 averages, BB% in Norway, 79% in Japan, 
74% in Finland, 68% in W. Germany, 54% in the U.K. , 41% in the 
U.S., 6;% in Puerto Rica, 57% in Brazil. (U.N., World Economic 
Survey 1960,· New York 1961, pp. 31 and 71). 
(contd. from page 115). 
Foreign Corporations: Revenue before taxes 
Corporation Tax 
1,400 million T.L. 282 II II 
1,118 II II 
2ofo withholding tax 223 
Net Revenue after taxes 895 11 11 
Total Net Revenue after Taxes of the Private Corporation Sector: 
242 million T.L. + 895 million T.L. = 1,137 million T.L. This 
amount may slightly differ from the actual amount since we have 
not considered various exemptions from the withholding Income Tax. 
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that the latter·ratio holds good for 19~2, the contribution by 
Turkish private corporations to the total private saving in 1962 
. 1 
is calculated as 6% • We have no data at our disposal with 
respect to the savings by foreign corporations operating in 
Turkey. However, from the 11profit t:ransfers 11 item ($2 million = 
18 million T.L.) in the Balance of Payments it can be computed 
that only a small fraction, that is, about ~' of the net revenues 
of foreign corporations was remitted abroad in 1962. Fuxthermore, 
a survey by the S.P.O. of a sample of foreign corporations has 
revealed that the profits of such corporations are to a great extent 
reinvested. From these two indications it could be reasonably 
supposed that the retention ratio in the foreign corporations 
operating in Turkey is simila~ to that in the Turkish private 
corporations. Hence, the total corporate saving may be put at 
something around one-quarter of the total private saving2• 
Production in the private sector is dominated by unincor-
porated and small enterprises. To illustrate this matter, L~ 
industry only the production of the small units employing less 
than ten workers or machines of less than 10 H.P., which are about 
1. (71% x 242 million T.L.)/2,900 million T.L. = 0•06. 
2. In India, corporate income after tax comprised less than 1% of 
national income and corporate saving accounted for 5•8% of. 
total private saving in 1950's. In Japan these percentages 
are 13 and 53, respectively. (U.N., "Financing of Economic 
Growth" in the Economic Survey of Asia_& the Far East 1961, 
Bangko~ 1962, pp. 41-65). 
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60,000 in number, constitutes 34% of the income that private enter-
prise creates in industry. The number of enterprises employing 
more than ten workers or machines of more than 10 H.P. is about 
5,200, only about one-third of which are of incorporated form1 • 
No study, to my knowledge, has been undertaken to estimate the 
saving of the unincorporated business sector in Turkey. It may 
be argued that the rate of saving in this sector is likely to be 
higher than in the incorporated business sector because of the 
greater difficulties encountered by the former in obtaining external 
finance. This favourable factor, however, might be more than 
outweighed by some other considerations. First of all, the high 
ratio of undistributed to total profits in the corporations is due, 
as pointed out b,y Dr. ~t, to the inclusion of banks and insurance 
companies among the incorporated enterprises. Secondly, the system 
of taxation of corporation discriminates in favour of undistributed 
profits2, whereas no such an inducement exists for unincorporated 
enterprises. Furthermore, today the small businessmen in Turkey 
are not characterized by the acquisitiveness of capitalism, and, 
hence, do not endeavour to create an ever growing expansion. 
Their narrow-horizons coupled with the difficulties in financing 
1. S.P.O., Development Plan 1963-1967, pp. 70; and, I.N.S., 
Annuaire Statistique 1960-1962, pp. 400. 
2. See Chapter 5, pp.l84-19A of this dissertation. The conditions 
of the enjoyment of various incentives in the income tax 
m~y be fulfilled more easily by big corporations than by 
individuals and small unincorporated enterprises. 
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and marketing make them rather content with a comfortable living. 
While these factors work so as to result in a somewhat lower rate 
of saving by unincorporated as compared with incorporated enter-
prises, the greater identity between ownership and management in 
the former also makes for a similarity betlveen the saving behaviour 
of the small businesses and households. 
While the contribution of the corporate sector to the total 
domestic saving is limited "'i th its small share in the national 
income, the same cannot be argued for the households sector as a 
whole, including unincorporated enterprises. Nor could the low 
level of average per capita income be the cause of the low rate of 
households saving. In fact, several U.N. studies1 have demonstrated 
that the range of variation in the saving propensity of ~ouseholds 
in various countries is not related to either the absolute level or 
to the share of households income in national income. Notwith-
standing great disparities of households income both Burma and 
Japan saved more than ten per cent of it; whereas in Taiwan, where 
personal disposable income is higher than in Burma, the rate of 
households saving l·tas only one-half as high2• 
1. World Economic Survey 1960, New York 1961; Economic Survey of 
Asia and the Far East 1961, Bangkok 1962; World Economic Survey 
1965, New York 1966. 
2. U.N., "Financing of Economic Growth" in the Economic Survey of 
Asia and the ~ar East 1961, pp. 41-65. 
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It is ~~erefore more reasonable to explain the low rate 
of private saving in ~key by the lack of adequate desire for 
saving. Unless the factors accounting for the lack of adequate 
desire for saving are removed the increasing of national income 
could hardly lead automatically to a higher rate of private saving1 • 
Such factors need, of course, be sought in relation to those income 
classes ,.,rhich have income surpluses over their essential consump-
tion, since only they can afford saving. As manifested by the 
study of the distribution of income and wealth in Chapter l, the 
distributional inequalities in Turkey are, at least, as great as 
in the advanced countries. It seems, however, that the very 
existence in Turkey of the highly unequal income and wealth distri-
bution has not been sufficient to secure a high rate of private 
savings, particularly, of households savings. This means that 
the great distributional inequality in Turkey does not coincide 
with the concentration of income and wealth in the hands of those 
2 income groups with strong propensities to save • The main factors 
l. As Keynes thought the proportion of consumption to income can be 
expected to decline as income rises. But consumption function 
cannot be linear, non-proportional and stable in a developing 
country like Turkey, where the scope for the development of wants 
and needs is immense and where a swift development is projected. 
This has been proved empirically by S. Kuznet in relation to the 
U.s·., and provoked new consumption theories by A. Smithies, 
Du.senberry and Friedman, etc. (G. Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory, 
New York 1961, The Mac~tillan Comp., pp. 236-246). 
2. "The ratio of savings to national income is a function not just 
of inequality, bu~ more precisely, of the ratio of profits to 
national income" (W. A. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 227). In Ceylon 46% 
and in the Philippines 56% of households income is classified as. 
enterpreneurial income from property; but the households in the 
(contd. at foot of page 121). 
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accounting for the weakness of the·saving propensit.y of the well-
to-do class in Turkey are particularly related to th~ee structural 
de£ects which are:-
(1) the prevalence of a strong demonstration effect and 
of the popular habit of conspicuous consumption; 
(2) the static character of the wealth structure; and 
(3) the lack of a financial superstructure to provide 
attractive saving means1 . 
It is not possible to describe in measurable terms the 
effect of emulative consumption on the rate of private saving. 
However, the enormous \V"aste of resources in luxury consumption is 
conspicuous to anyone travelling around the country or going 
through the modern Turkish literature, even daily newspapers. 
The present state of advanced international co-operation embracing 
Turkey in every field, the advanced techniques of communication 
and the democratic System of government make it impossible for 
Turkey to repeat the Japanese experience of containing the 
consumption of the masses to the traditional patterns. T.he 
1. These are of course inte~-related factors; the inter-relation 
is particularly strong between (2) and (1), and (2) and (3). 
(contd. from page 120):-
Philippines have been dissaving. In Japan the proportion of 
households income appropriated by enterprise and property income 
has been the same as in Ceylon, but the rate of household saving 
there has been 2i; times as high as in Ceylon. (U.N. , Financing 
of Economic Growth, op.cit.). 
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American way of life is, through the high-income classes, permeating 
even among the masses, but with its attitudes towards consumption 
. 1 
and not towards investment, savillgD"S and v1orking • The political 
1. P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey write in their "The Economics of 
Underdeveloped Countries", Camb. Univ. Press. Camb. 1963, 
p. 139.: "It is not obvious vthy the high standards of consump-
tion in richer countries alone should arouse interest. 
Accumulation and investment as means to an improved standard 
of living may be imitated; ••••• It is of interest, for example, 
that immigrants in rich countries not only gradually assimilate 
the local habits of consumption but also that many of them save 
a very high proportion of their income .••••• ". I think Bauer 
& Yamey are led to a mistaken view vti th respect to international 
demonstration effect by their belief in unhampered trade 
between developed and poor countries. First of all, it is 
obvious that consumption patterns, and not saving and invest-
ment habits, of rich countries will be imitated because (a) it 
is more appealing to human nature, particularly in under-
developed countries: (b) consumption pattern ·of rich countries 
is more conspicuous to the people of underdeveloped countries 
than their saving and investment patterns; (c) Today, every 
effort is ~d.~'~ to expand markets for the commodities which may 
be deemed as luxury for poor countries while no such effort is 
.. :n::_ta:de to develop the saving and investment habits of the people 
of poor countries. In the second place, the example given by 
the authors is not relevant to the issue for these reasons: 
(a) It is attitudes of the society in underdeveloped countries 
that induce the individual to indulge in emulative consumption. 
To observe the behaviour of an immigrant in an advanced country 
and then to reach a judgement from this observation about the 
behaviour of the poor country's people is not convincing at 
all. (b) An immigrant is not the typical representative of 
the people of his native country simply because being an 
immigrant proves that he is dissatisfied with the status quo 
and showing enterpreneurial habit to take risks. 
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struggle for power has been proved to lead to success through the 
promises for higher consumption without mentioning the sacrifices 
necessary for it. T.he politicians' slogan that Turkey is a state 
of non-strata is endeavoured to be proved true by low- and, 
particularly, middle-income classes indulging in conspicuous 
consumption. This process is fed by the continuous incorporation 
of new wants and needs in the living standard of high-income classes. 
T.he Development Plan envisages fiscal and credit policy 
measures in order to cope with luxury consumption. In this 
connexion, the tougher rules of taxation on buildings introduced 
from the beginning of 1963 and the tighter credit market since the 
end of 1963, coupled, in both cases, with a discrimination against 
luxury buildings, have checked the increases in the construction 
of luxury buildings1 • According to the license-statistics, the 
share of blocks of flats in both the total value of, and total area 
covered by, new construction has been declining since 1962 in favour 
of tenement houses, industrial and commercial buildings, and, 
particularly, cultUral and social constructions2• The introduction 
of a new tax on private cars and taxation of non-basic commodities 
1. O.E.C.D., Turkey, 1965/66, Paris 1966, P• 40. 
2. Ministry of Finance, Budget Preamble for 1966 Fiscal Year, 
Ankara 1965, p. 12. 
- l24 -
at higher rates than the necessities, etc., have no doubt served 
as curbs on emulative consumption. But the problem is so deeply 
rooted in the social value pattern and wealth structure that it 
cannot be solved with incentive measures such as of the monetary 
and fiscal policy. In the long run, education can do much good 
in incorporating the "rationale" element into the value patterns. 
However, the close interaction between the value pattern and 
wealth structure of any community suggests that the adverse effects 
of emulative consumption on the rate of saving could not be reduced 
to a minimum unless the wealth structure is revised. 
In Turkey, the effects of the present wealth structure go, 
indeed, well beyond a mere inducement of consumption through 
demonstration effect. As will be seen shortly, its static character 
is the crucial obstacle to raising the rate of private saving1 • 
In Turkey, only a fraction of total real wealth is produced wealth; 
the major part of total wealth consists of natural resources such 
as farm land; mineral resources, forests, fisheries, etc., the 
1. The following analysis of the relationship between the static 
wealth structure and the low rate of private saving in Turkey 
is based on a study by Prof. Anders 8stlind, of UNTAO, who has 
been requested by the S.P.O. to prepare it as the basis of the 
chapters dealing with monetary policy, wages and price policies 
of the First Five-Year Development Plan: 11Scope for Non-
inflationary Economic Expansion in Turkey", Ankara May 19.62, 
mimeographed, pp. 107. 
- 125 -
remainder being dwellings, farm buildings, simple tools and 
means of transportation, animals, seed, inventories and the like. 
The sum total of real wealth does not change much. Putting it 
differently, net real investments are low relative to the total 
wealth. Most individual fortunes are made up predominantly of 
real assets, the financial components being meagre. The prefer-
ences of individual wealth-owners are oriented rather towards 
existing property objects. Some transactions in real wealth 
objects may take place but without anything being added to the 
total real wealth. This general static frame characterizes 
predominantly the wealth structure in the rural economy of Turkey 
but less so in the urban sector where the dynamic-wealth-owners 
are more frequently met. ~ic-wealth-owners, compared with 
static-wealth-owners, have a wider register of investment 
alternatives and wider knowledge and better competence in 
appraising capital values. They are the potential force for 
industrial and commercial development. Yet, the majority of 
dynamic-wealth-owners do not at present give priority on their 
preference scales to investments in modern industrial and 
commercial enterprises but to traditional investment in land, 
particularly urban and potentially urban land. In this inclina-
tion towards investment in land dynamic-wealth-owners are attracted 
by the prospects for big capital gains, while the static-wealth-
' 
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owners hang on investments in land for such reasons as prestige, 
ignorance of alternative investment outlets and lack of knowledge 
and skill necessary to deal with investments in assets other than 
land. It is, however, understandable that as long as the dynamic-
wealth-owners are still very few and as long as they have only 
limited access to credits at moderate rates of interest there will 
be much land that will stand out as undervalued in the opinion of 
dynamic-wealth-owners. 
:-. ~: It caf):'''jb~e~IEfeen that the above-described wealth pattern 
in Turkey off·e*s''::a -nlimbar·-ot obstacles to increasing the rate ·of 
private saving. Firstly, as long as the static-wealth-owners 
dominate over the major part of wealth the rate of investment in 
private sector is bound to be low. In Turkey, saving and investing 
units in most cases are the same. Therefore, the domination of 
the wealth-owners with narrow-horizons as regards investment 
alternatives result in lack of inducement for saving. Secondly, 
it is apparent that in a country with a wealth structure of the 
type observed above profits cannot constitute a significant part 
of the private sector's income. In Turkey, most incomes out of 
which some saving could be afforded are in the form of rental 
incomes and capital gains on real estate; and, these are known as 
flowing in large part towards lavish consumption expenditures. 
- 127 -
Thirdly, the orientation of the most wealth-o~mers towards 
investments in existing assets, is the main obstacle for the 
growth of the private sector in Turkey, though it is sometimes 
argued that it is the lack of adequate saving that holds back 
growth in the private sector. As a matter of fact, capital 
formation and saving can escalate each other if only a dynamic 
character can be infused into the present wealth structure in 
Turkey. Finally, the prevailing pattern of wealth structure in 
Turkey is certainly not conducive to the flourishing of a 
financial superstructure which would stimulate private savings 
by providing saving means of various types and which would secure 
the using of available savings in the most productive fields. 
The Development Plan contemplates various Government 
action to change the composition of private wealth so as to accord 
a dynamism to it. Of these, the following are of vital 
importance:-
1. A progressive land policy; 
2. To induce the preferences of dynamic-wealth-owners in 
favour of the creation of real industrial and commercial 
capital and stimulate the growth of private corporations 
by introducing new legislation, especially tax reforms; 
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1 As it is stated in the 1963 Annual Programme , a land 
reform is the precondition for the success of the measures 
envisaged in the Development Plan as regards the Agricultural 
Sector. Attention here will, however, be focused only on the 
possible effects of the land reform proposed by the Plan on the 
wealth pattern and saving propensities; and, it will be assumed 
that the safeguards in such a reform will be effective in ~Ain-
taining and, perhaps, raising, the agricultural productivity. 
The studies for a comprehensive Land Reform Bill started 
as early as in 1961. The main features of the proposed Reform 
w·ere the limitation of maximum and minimum size of holdings 
according to the types of farming and varying from one district 
to another, and the protection of the rights of share-croppers 
and tenant farmers by the special legislation2• The expropria-
tion of land-holdings above the maximum size would serve two 
important purposes. First, it would wither away the absentee 
landlordism and the holding of land with non-commercial purposes. 
Secondly, the ex-landlords would be endowed with financial assets 
which are likely, if adequate incentives are given, to be placed 
1. S.P.O., 1963 Annual Programme, pp. 303. 
2. Ibid, pp. 303-304. 
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under the disposal of entrepreneurs. These changes in the wealth 
pattern of the well-to-do agrarian class would stimulate them to 
curb their lavish consumption expenditures and to put their 
resources into profitable uses1 , since only in this way they could 
maintain their higher status in the society. As for the rest of 
farmers, those who would become owners would have an incentive to 
save and invest more on their own land. Moreover, thefixing of 
rents and also fixing the share of landowner in the crop-sharing-
system would make secure the small peasant' thus encouraging him 
to save and invest in the land. It is, however, likely that the 
land reform would create tendencies towards increasing consumption. 
Although the part of the increased consumption directed towards 
the manufactured goods could help in expanding the limited market, 
the other part directed towards food crops might result in a 
reduction of the supply of foods to the market and in a reduction 
in the cultivation of cash crops and export crops. It would 
thepefore be necessary to give more positive inducement to the 
1. Since the ex-landlords are neither accustomed nor willing to 
keep substantial financial assets they may try to re-invest in 
urban land and buildings. But the market would then be so 
narrow that even a marginal increase in demand '\'rill force urban 
land and building prices up to a level that makes them unattrac-
tive investment alternatives. The scope for residential house 
building is also limited by demand factors. There is then no 
course open to ex-landlords who are anxious to get rid of their 
11excessive 11 financial assets other than to look more to new 
investments in industrial and commercial ventures. 
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farmer to invest than the mere ownership spirit. 
Despite the great emphasis placed on a land reform in 
the Development Plan and Annual Programmes, the landed interests 
have so far succeeded in obstructing the progress of the Bill in 
the Parliament. Following the change in power in the October 
1965 election, the hopes for a radical land reform have to be 
deferred till the next election in 1969. 
The tax measures which are designated to affect the 
investment preferences of the wealth-owners are studied in the 
next chapter. The conclusion arrived at there is that the 
incentive measures in the present tax system are incompatible 
with the Plan's objectives, i.e., they favour the use of resources 
in agriculture and in speculative investments. 
III 
PRIVA'.rE SAVLT\JGS THROUGH FINANCIAL 
ASSETS 
The kinds of ·assets through which savings a.re held do not· 
have much significance from the viewpoint of this dissertation. 
The attention in this dissertation is concentrated on the level of, 
and changes in, the aggregate level of domestic savings in relation 
to G.N.P. Whether. savings are largely held in the form of physical 
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assets or in the form of financial assets does not have any direct 
relationship with the level of savings/G.N.P. ratio. Similarly, 
whether people hoard in cash or purchase saving bonds has nothing 
to do directly with the level of savings/G.N.P. ratio. For the 
act of saving is essentially an act of restraint from current 
consumption. 
The kinds of assets thro~h which savings are held 
constitute a problem '\.othich is more relevant to the investment side 
rather than to the savings side of the financing process. If 
savings are largely directed towards saving institutions the 
authorities will have greater control over the allocation of 
savings to various uses than they will have if savings are held 
in cash hoards, jewelry, or the like. It is true, the authorities 
can extend credit for development projects, without inflationary 
effect, to the amount of money withdrawn from circulation into 
cash hoards1 ; but, money in hoards may be "hot 11 in the sense that 
it may suddenly be spent. 
The private savings through financial assets are shown in 
Table 26. In Turkey, as in all underdeveloped countries, the 
1. B. Higgins, Economic Development, London 1959, p. 484. 
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financial assets which serve as saving media are of very limited 
types. The most important of them is the bank deposits. In 
the second place, currency, saving bonds and contributions to the 
Pensions Fund can be counted. Finally, the contributions to the 
Workers' Insurance Fund may be expected to develop as an efficient 
medium of saving in future as the industrialization and the 
organisation of workers gain momentum. 
TABLE 26 
PP.IVATE SAVINGS THROUGH FINANCIAL ASSETS, 1960-1964. 
Million T.L. 
Changes in: 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
5· 
6. 
Currency 422 312 387 399 909 
Demand deposits with 
banks 111 369 579 813 1094 
Time deposits with 
banks 255 305 68 410 227 
Saving bonds 
- 407 407 478 542 
Pensions Fund 375 459 497 580 627 
Workers' Insurance 
Fund 43 48 54 61 71 
.. 
Sources.: Banque Centrale de la Republique de Turquie S.A., 
Bulletin Mensuel, Avril-Mai, No. 4-5, Ankara 1965. 
Institut Nationa1e de 1a Statistique, Annuaire 
Statistique 1960-1962, Pub. No. 460, Ankara 1964. 
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The first item in Table 26 shows the changes in the 
volume of currency (banknote.s plus coins) circulating outside the 
banks. The fact is sometimes missed that the currency held by 
the public represents a part of the total savings in the sense 
that the current consumption of goods and services is foregone in 
d t . "tl or er o acqu1re 1 • Since the Turkish Lira is not convertible 
it is not necessary for the authorities to ensure that a substan-
tial fraction of the resources handed over to them in return for 
currency is held in the form of gold, or of foreign exchange 
2 
easily convertible into gold • The increase in the currency in 
circulation is backed mainly by Government Bonds. This means 
that the Government may obtain command over a part of private 
savings b,y increasing the currency. There are, however, some 
limitations over this method of financing the Public sector, 
which will be explained in Chapter 6. 
The Commercial banks and the Agricultural Bank, which is 
a State Economic Enterprise, play a widespread role all over the 
country in the collection of small savings. With their branches 
1. E. Nevin, Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries, 
London 1961, p. 4· 
2. If a part of the currency increase is backed by foreign exchange, 
this means that foreign governments acquire command over 
resources foregone by the Turkish public in order to hold more 
currency. The same explanation holds good for use of gold as 
backing, since gold is not extracted in Turkey. 
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extending to the remote parts of the country and with their 
various schemes to attract deposits from the public, they may be 
considered as inducing the public to save more and as mobilizing 
the private savings. However,· a study by Dr. 0. Yenal has shown 
that the volume of total deposits in Turkey is closely related to 
the volume of currancy in circulation1 •. In other words, the 
people have deposits with banks mainly for liquidit,y purpo~es. 
This, of course, does not alter the fact that deposits constitute 
a part of total private savings; but it does make deposits a 
very volatile part of private savings. Consequently, the 
commercial banks and the Agricultural Bank cannot use their 
resources to a great extent f:Prfinancing ~ capital formation. 
Saving Bonds are a recently introduced device of compul-
sory saving. Those who are subject to Income Tax are bound to 
accept saving bonds to the value of a certain percentage of their 
income. This percentage, which is a flat rate for all taxpayers 
and which cannot be higher than 3%, is determined by the l1inistry 
of Finance. Varying exemption limits are considered for different 
kinds of incomes. Saving Bonds are not transfera~le for ten years2• 
1. During 195}-1962 the ratio of deposits to currency stood around 
· 2.~ 0. Yenal, op. cit., pp. 22-23. . 
2. These particulars were those prevailing by the mid-1965. Some 
changes in them had taken place and substantial alterations were 
being proposed by then. For a detailed account of the practice 
of Saving Bonds in Turkey, one may be referred to these studies: 
Articles by Alpaslan Onay in the newspaper ''Ulus", 13-14 June, 
1964, 8 December 1964, and 15 July 1965; H. Kizilyalli, op. cit., 
92-102. -
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Saving Bonds may cause an increase in total domestic 
savings if they entail a reduction in the consumption by the Bond 
owners. As for the low-income groups, Saving Bonds may be 
regarded as contributing to the increase in domestic savings 
since the low-income earners would not have probably saved 
voluntarily. As for the middle and high income classes, Saving 
Bonds may partly cause an increase in total savings and partly 
give rise to a transfer of some private savings to the public 
sector. This is because some individuals in these income classes 
may reduce their voluntary savings as they are forced to save 
through Saving Bonds. 
Turkey does not have a well-developed social security 
system. Social securit,y services are performed on a limited 
scale by the Pensions Fund and Workers' Insurance Fund, which have 
status as State Economic Enterprises. T.he former covers all 
civil servants and military officers, while the latter is concerned 
with the employees of the S.E.E., and the large private enter-
prises but is very limited in its coverage. 
A social security system based on the principle of actuarial 
reserves will accumulate large savings, at least for a time, because 
future benefits (especially retirement and death benefits) must be 
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1 preceded by a period of building up reserves • In a mature system, 
payments would on an average equal receipts, except to the extent 
that the working population grows. However, in Turkey, where the 
coverage of the social security system is eA-pected to extend 
steadily as the area of the ''business economy" grows relative to 
the "non-business economy", the period of accumulation may be very 
long. 
The proliferation of financial institutions in Turkey cannot 
be expected to take place in a short time. For the development of 
the financial institutions of the types observed in today's advanced 
countries, it is not sufficient to have funds willing to flow into 
them but also there must be a stea~ demand for these funds by the 
business sector through the issue of bonds and shares. This 
requires that the capitalist class in Turkey must change their 
scale of preferences in relation to investment and their methods of 
financing. T.his is a time-consuming process. However, there is 
a whole range of savings institutions that can be developed at the 
present time in Turkey. For instance, post office savings, 
friendly societies, co-operative credit societies, co-operative 
1. E. M. Bernstein, "Financing Economic Growth in Underdeveloped 
Economies", in Savings in the Modern Economy, (ed.) W. W. Heller, 
The Univ. of ~tinnesota Press, Minneapolis 1953, p. 299. 
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retail societies, building societies and the like do not require 
any great specialization within the financial system. These 
institutions have proved to be effective in mobilizing the small 
savings in many underdeveloped countries1 • "If they are pushed 
right under the individual's nose, to the extent of having 
street savings groups, or factory groups, or even deductions 
from earnings at source, people save more than if the nearest 
2 
savings institution is some distance away" • 
l.United Nations (EGlFE), Mobilisation of Domestic Capital, 
Reports and Documents of the Second Working Party of Experts, 
Bangkok 1953. 
2.W.A.Lewis, op.cit., p. 229. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TAX..\TION. 
In the previous chapter we have seen that the private 
sector could not provide even half of the savings required from 
the domestic sources for the realisation of the plan targets. 
The major part of the efforts to mobilise the real resources 
for development purposes, therefore, falls upon the public sector. 
The public sector has at its disposal many instruments to obtain 
command over a particular proportion of the national income. 
The present chapter ~nll deal with taxation, which is of the 
foremost importance compared ,.lith other instruments, leaving non-
tax instruments to the next chapters. In the first section 
below, the taxation structure of Turkey will be introduced. 
This will be followed by a study of the main problems of the 
tax system. In this connection, Section II will be devoted to 
the problems of direct taxation of the agricultural sector; 
section III to the taxation of incomes and profits; and section 
IV to the taxation of commodities. Finally, the study of 
taxation will be concluded \vith an analysis of the taxation 
policy followed in the first years of the plan implementation 
and with some suggestions with respect to the policy to be 
followed in the rest of the plan period. 
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I 
THE TAXATION STRUCTURE IN TURKEY 
T.he structure of taxation in Turkey bears many characteris-
tics common to all underdeveloped countries. We have already seen 
in chapter 3 that the ratio of tax revenue to G.N.P. is around 12,% 
in Turkey. On the other hand, in many advanced countries, this 
ratio is twice as high as it is in Turkey. As seen from 
Table 27, the ratio of tax revenue to G.N.P. in Turkey is consider-
ably smaller than in all the developed countries, except Japan and 
Switzerland, and is even lower than in some underdeveloped 
countries such as Bra~il, Ceylon, Burma, the Federation of Malaya, 
and Greece. 
Only about one-third of total tax revenue in Turkey comes 
from direct taxes (taxes on income and property), whereas direct 
taxes constitute the major source of revenue in most of the 
developed countries. Indeed, the share of direct taxes in total 
tax revenue in Turkey is smaller than in ten out of the thirteen 
developed countries listed in Table 27. On the other hand, only 
four out of the fifteen underdeveloped countries in the table 
obtain through direct taxes a larger share of their total tax 
revenue than Turkey can do. 
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TABLE 27 
TAX REVENUE AND DIRECT TAXES 
in Developed and Underdeveloped Countries 
Tax revenue Direct Taxes 
Country Year as % of as % of total 
G.N.P. tax revenue 
I. Developed Countries: 
1. Australia •••••••••••• 1961 24•1 53"5 
2. Austria ••.....••.•... 1961 23•3 48•0 
3· .Belgi llJD.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1961 19•0 38·0 
4· C81l8da • •••••••••••••• 1961 13•6 63•0 
5· France ............... 1961 20·1 29•7 
6. 'Germany (Fed. Rep.) •• 1961 34·8 58•9 
1. Italy •••••••••••••••• 1961 19•3 21•5 
a. Japan •••••••••••••••• 1961 10·6 52·9 
9· Netherlands ••••••.•.• 1961 23·1 60•6 
10. Sweden •.•.•...•...•.• 1961 21·9 52•0 
11. Switzerland •••••••••• 1961 1·3 22•3 
12. United Kingdom ••••.•• 1961 ]0•0 54•8 
13. United States •••••••• 1961 24•7 76•2 
(oontd. on page 141) 
Table 27 (contd.) 
Tax revenue Direct Taxes 
Country Year as fo of as % of total 
G.N.P. tax revenue 
II. Underdeveloped 
Countries: 
1. Argentina ............. 1961 10·2 28•0 
2. Brazil •..•.•.••••..•.• 1960 16•9 23•8 
3· Btlrma ••••••••••••••••• 1961 13·3 34·6 
4· Ceylon . . • ............. 1961 19•0 25·2 
5· Colombia •••...•..•...• 1960 7•4 57·8 
6. Federation of Malaya •• 1960 20·1 22·1 
1- Greece ••••• ~ .•.••••••• 1961 13·1 20•2 
8. India1 ................ 1961 9•2 29·7 
9· Indonesia 1 1959 6•4 42•2 ............ 
10. Israel •.•....••.•••••• 1961 18·7 41•5 
11. Mexico ••••..••.......• 1960 7•6 25•8 
12. Pakistan2 ••••••••.•••• 1961 11•6 25•0 
13. Philippines ••••••••••• 1961 7•5 27•9 
14. Spain •••••••••••••.••• 1960 11•3 40·9 
15. 'lilailand . ............. 1959 8·7 10•0 
16. Turkey •••••••••••••••• 1961 11•6 34"1 
1. As percent of national income. 
2. As percent of net national product at 1949-52 prices. 
Sources: as taken from K. S. KrisbnaswaJey", "'lhe Evolution of tax 
structure in a Development Policy 11 in the Government 
Finance and Economic Development, edited by 
A. T. Peacock and G. Hauser, Paris 1965, pp. 75-90. 
1. G.N.P. figures are as given in the International 
Financial Statistics, July 1963. 
2. Figures relating to taxes are as given in the U.N. 
Statistical Year Book, 1962. 
Note: Receipts from fiscal monopolies are considered as non-tax 
revenue. 
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The total tax revenue has increased rapidly since 1952. 
A great proportion of the increase in money terms, however, is. 
accounted for by rising prices. As seen in Table 28, although 
total tax revenue in 1964 was almost six times as great as that 
in 1952 in money terms, the increase in real terms was only 
slightly more than twice. If we take account of the population 
factor as well, it is understood that the increase in per capita 
tax has been only 56% in a twelve-year period, most of which has 
occurred after 1962. The increases in per capita tax during 
1952-1960 have been only slightly more than proportional ~dth 
the increases in per capita national income. This is observed 
from the ratio of total tax revenue to national income which 
increased from 11% in 1952 only to 11·6% in 1956 and kept the same 
level in 1960. In other words, as already shown in Chapter 3, 
income elasticity of the Turkish tax system has been around one 
(unit elasticity) during the 1950's. Only •Y"i th the beginning of 
economic planning, attempts have been made to increase the share 
of tax revenue in G.N.P. (see Table 2~.>·- ~: ~-. ··-
As for -the composition of the taxation, the income tax 
has the largest share in total tax revenue. Since its first 
application in 1949 its importance has grovm steadily with its 
share in total tax revenue risiv~ from 19% in 1952 to about 3o% 
in 1956, and to 32·6% in 1960. In recent years its importance 
(contd. at foot of page 145) 
TABLE 28 
CERTAIN TAX INDICATORS 
1952 1956 1960 1962 1963 1964 
1. Total Tax Revenue (mill. T.L. money 
terms) 1,580 2,Bl6 5,671 7,114 8,424 9,258 
2. Index of (1) 100 178 360 450 533 5~6 
3. Wholesale Price Index 100 141 243 265 276 272 
4. Total Tax Revenue in real terms 
(mill. T.L.) 1,580 1,928 2,334 2,685 3-056 3,404 
5. Index of (4) 100 122 148 170 193 215 
6. Per Capita Tax in real terms (T.L.) 71 78 84 92 102 111 
1. Index of (6) 100 110 118 120 143 156 
8. Total Tax Revenue as %of G.N.P. 11 11•6 11·6 13·0 13·4 13·0 
Sources: for (1) see Table 29.- - ··_. 
for (3) see Chapter 1, Table 8; and Chapter 4; p. llOn. 
for population figures, see Chapter 1, Table 9; and Chapter 4, p. llOn. 
for G.N.P. figures, S.P_.O •. , :p~;velopment.Plan, ·and .; ArulUal Programmes 
· for 1964 and 1965. 
I 
1-' 
~ 
VI 
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TABLE 29 
REVENUES FROM THE TAXES IN TB:::E GENERAL & ANNEXED BlJl'GETS 
(I"'illion T.L.) 
Kind of Tax 1952 1956 1960 1962 1963 1964 
Income Tax 299 840 1851 1911 2240 2419 
Corporation Tax 50 129 238 359 415 443 
Defence Tax on Buildings 5 10 24 31 36 92 
Inheritance and Gift Tax 3 10 10 13 14 16 
Motor Vehicle Tax 
- - - -
41 51 
Revenue from Abolished 
Direct Taxes* 57 58 50 22 5 2 
TOTAL DIRECT TAXES 414 1047 2173 2336 2752 3024 
Import Production Tax** 225 170 681 837 883 744 
Domestic Production and 
Expenditure Tax** 162 343 506 618 705 744 
Petroleum Production Tax*** 81 96 187 283 336 554 
Petroleum Import Treasury 
Share - - 128 180 169 182 
Banking & Insurance 
Transaction T. 27 95 227 237 342 366 
Transportation Tax 18 35 27 62 64 69 
P.T.T. Service Tax 5 7 25 27 36 40 
Customs Duty 191 193 551 737 796 948 
Defence Tax & Monopoly Rev. 209 417 634 941 1072 1193 
Sugar Consumption Tax 137 222 110 330 361 408 
Foreign Travel 
Expenditures Tax 
- -
- - 98 110 
Revenue from Abolished 
Indirect Tax 5 6 9 7 6 20 
Stamp Duty 50 84 231 276 545 565 
Real Estate Regn.Fees 23 48 83 106 134 152 
Other Duties and Fees 33 53 99 137 118 132 
TOT_~ INDIRECT TAXES 1166 1769 3498 4778 5672 6233 
TOTAL TAX Illi"'VENUE 1580 2816 5671 7114 8424 9258 
* Livestock tax till 1961, the tax on artisans and shopkeepers 
till 1956 and the tax on private cars till 1962. 
** Till 1956 it shO\oiS the revenue collections from the 11import 
and production transactions ta.x11 • 
*** Till 1956 it shows Revenue collection from the Petroleum Road 
Tax and Petroleum Consumption ~ax. 
- 145 -
TABLE 29a. 
THE SEA..."RES OF SQ!.!E IMPORTAW.r TAXES IN TOTAL T.AX R....."G:VENUE 
(as %) 
Kind of Tax 11952 1956 1960 1962 1963 
Income Tax 19·0 29-8 32·6 26·8 26·6 
Corporation Tax 3·2 4"6 4"2 5•0 4•9 
TOTAL DIRECT TAXES 26·3 37·2 38·3 32·8 32·6 
Import Production Tax 14·2 6·0 12·0 11•7 10·5 
Domestic Production T. 10·2 12·2 9•0 8·7 8·4 
Petroleum Production T. 5·1 3•4 3·3 4·0 4'0 
Banking & Insurance T. T. 1•7 3"3 4"0 3·3 4•0 
Customs Duty 12·0 1·0 10•0 10·3 9·4 
Defence Tax & Monopoly Rev. 13·2 14"8 11·2 13·2 12•7 
Sugar Consumption T. 8·6 8•0 2•0 4·6 4•3 
Stamp Duty 3·1 3·0 4·0 3·8 6·4 
Source for Tables 29 and 29a. 
Ministry of Finance, "Budget Revenues Bull., 1964" 
Ist. 1965, pp. 14-15. 
The 1964 figures are provisional. 
(contd. from page 142). 
1964 
26·1 
4·8 
32·6 
8·0 
8·0 
6·0 
4"0 
10·2 
12·9 
4•4 
6·1 
has somewhat declined and its share now stands at slightly above a 
quarter of the total tax revenue. The tax on the profits of 
corporations, namely, the Corporation Tax provides something of 
the order of ~ of total tax revenue. Thus the taxes on incomes 
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and profits together account for in recent years around 31% of 
total tax revenue while their share was 34·4% in 1956 and 36·~fo 
in 1960. The other direct taxes, i.e., defence tax on buildings, 
inheritance and gift tax and the recently levied motor vehicles 
tax are insignificant from the revenue point of view. They 
altogether amounted to only 1•7% of total tax revenue in 1964. 
Among the various indirect taxes the largest revenue is 
raised by the defence tax on, and the profits from the sale of, 
the products of the State Monopoly Administration which are the 
most widely consumed commodities, such as ci5~rettes, alcoholic 
drinks, tea, table salt, etc. This is followed by the import 
production tax and customs duty. They fluctuate in accordance 
with the external paJ~ents situation, and together provided 
18·~ of the total tax revenue in 1964. vfuen taken together, 
their share appears to have continually diminished from 26·2% in 
1952 to 22·q% in 1960 and to 19•9% in 1963. In view of the 
intention of Turkey to join the Common ~~rket it is reasonable 
to expect that the diminishing trend of revenue from the taxation 
of commodities of foreign-origin will continue in the coming 
years. The domestic Production Tax, \·lhich is an excise tax 
levied on raw materials and primary products,provided 8% of total 
tax revenue in 1964 against lc,fo in 1956. With the increasing 
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consumption of petroleum, the share of the petroleum production 
tax in total tax revenue has increased from 3·~ in 1960 to 6% in 
1964. Taxation of the consumption of sugar constituted an 
important source of revenue in the 1950's but in the 1960's its 
contribution to the total tax revenue has been only slightly above 
4% against 8·6% in 1952 and 8% in 1956. Banking and Insurance 
Transactions Tax and Stamp Duty, which fall in the main upon 
businesses and property owners, each contributes around 3-4% of the 
total tax revenue. However, the recent changes in the stamp duty 
rates raised its share to over 6% in 1963 and 1964. 
II 
TAXATION OF THE AGRICu"LTURAL SECTOR 
In the days of ~~e Ottoman Empire, both agricultural land 
and agricultural income were subject to taxation. The tax levied 
on agricultural income, namely, the tithe, constituted the most 
important source of revenue.of the Empire. However, since it had 
become an instrument of force and source of injustice, it was 
abolished by the Republican Administration in 1925. Agricultural 
incomes had not since then been directly taxed till 1963, except 
during the Second World War when the agricultural income was taxed 
both directly by the Agricultural Produce Tax and indirectly by 
the tax on exports. The taxation of agricultural land, on the 
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other hand, continues being in effect at the present time; but, 
owing to the absence of any reassessment of land values since 1936, 
it has been largely eroded. According to the 1936 cadastral 
survey and to a sample survey recently made by the University of 
Ankara, the land values in 1960 were on average 50 times the 1936 
values, whereas the increase in the land tax revenue in the same 
period has been only 2·7 fold. Accordingly, the share of the land 
tax in total tax revenue fell from 4% in 1936 to 0·~ in 19601 ~ 
Although, according to the S.P.O. estimates, the net income 
of the agricultural sector in 1961, that is, 17• 6 billion T. L •. , 
accounted for 42·~ of the net domestic product of 41"3 billion 
T.L., agricul tur~ .. }~ontributed O·e% of all direct taxation2• 
As regards the indirect tax burden of the agricultural sector, 
Mr. Kaldor estimates that, in view of the high ratio of income 
consumed directly by the pro¢ucers, its contribution could hardly 
exceed 20-2~ of the total revenue from indirect taxes, though 
he points to the impossibility of allocating the incidence of 
indirect taxation with any precision3. 
Thus, it becomes apparent that the burden of all kinds of taxes 
1. Nicholas Kaldor, Report on the Turkish Tax System, April 1962, 
mimeographed. 
2. Ibid. 
3. N. Kaldor, op. cit. 
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falling on the agricultural sector is around 5% of its income1 
against a burden of 20-25% on the rest of the economy2• 
ThrOiving a disproportionate share of the burden of taxation 
on the non-agricultural sectors does not seem to be compatible with 
the objectives and strategy of the Development Plan. It does not 
seem feasible, quite apart from the need of increasing public 
savings, to plan a growing share for the non-agricultural activi-
ties in the national income and in the total active population, on 
the one hand, and to follow a taxation policy giving every induce-
ment to the agricultural activities to expand at the expense of 
non-agricultural activities, on the other. Taking into account 
that about 15% of total investment expenditUres is planned to go 
directly into agricultural sector and that considerable benefits 
will accrue to the agricultural sector from the investments in 
1. This has been calculated on the basis of the following data: In 
1961 the revenue from direct taxation was 2626 million T.L. and 
from indirect taxation 4073 million T.L. (~linistry of Finance, 
"Budget Revenues Bulletin, Fiscal Year 1964", Istanbul 1965, 
pp. 14-15. 
2. Mr. Kaldor' s estimates are somelvhat different from the following 
estimates quoted in HusnU. K~zilyalli, Economic effects of the 
Turkish Tax system (in Turkish), mimeographed by the S.P.O., 
1965, pp. 31. : Nazif Oker estimated that in the early 1950's 
the agricultural sector contributed 8·15% of its income to the 
total tax revenue and the other sectors 22"83% of their incomes. 
The estimates made by Professors 0. Dikmen and M. Ya~a, of the 
Istanbul Univ., in 1963 give the former ratio as 8% and the 
latter as over 2~. These estimates differ from those of 
Mr. Kaldor particularly with respect to the burden of the agric-
ultural sector, though the difference is not as great as to alter 
the main conclusion that agricultural sector is taxed more 
lightly than the other sectors. 
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energy, transport and communication and housing, which altogether 
amount to the 4o% of total'investment expenditures, the prevalence 
of the pre-plan state of agricultural taxation in the plan period 
would in effect mean the subsidization of the primary sector 
(agriculture) by the secondary (industry) and tertiary (services) 
sectors. 
Since economic development invariably entails a growing 
proportion of the population to be employed in non-agricultural 
sectors, the "agricultural surplus"1 must steadily increase in 
order to make a balanced growth possible. Our study, in chapter 1, 
of the characteristics of the agricultural sector has shown that 
the production in that sector is held back by some basic structural 
defects. Hence, it seems that an expansion of the agricultural 
surplus cannot be relied on to occur automatically as a result of 
the economic incentives which may be expected to arise from the 
overall process of growth. Besides, the economic incentives do 
not operate in the same way in agriculture as in the case of 
industry and commerce. An excess demand for food may, through 
the rising prices of basic foodstuffs, lead to a decrease in the 
supply of food as the farmers receiving higher prices may tend to 
1. By "agricultural surplus" we mean the excess of agricultural 
pro~uction over the food consumption of the agricultural sector. 
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increase their own consumption and/or to work less. The imposition 
o£ compulsory levies on the agricultural sector which will penalize 
the unproductive farming units may therefore be the only sure way 
of compelling this sector to expand its surplus. 
Manifestly, there is every good reason to throw on the 
agricultural sector a tax burden much heavier than it has so far 
carried. Although the attempts made in the 1950's to subject 
agricultural incomes to the income tax law seem to have been 
frustrated with such arguments as that the low levels of per capita 
incomes in the agxicul tural sector do not permit levying any tax 
and that administrative difficulties involved in such a taxation 
are formidable, the real factor behind this failure has always been 
the political rather than any other considerations~ 
The fact that, on average,the farmers in Turkey are poorer 
than the rest of the community does not justify the farmers' paying 
2 less tax • The averages may be misleading in the assessment of 
1. M. Yasa, "The Taxation of Agricultural Income and La.nd" in the 
I Agricultural Aspects of Economic Development, edited by the 
Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, Istanbul 1964, 
p. 190. 
2. For the relative income of farmers, on average, see chapter 1, 
page9. 
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the tax potential of an economy or any sector of it. The degree 
of inequality in the distribution of wealth and income and the 
amount of income in the each income range ought to be considered 
as well. In the Turkish agriculture the land tenure situation 
is the best indicator of the degree of inequality in the distribu-
tion of \>teal th and income. vle have already explained in 
chapter 1 how great is the inequality in the distribution of 
landholdings among farm families1 . ~ classifying all the farm 
families into ten percentile according to the size· of their land-
holdings we see that on the average the farmers in the first three 
percentiles O\offi farm units of 11 decares \vhile the farm families 
in the top percentile own farm units of about 400 decares. The 
degree of concentration in the ownership of land is also very 
great. While the first three percentiles of the farm families 
own OP~Y 4·3% of the total cultivated area and the following three 
percentiles 14·~ of the area, the families forming the top percen-
tile own more than half the total cultivated area. Despite the 
existence of such a substantial inequality between the agricultural 
income groups, it is estimated that under the tax system of the 
pre-plan period the 10\;est income category in agTicul ture pays 
6•7% of its income in taxes, the middle category 9•7% and the highest 
1. See Chapter 1, pages 10-1'3. 
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income categ~ry only 12·5% of its income1 • It thus becomes 
obvious from what we have so far said in this section that it is 
not only an economic necessity to bring the agricultural sector 
~dthin the tax system but that the sector also carries a substan-
tial tax potential which cannot be neglected in a country where 
the main obstacle to economic development is the low level of 
total savings. 
There are two methods of taxing the agricultural sector 
directly :-
(1) taxation of agricultural land, and 
(2) agricultural income tax. 
In the Ottoman Empire and in the initial stages of development of 
today's advanced countries, much greater reliance has been put on 
the former. But, today, it has lost its significance in Turkey, 
and only h~s some role in the budgets of the local administrations. 
Taxing the agricultural sector within the General Budget 
was made possible with the Income Tax Law No. 193 which was enacted 
on the eve of return to the parliamentary regime, 31.1.1961, 
following the May 1960 coupe d'~tat. However, the heavy pressure 
1. From the report of Prof. J. L. Enos given to the Turkish Govern-
ment quoted in Dr. G. Kazgan, "Agriculture and Industrialization" 
in the Agricultural Aspects of Economic Development, op. cit., 
p. 65. 
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by the big landlords on the political organs soon resulted 
in the enactment of the Law No. 35 on 22.8.1962 \o~hich provided 
that the application of the legislation of the Income Tax Law 
No. 193 pertaining to agricultural incomes should be postponed 
1 till new legislations are prepared • 
On 19.2.1963, the articles of the Income Tax Law No. 193 
referring to agricultural incomes \o~ere changed with the La\.,r No. 202 
on the recommendations of the Tax Reform Commission. 
'lhe Income Tax Lav1 No. 193 exempted the "small 11 farmers 
from taxation. It accepted two criteria for the small farmer 
exemption: 
(a) Those cultivating a land smaller than a certain size 
which varies according to the type of produce; 
(b) Those 1rshose annual sales are under 15,009 T.L., whatever is 
the size of land they cultivate. 
The Law also granted a 5,000 T.L. exception to those earning a net 
income up to 10,000 T.L. above the exemption limit of 15,000 T.L. 
It was expected that with this Law about 200,000 fa.rm families would 
have been brought within the general income tax schedule, and that 
a revenue of around 150 million T.L. would have been obtained. 
1. t-1. Ya~?a, "Taxation of Ag.ricul tural Land and Income", ibid, 
p. 194· 
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The Law No. 193 was criticized mainly on grounds that the 
limits of exceptions and exemptions were too low, resulting in the 
imposition of a hea~J burden on small farmers, and that neither the 
taxpayers' nor the Administration's technical capacities to 
comply with such an extensive liability were taken into account; 
accordingly, the Law No. 202 increased three to four times the 
size of cultivated area which is the first c~·iterion of the small 
farmer exemption, and increased the amount of annual sales, which 
is to be considered as the second criterion, from 15,000 T.L. to 
40,000 T.L. The 5,000 T.L. exception limit was kept unchanged. 
Furthermore, while the Law No. 193 accepted a 100,000 T.L. annual 
sales proceeds as the dividing line between those farmers whose 
taxable income would be calculated on the basis of a lump sum 
method and those whose taxable income would be based on an 
accounting system, the Law No. 202 raised this limit to 150,000 T.L. 
The Government estimated that the Law No. 202 would reduce 
the number of agricultural taxpayers from 200,000, which would 
have been subject to the Law No. 193, to 20,000 and provide a 
revenue of 100 million T.L. to the 1963 budget. But the first 
year's application brought about a great disappointment for the 
supporters of a moderate taxation who put more weight on the 
incentive effects of taxation than on the direct saving effects. 
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In fact, 18,000 new taxpayers declared a revenue of only 
110 million T.L.1 and the tax levied was 24·4 million T.L. 2• 
This result forced the government to revise the Law 
No. 202 and the Parliament approved the 1964 budget on the 
assumption that these revisions would become legislations at the 
end of ~~e 1963 fiscal year (at the end of February 1964). In 
reality, the revision draft could become a law, the Law No. 484, 
only on 26.6.1964 and brought with it two principal changes:-
(a) The land size criterion for the small farmer exemption 
was reduced as much as coming closer to the proVisions 
of the Law No. 193. The annual sales criterion was also 
lowered from 40,000 T.L. to 30,000 T.L. Furthermore, 
the exception limit was decreased from 5,000 T.L. to 
2;500 T.L. for the net profits below 10,000 T.L. With 
these changes, the tax base was enlarged and the number 
of taxpayers was increased. 
(b) For the farmers whose incomes are above the exemption 
limits minimum taxes were assessed which would change 
according to the amount and kind of their produce. 
These changes have been expected to increase the revenue to 
200 million T.L.3. 
1. M. Ya~a, op. cit., p. 197. 
2. Ministry of Finance, Budget Revenues Bulletin, Ankara 1965, 
pp. 63. 
3. O.E.C.D.'s Economic Survey, Turkey, Paris 1964, p. 33. 
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The attempts so far made to tax agriculture could not be 
regarded as successful even if they had provided a revenue around 
the official expectations, since they have not been tailored to 
the characteristics of the Turkish agriculture and to the require-
ments of economic development of Turkey. Any method of taxation 
of agriculture in Turkey, first of all, should aim at serving as 
an effective tool of economic development; and this would require 
a careful study of the following points1 :-
(a) the place of the agricultural sector in the economic 
development; 
(b) relevant characteristics of the agricultural sector; 
(c) the types of proprietary relationships among the farm 
populations; and 
(d) the source of motivation for work and investment in 
· agriculture. 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation has been intended to cast some 
light on these points. Once reviewed from these points of view, 
it is not surprising at all that the above-mentioned attempts have 
resulted in failure. Such a review, which we are about to start, 
will also show that taxation of agricultural land would suit best 
1. Papers and Proceedings of the Conference on Agricultural 
Taxation and Economic Development, H. P. Wald (ed.), Camb. 
Mass. 1954. 
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to the requirements of economic development in Turkey. 
The dominant place of the agricultural sector in Turkish 
economy has time and again been pointed out in this essay, and it 
is a corollary of this fact that a sizeable contribution to the 
Development Plan would have to be obtained from the agricultural 
sector despite the low level of average per capita income in 
t~t sector. As Mr. Kaldor puts it, "if agriculture were to 
make a g~nuine contribution to economic development, which would 
make it possible to expand investment and industrial production 
without creating inflation, and if the official estimates on the 
net product of agriculture are anywhere near correct, its 
contribution to direct taxation should be nearer to T.L.l,OOO mil-
lion than to T.L.lOO million1 •i. This would mean a burden of 
direct taxation on agriculture around 5-6% of its income, whereas 
the burden of direct taxation on all other activities is about 
12·5% 
Turkish agriculture is characterized by the dominance of 
food crops and subsistence farming which makes it difficult both 
to assess incomes accurately and to collect taxes. Moreover, the 
great degree of illiteracy prevailing in this sector is an important 
barrier for an income taxation to rely on self-assessment and 
1. N. Kaldor, Report on the Turkish Tax System, mimeographed by 
the S.P.O., 1962. 
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maintenance of records. These difficulties would no doubt make 
for higher exemption limits, even if not as high as in Law No. 202, 
in any agricultural income tax. Furthermore, self-assessment 
requires a high degree of tax morale which is obviously lacking 
in the Turkish agricultural sector. The striking evidence of 
this is the fact that, in 1963, 18,000 top-earning farm families 
declared only a revenue of 110 million T.L., ¥rhich on average 
means about 500 T.L. per month, i.e., less than the monthly salary 
of a modest civil servant. As a matter of fact, it is evident 
from Table 4 in chapter 1 that these families altogether own 
almost l/5th of the total cultivated area. Assuming that their 
share in the total agrictutural income is around their share in 
the total cultivated area - we are neglecting the favourable 
effect on productivity of elimination of indivisibilities in 
large holdings - they altogether must have an annual income of 
3,000 - 4,000 million T.L. Even if we assume that they share their 
income half and half with sharecroppers and tenants, their income 
tax returns must have shown a total income around 1,500 - 2,000 mil-
lion T.L., but certainly not around 110 million T.L. The huge 
difference could be attributed to two factors or to a combination 
of them: they have either concealed the true amount of their 
earnings or handled the resources available to them in a surpri-
singly unproductive manner. It is therefore necessary to have a 
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method of taxation of agriculture which would not be easy to evade 
and which would penalize the inefficient farmers. Such a method 
of taxation was recommended by Nicholas Kaldor in his Report on 
the Turkish Tax System submitted to the Prime Minister on 
April 21st, 1962. 
According to Mr. Kaldor, a successful taxation of the 
agricultural sector in Turkey can be realized by means of an 
agricultural land tax. The tax would be levied on the "potential 
output 11 rather than on the actual output of any piece of land1 • 
A "basic value" of land per hectare for each of the 67 provinces 
of the country can be obtained by dividing the net product of each 
province, which is estimated as defined for the purpose of national 
accounting, by the number of "cultivable 11 hectares2 in the province. 
The next step is to determine the individual value of each hectare 
of land in the province by taking into account all the factors 
such as average annual rain-fall, irrigation, slope or inclination 
of the land, porousness, etc.", but not the value of crops or the 
type of crop actually produced, except in the case of horticulture 
1. By 11potential output 11 , it is meant the output which the lal\d would 
yield if it were managed with average efficiency. 
2. "Cultivable hectares" cover those lands which are either actually 
producing crops or could be brought into cultivation without any 
large capital outlays. 
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and viniculture where the land should be valued on the basis of 
the crop. Once the relationship between the individual value of 
each hectare of land and the 11basic value 11 for the province is 
established, it will serve as a permanent yardstick of the potential 
output of each hectare. Only by revising the "basic values" as a 
moving average of the net value of the output of the province in 
the last five years, the system could be kept up to date in relation 
to variations both in the output and in the average level of prices 
without reassessing the individual pieces of land. 
The system recommended by Mr. Kaldor has numerous advan-
tages over the method of taxing agricultural incomes within the 
general income tax scheme as in Law No. 193 and its versions. It 
is, first of all, possible to raise the revenue needed for the 
Five-Year Development Plan with a land tax described above without 
putting an exorbitant burden on the taxpayers. A 1,000 million T.L. 
revenue, or about 6% of the net agricultural product, could be 
obtained from such a land tax by taxing only those families owning 
more than 10 hectares of land who constitute only about 16% of the 
total .. farm families but possess about 60'% of the total cultivated 
area. Even on them, the burden of the land tax would not be more 
than 10% of the net product of the land, assuming that the average 
productivity of the land does not vary with the size of landholdings. 
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Once the preliminary requirements have been fulfilled, the 
administration of the land tax would be easier than that of an 
agricultural personal income tax1 ; it would not also require any 
particular technical capacity on the part of taxpayers. r1ore-
over, the taxpayers would not be able to evade the land tax since 
its base cannot be concealed. 
It has been pointed oulin chapter 1 that the existing 
proprietary relationships among farming population account for the 
low productivity in agriculture and that the number of farmers 
without land or with inadequate land creates an important social 
problem. Since the prospects for a land reform in Turkey are 
very remote, some contribution to the betterment of the proprietary 
relationships needs to be done by the tax system. Neither Law 
No. 193 nor its revised versions could have a~~ favourable effect 
in this respect. Farming income and the absentee landlord's 
income are not subject to differential treatment. These laws do 
not contain any deterrent to the increasing concentration of 
1. It is true that the application of a land tax of Kaldor type 
would require the valuation of each hectare of land in the country 
and this would be an expensive task in terms of both resources 
and time. But it is of a once-and-all character and would 
provide useful data for many considerations other than taxation. 
Prof. B. Hansen, however, thinks that the same economic results 
could be obtained with the present land tax, which is levied on 
the rental value, if the tax base is freed of erosion and 
increased accordingly. (H. Kizilyalli, ibid., p. 40). 
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ownership. Instead, they have every kind of incentives for the 
big landlords1 . On the contrary, a land tax of the type 
recommended by Kaldor wo~ud work in the direction of lessening 
the inequality in distribution of land. Since its base would be 
the potential output of land, it would penalise the absentee land-
lords and the inefficient farmers 2• Graduation of tax rates 
would augment these favourable effects. Graduation of tax rates 
could be accorded to the system not only on the basis of the size 
of landholdings of a family but of the total value of holdings as 
well. Even without imposing a rate of progression of 11penal" 
character, favourable effects could be had on the distribution of 
land-ownership with a moderate rate of progression. Mr. Kaldor, 
for example, suggests that, if the holdings between 10 and 50 hec-
tares are taxed at 10% and the holdings above 50 hectares at 15%, 
1. In addition to the m1n1mum subsistence allowance and to the 
5000 T.L. agricultural income allowance, the consumption 
expenditures of the family are also deducted from the agricul-
tural income. Capital gains are not taxed. Those 'tthose 
taxable income is calculated by presumptive methods do not 
have to add their non-agricultural incomes to their agricul-
tural income. The total amount of investment required to 
benefit by the investment allowance is 50,000 T.L. in 
agriculture whereas it is 250,000 T.L. in the non-agricultural 
investments. (H. Kizilyalli, ibid., p. 31-39). 
2. The "penalty11 would fall on landlords if the further 
exploitation of tenant cultivators by landlords is prevented 
by legislation. 
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a man who ownes 55 hectares might prefer to sell rather than keep 
5 hectares since the tax on his last 5 hectares would work out 
at 15 + 2g0 = 65%1 , provided that the tax schedule is expressed in 
terms of effective rates and not marginal rates. 
III 
TAXA'l'ION OF INCOMES, PROFITS, and WEALTH 
In Turkey, today, all kinds of personal incomes are subject 
to a uni taryincome tax~'boverage of \vhich has recently been extended 
so as to include agricultural incomes and the incomes of artisans 
and small traders. Incorporated businesses' profits are subject 
to a corporation Tax. Furthermore, there are some taxes on 
wealth such as I~~eritance and Transfer Tax, Building Tax and Land 
Tax, but they play, as we shall see below, an insignificant role 
today owing to the effects of inflation and of their structural 
defects. 
A. Taxation of Personal Income: As seen from Tables 29 
and 29a the income tax is the largest-revenue-raising tax in the 
Turkish Tax system, though its share in the total tax revenue has 
1. A similar suggestion of using the land tax for land reform 
purposes is made by I.M.D. Little in "Tax Policy and the Third 
Plan'!, published in Pricing & Fiscal Policies, P. N. Rosenskin-
Rodan (ed.), London 1964, p. 39. 
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somewhat declined since 1960. Its coverage in terms of the 
numbers of taxpayers is very much limited when compared with that 
in the advanced countries1 . About 3o% of the national income is 
assessed to the income tax2• This ratio is around 75% in the 
U.K., but only 10-20% in th~ Caribbean and something of the order 
of 5% or less in African territories3. 
We have already seen that a remarkable feature of the 
taxation system of Turkey in the 1950-62 period has been the almost 
constant share of taxes in national income. It is necessary to 
seek if the low income elasticity of tax revenue in Turkey is due 
to the unresponsiveness of the income tax. In Table 30 below, we 
relate the revenue from income tax to the non-agricultural net 
national product, since agTicultural incomes have not been subject 
to the income tax until 1963. Income tax revenue in money.ter.ms 
has recorded about a ten-fold increase in the period 1951-1962. 
However, much of the increase has been due to the rising prices and 
to the increase in the number of taxpayers as a result of the 
1. In 1963, 3,848,633 persons paid income tax. (Ministry of Finance, 
Budget Revenues Bull., 1964, p. 55). This corresponds to about 
12% of total population. This ratio is of the order of 30-40,% 
in.the U.S.A. and U.K., but 2-3% in the Carribean and 1-2% in 
Africa and Asian Countries. (A. R. Prest, Public Finance in 
Underdeveloped Countries, London 1962, p. 28). 
2. We are caught by the lack of data about the amount of the assessed 
incomes of wage and salary earners. According to Kaldor they 
altogether amount to 11,500 million. Adding to this 3,000 mil-
lion T.L. income declarations in 1960 by the remaining income tax-
payers, we find that the income tax in Turkey covers 3o% of 
national income. 
3· A. R. Prest, Ibid., p. 28. 
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TABLE 30 
ELASTICITY OF THE INCOME TAX, 1952-1962. 
Year Non-Agricultural Income Tax I/II Income Tax IV/I 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
N.N.P. at current Revenue % assessed by 
Prices ( 00 miLT .L) declarations 
(00 million T.L) ( 00 mil. T. L) 
IN II III*** IV** 
51·3 2·1 -
62-3 3·0 5•8 
74·6 3"9 6·2 1·4 
88"5 5•3 7·1 2·1 
105·8 6·5 7"3 2·6 
121·0 8·4 8-0 3.·3 
' 146•1 9"1 8·0 3·7 
177·2 11-5 8·0 4"9 
220•3 15·6 8•8 5·4 
240·0 18•5 8·4 6-8 
246•0 20·5 8·5 7·0 
19·1 7•7 6·6 
*Agricultural incomes were not subject to income tax 
till 1963. 
% 
V*'*-* 
2•2 
2•8 
3"0 
3•1 
3·0 
3·3 
3·0 
3·1 
2•9 
2•7 
** Assessment by declarations covers incomes from businesses, 
professions and properties. Tax on wage- and salary-
earners is withheld at the source. 
*** The calculations are made on the basis of one year lag 
between N.N.P. and tax revenue collections. 
Sources: N.N.P. figures are from the S.P.O., Development Plan, 
p. 13. Income tax figures from the Ministry of 
Finance, Budget Revenues Bull., 1964, pp. 128-129. 
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growing population and of the extension of the monetized sector. 
Expression of the revenue from income tax as percentage of the non-
agricultural N.N.P. as in the column III of Table 30 cancels all 
these effects, and the emerging trend of the income tax ratio 
reflects the following factors:-
(a) Changes in the structure of the tax; 
(b) Progressiveness of the income tax rates; 
(c) Changes in the distribution of income. 
The only significant change in the income tax during 1952-
1962 was made in 1958 by increasing both the minimum subsistence 
exemption and family allowances, on the one hand, and the progres-
siveness of the tax rates for higher incomes, on the other hand. 
The income tax had a rate of progression rising from 17"5% effec-
tive rate on 5,000 T.L. annual income to 35% on 100,000 T.L. and 
above, which was raised in 1958 to 5o% on the incomes of 500,000 
T.L. and above per a~~um. During the period considered, non-
agricultural N.N.P. in money terms has increased by about 5 times 
and the distribution of this income, according to a study by the 
S.P.O., has changed in favour of the groups deriving their incomes 
from capital and real estate at the expense of the living standards 
1 
of wage- and salary-earners - Consequently, since there has not 
1. The conclusions of that study are quoted in the Development 
Plan 1963-1967, PP• 45-50. 
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been an increase in the share of the number of wage- and salary-
1 
earners in the total number of taxpayers , a growing share of the 
non-agricultural N.N.P. must have come under the higher rates of 
the income tax schedule. 
In fact, the income tax ratio shown in column III of 
Table 30 has an increasing trend which may imply that the implemen-
tation of the progressive income tax in Turkey has been successful 
in transferring a growing proportion of income to the public use 
as the national income rises and inequality in income distribution 
grows. A closer study, however, will show the opposite. Although 
the share of income tax revenue in non-agTicultural N.N.P. in 1961 
was about 5o.% higher than the 1952 ratio, much of the increase, 
i.e., about 4o.%, was achieved bet,.,reen 1952-1956. On the other 
hand, the 1962 ratio was even lower than the 1956 ratio. The 
incremental income tax ratio (the ratio of the increase in the 
income tax revenue to the increase in the non-agricultural N.N.P.) 
was 9·6% for 1952-56 and fell to 7"6% in 1956-1962 in spite of the 
1. We do not have accurate data about the number of wage- and 
salary-earners who pay income tax. But we understand from 
the data on civil servants given in the sta~istical Yearbook 
1964 of the State Institute of Sta.tisticl"ttj_D. no public service 
has the number of employees more than doubled in 1952-1962. 
As for the number of "''age-earners, vre have seen that the· number 
of non-agricultural workers increased by about 5~ p.a., in the 
1950's (Chapter 1). On the other hand, the number of taxpayers 
whose liabilities are based on their declarations rose from 
72,318 in 1953 to 304,601 in 1962, recording a more than four-
fold increase. 
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facts that the non-agricultural N.N.P. increased by 11·3% in the 
period 1955-61 and that the above-listed three factors did not 
account for such a drop. The drop could be explained better if 
we divide the income tax revenue into its two components, namely, 
the revenue from the taxpayers who.derive their incomes from wages 
and salary, and the revenue from those whose incomes come mainly 
from businesses, professions and properties and whose liabilities 
are assessed on the basis of self-assessment (of their declarations). 
The latter is shown as absolute amounts in column IV of Table 30 and 
as percentages of non-agricultural N.N.P. in column V. It appears 
that the share of the revenue from the income ta~ declarations in 
the non-agricultural N.N.P. had slowly risen till 1958 and then 
gradually declined, the 1962 ratio being lower than the 1954 ratio. 
This decline has not been effected by any deterioration in the 
relative incomes of this category of taxpayers.. No deliberate 
policy measures have been taken to affect the distribution of 
income in favour of wage and salary-earners. If such an effect 
were produced by the overall development of the economy, a similar 
effect within the sector of businesses, properties and professions 
would have operated in favour of low income groups. But an obser-
vation of the data about the income tax declarations shows that in 
1952-1962 there has been no significant change in the shares of 
low and high income classes both in the total number of and revenue 
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from the declarations1 • We therefore have to come to the conclu-
sian t~~t tax evasion has been taking place on a large scale, and 
creating, particularly since 1957, a setback in the way of effect-
2 ive functioning of the income tax • Since wide-spread tax evasion 
in a country is the result of deficiencies in tax-morale and in 
fiscal administration and since these are deep-rooted problems in 
Turkey which cannot be remedied in the short-run, it can be 
reasonably assumed that the tax evasion will continue to be a set-
back even after the First Five-Year Plan. 
We had indicated in Section II above that in the pre-plan 
period agricultural incomes escaped the income tax completely. 
We also pointed in this section to the low income-elasticity of 
1. The data given in the 1964 Budget Preamble show that the 
share of the taxpayers who declared an income under 
17501 T.L. in the total number of taxpayers was 88% in 
195), 86% in 1957 and 86% in 1962 and in the total declared 
income was )4%, 31% and 3o% in respective years. 
2. In connection with the scale of tax evasion, it is significant 
to note the follovling facts:-
(a) between 195) and 1962, the average per capita income tax 
assessed according to declarations increased by only ;% 
per annUJ;J., while in the same period the average annual 
increase of G.N.P. (minus agriculture) was 1~ in current 
prices (O.E.C.D., "Turkey 1964", Paris Aug. 1964, pp.)2-
3)); and 
(b) according to the declarations, the average income of this 
category taxpayers in real terms have fallen from 10,)71 
T.L., in 1953 to 6,845 T.L. in 1957 and to 4,422 T.L. in 
1962. (I deflated the·income figures given in the 1963 
Budget Proposal with the wholesale price index given in 
the Development Plan). 
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the tax and to the large-scale tax evasion in that period. These 
are of course not the only problems of the income tax of the pre-
plan period but are surely the essential ones which one must bear 
in mind when making suggestions with respect to the income tax in 
the plan period. 
The basic structure of Turkish Income Tax reform in 1949 
was formed on the German model. There has been no ~:undamental 
change in the income tax system in the pre-plan period. When the 
tax was developed, economic development was not the dominant aim 
of public policy. Nor is the German pattern of income taxation 
suited to the very different conditions prevailing in Turkey. One 
would have expected, therefore, that steps would have been taken at 
the outset of the development planning to reform the system of 
income taxation. Significant changes, indeed, were made with 
Law No. 193 at the end of 1961. A Taxation Reform Commission 
(T.R.C.) was appointed in 1961 and in 1962 Mr. Ka.ldor \>las called 
in as a consultant to suggest reforms in the tax system. 
Mr. Kaldor suggested fundamental changes in the structure of 
direct taxation but they were not accepted by the Turkish Govern-
ment. On the other hand, the government, acting on the recommen-
dations of the ·T.R.C. Report, introduced with Law No. 202 such 
amendments to the Income Tax Law No. 193 that the latter has almost 
completely lost its essential features. 
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The main factors effecting the Income Tax La\oJ No. 193 were 
the need, on the one hand, to increase the tax revenue, and, on the 
other, to correct the distribution of the true"· ·burden distorted by 
inflation in the 1950's. With these purposes, the progression 
of the income tax rates was mitigated for low income groups and 
increased for the high incomes; the personal allowances were 
increased; high agricultural incomes were brought within the tax 
net; the exemption limit for small traders was lowered; the time 
/r..onl'ltilc. 
period during which transactions in real estate escape tax liability 
was extended from 2 years to 4 years; an obligation of wealth 
declaration was imposed on those taxpayers whose income tax 
liabilities are assessed on the basis of the tax returns. 
I1r. Kaldor, in addition to his proposal of a land tax in 
place of the agricultural income tax, suggested further steps which 
would bring the capital gains within the tax net and which would 
make tax evasion more difficult. 
The Income Tax Law No. 193 had had a chance of application 
for only a year and·in 1963 \'las revised substantially with Law 
No. 202 which introduced the follovring main changes: the rate of 
progression of the whole income tax schedule was reduced; the 
personal allowances were further increased; the limits for the 
small farmer exemption were raised; the assurance was given that 
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wealth declarations would not be used with a purpose of investiga-
tion of any matter prior to their first submission; incentives 
vrere given to the investors mainly in the form of investment 
allowances and accelerated depreciations. 
It is neither possible no:r· pertinent to our task to discuss 
the relative merits of all kinds of the above-mentioned schemes. 
For our purpose, it will suffice to examine critically those 
aspects of the present income tax which might have considerable 
effects on the aggTegate savings; and, in this con..11.ection, \ve 
shall deal with its progressiveness and its incentive features. 
The income tax has a fairly steep rate of graduation. The 
rates of taxation in force since 1950 are given in Tables 31 and 
32. It will be seen from these tables that the minimum rate of 
income tax (10%) is applicable to an annual income of 2,500 T.L. 
and that the maximum rate (60%) is made applicable above the level 
of 1,000,000 T.L. In the lov1 income ranges the tax rates are 
sharply progTessive, rising from nil at 1080 T.L. income to 14·1~ 
at 10,000 T.L. income. This means a marginal tax rate of 15·~fo 
for the first 10,000 T.L. income. For the additional incomes 
marginal tax rates are increasing but not at any definite pace. 
This is observable from the slope of the dotted line in DiagTam 5 
and 5a. However, it is conspicuous that the curve representing 
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TABLE 31 
INCOI"iE TAX RATES APPLIED SINCE 1950 
Law Period of 1~~ 151; 20% 25~& 30% 35% 40% 4~ No Implemen-
tation. 
5421 1/1/1950 - 2,500 5,000 10,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 22,500 
6908 1/1/1958 - 2,500 5,000 10,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 22,500 
193 1/1/1962 2,500 - 7,500 - 15,000 - 30,000 -
202 ·1/1/196·3 2,500 2,500 5,000 15,000 - 30,000 - 60,000 
Law Period of 5<Y'fo 55% 60% 65% 68% 70% No Implemen-
...... 
... a"t~on. 
5421 1/1/1950 
- - - - - -
6908 1/1/1958 25,000 50,000 125,000 - - -
193 1/1/1962 70,000 - 157,500 - - 217,500 
202 1/1/1963 - 150,000 225,000 225,000 285,000 -
Fixed Rates:-
In the Law No. 5421, 357b on the incomes over 100,000 T.L. 
II II 
II II 
II II 
11 II 6908, 500,0 II II ll II 300,000 T.L. 
II II 193, 60% II II II II 500,000 T.L. 
II II 202, 60"~ II II " II 1,000,000 T.L. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Budget Revenues Bull. 
1964, p. 132. 
·-
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TABLE 32 
EFFECTIVE AND MARGDUL RATES IN THE PBESENT INCOME· TAX 
(LAVl NO. 202) 
Inceme Ranges Effective Ra tea Marginal Ra tea 
" " 
1,080 Nil 
-
10,000 14•1 15•8 
20,000 19·2 24·4 
30,000 23·3 28·9 
50,000 28·2 36•8 
90,000 34·6 42•5 
150,000 41•0 50·0 
200,000 44•5 55•0 
300,000 48•6 56•7 
500,000 53·2 60·2 
1,000,000 60·0 66·6 
Above 1,000,000 60·0 60•0 
Source: Calculated on the basis of in.fomation 
given in Table 31 above. 
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the effective tax rates on ve.rious income ranges is rising 
relatively steeply up to aroundlOO,OOO T.L. annual income and 
then flattening, particularly after 400,000 T.L. income1 . This 
observation points to an important feature of the income tax, 
that is, the increases in tax burden get smaller as one moves up 
from lower to higher income ranges. This is no doubt the 
opposite of what should have been if the income tax is to contri-
bute to the realization of the Plan's objective that a more 
equitable distribution of income will be approached in the Plan 
period. Nevertheless, if one entertains the·.-:V'ie"l that high 
income groups have a greater marginal propensity to save than low 
income groups, the present income tax schedule seems to be 
favourable to the high-savers. 
dence in support of this view2 
But there is in Turkey no evi-
In fact, the examples of rich 
1. The relatively high rate of progression in the lo\ver end of 
the income scale would have been more apparent if Diagram 5 
and Diagram 5a. had been drawn on the same scale instead of 
the former's scale being l/4th of the latter's. 
2. In Turkey, no data on the saving propensitives of various 
income classes. have so far been available through family 
budget studies. Only in a few underdeveloped countries, 
e.g., Puerto Rico and Delhi, scientifically designed sample 
surveys of this kind have been conducted. They indicate 
negative saving ratios in the lowest income classes and in-
creasing saving ratios in higher income classes. These data, 
however, measure average rather than marginal propensity to 
save. If saving is a linear function of income and the inter-
cept of the saving curve is negative, saving .,.Jill be a larger 
fraction of high incomes than of lo\·1 incomes, but the M.P. s will 
be the same for all income levels. Under these conditions the 
degree of progressivity will not affect the amount of private 
saVing. (R. Goode, Taxation of saving and consumption in Under-
developed Countries, National Tax Journal, December 1961.) 
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spendthrifts could be met more frequently than those of rich 
high-savers. Furthermore, in a country like Turkey, where a 
considerable portion of the private sector savings is invested 
with speculative purposes, it would be wiser to treat favourably 
only those savings put into desirable uses rather than the whole 
savings. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that the 
effective tax rates on incomes above, say,lQO,,OOO T.L. be raised 
so as to attain present highest rate at 500,000 T.L. instead of 
1,000,000 T.L. and 70% st 1,000,000 T.L. and over. If the 
increases in the tax rates applied to higher incomes are incor-
porated with a generous treatment of savings directed towards the 
uses conducive to the realization of the Plan's objectives, there 
would not be much ground for the criticisms that high income tax 
rates cut deeply into the return on savings and on risk-taking. 
Such an increase seems appropriate also on the grounds of inter-
temporal and international comparisons. 
T.he present income tax has surely gone some way towards 
increasing the tax burdens of high - as well as lm·l - income 
classes as compared with the income tax of the 1950's. As will 
be seen from ·;P.iagram--L5~5~, the curve representing the effective 
tax rates at various income levels in 1963 lies above the similar 
line of 1953 throughout the whole income scale. As the income 
scales of the two curves have so been adjusted that the corres-
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panding points on the two scales represent those incomes standing at 
the same relation to the per capita G.N.P. in the respective years1 , 
it is obvious from the Chart that in 196~ every person pqs a greater 
percentage of his income in income tax than his counterpart did in 
195~- The rate of progression, however, has been increased more for 
those in the lower end of the income scale than others. This is 
manifested by the chart as the two curves diverge glaringly up to 
around 1~0 T.L. (in 196~) annual income; thereafter become almost 
parallel to each other up to about ~00,000 T.L. (in 196~), and diverge 
again but at a less degree than the former divergence. 
How t":··caO:cfss:::~ the graduation of the Turkish income tax cc:)mpai?e:· 
with that of the American, British and Indian income tues.? Diagram 6 
and 6a provide us with such a comparison between the u.s., U.K. and 
Turkey. Once again, the income scales for each country's curve have 
so been adjusted to each other that the corresponding points on the 
three income scales represent those incomes in each country which stand 
at the same relation to the per capita G.N.P. of the respective countr,y2• 
The Chart does not aim at comparing the tax burden of a Turkish tax-
payer with a certain income with that of a British or American t~9\Yer 
with an equal income. Instead, it shows comparatively how the relative 
tax burden cha.nses in each country as one moves up along the income 
1. See the note to Diagram 5 and 5a. 
2. See the note to Diagram 6 and 6a. 
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Note on the preparation of the 
dfagra_!!!!!:-
~he curve representing the 
Turkish Income tax has been drawn 
on the basis of Table 31 above. 
The curves representing the 
American and British Income Taxes 
have been taken from A. R. Prest, 
Public l!'inance in Theory & Practice, 
pp. 
The income scales have been 
adjusted in relation to each other 
according to the per capita ~ress 
national incomes in national 
currencies at current prices. 
Thus, corresponding points on the 
three scales represent different 
levels of incomes but these incomes 
stand at the same position in 
relation to the per ca.pi ta income • 
That is to say, for instance, incomes 
of 9,000 T.L., £2,000 and ¢11,000 are 
4.5 times the per capita incomes in 
the relevant countries. 
The per capita incomes were 
calculated on the basis of the 
national income and population data 
given in the ~urkish Statistical 
Yearbook 1964. ~hey are 2,050 T.L.; 
£450; and ¢2,250. 
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scale. T.he Turkish income tax is less progressive for the incomes 
below 5,000 T.L. than the British income tax1 • Howev-er, in the 
income ranges between 5,000 T.L. and 25,000 T.L. the Turkish tax 
is more progressive than the British. Above the 25,000 T.L. 
incomes the Turkish income tax becomes increasingly less progressive 
than the British income tax up to 157,500 T.L. which is apparent 
from the increasing divergence of the two curves in Diagram 6a. 
It is significant to notice that in the British income tax an 
effective rate of 6o% is applicable to an income of £20,000, which 
is less than 50 times the percapita G.N.P., the same rate in Turkey 
is applied to an income of 1,000,000 T.L., which is about 500 times 
the percapita G.N.P. in Turkey. A similar comparison can be carried 
out between the U.S. and Turkey. At the very start the American 
schedule is much more progressive than the Turkish, but the situa-
tion shortly turns to that the American schedule is only a little 
more progressive than tha Turkish schedule up to 20,000 T.L.; and, 
thereafter the former becomes much more progressive up to an income 
around 100,000 T.L. Above 100,000 T.L. incomes the difference in 
the rate of graduation disappears until the American income tax stops 
being progressive. 
1. The comparison is between the incomes in Turkey under 5,000 T.L. 
and the incomes in the U.K. situated similarly, that is, between 
the incomes being of the same percentage of the per capita 
G.N.P.'s. In order to simplify the explanations the comparison 
will be conducted only in terms of Turkish incomes. 
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In India1 personal incomes are subject to three different 
taxes, namely, the income tax, the super tax and the surcharge, 
which also are supplemented by an expenditure tax on the personal 
spendable income above a certain amount and an annual wealth tax. 
The income tax, super tax, and surcharge together result in a 
highest effective rate of 74·4% (a marginal rate of 77%) on an 
earned income of Rs. 1,000,000. On the other hand, the first 
Rs. 2,oqo of taxable income is taxed at a lo\'r rate of 3%. Un-
earned income is discriminated against through higher rates of sur-
charge. The Indian tax system operates with much lower rates than 
the Turkish system in the lower end of the income scale. An 
Indian with an income about 10 times the per capita G.N.P. 2, 
i.e., Rs. 3,600, is charged at an effective rate of 2·~ while a 
similarly situated Turk would be liable at a rate of about 21%. 
On the other hand, the higher rates of taxes become effective at 
relatively higher levels of incomes in the Indian income tax than 
in the Turkish; however, the former operates with considerably 
hi~er tax rates at the upper end of the income scale. 
1. The source of information about the taxation of incomes in 
India is R. J. Chelliah, Fiscal Policy in Underdeveloped 
Countries, London 1960, pp. 111-114. 
2. As I calculated on the basis of the information given in the 
U.N., 1964 Statistical Yearbook the per capita G.N.P. was 
Rs. 345 in 1963. 
- 183 -
The personal allowances in the 1fu.rkish income tax are very 
low by international standards1 . In \>/estern countries, the 
personal allowance for a single person is so set as to extend the 
tax net to the lower ranges of clerical workers and the top ranges 
2 
of manual vrorkers • The Turkish Income Tax works with an annual 
allowance of 1,080 T.L. (:£4.~ for a single person, which is equal 
only l/6th of the annual income of an average worker3, (certainly 
less than half of the income of the lowest paid unskilled labourer). 
This is an important element making for the relatively hi&~er 
progressiveness of the income tax in the lower income ranges. A 
married taxpayer benefits by an additional family allowance of 
720 T.L. and by another allowance of 360 T.L. for each child. 
Under the Law No. 202, from 1/1/1966 the personal allowance was 
revised to 1,800 T.L., the family allowance to 1,080 T.L., and the 
allovrance for each child to 720 T.L. These increases will no 
doubt ease the tax burden on the low-income classes. But they 
will also mitigate the tax burden on those who are not burdened 
adequately. It is difficult to see the point, particularly, 
behind the rise in the children allo,·Tance. The tax relief to a 
1. N. Kaldor, Report on the Turkish Tax System. He does not, 
however, give any concrete comparison. 
2. U.K. Hicks, Development Finance, Oxford 1965, pp. 91-92. 
3. According to the figures of the \>lorker' s Insurance Institution 
the average daily income of insured workers was 17·91 T.L. in 
1963. (The S.P.O., 1965 kL~ual Programme, p. 32). 
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family by such an allowance bears no relation to the expenses of 
bringing up a child. Furthermore, the economic conditions compel 
the children of the lower-income families to earn their living at 
a young age, and, thus, the allowance for a child becomes another 
element accounting for inadequate progressiveness of the tax at 
higher income levels. Moreover, it seems unreasonable to offer a 
tax allowance for a child in a country where the rapid increase in 
population is one of the basic obstacles to economic development 
1 
and where the government engages in birth control-. 
Let us now have a brief look at the incentive features of 
the Turkish income tax. The present income tax contains incentive 
measures in the form of accelerated depreciation, investment 
allowance, higher exemption limit and tax holiday, offsetting the 
losses from other profits, and exemption of capital gains2• 
The usual method of depreciation accepted by the Turkish 
income tax is the writing off of the normal wear and tear on the 
basis of the current book value (historical value) of the fixed 
1. U.K. Hicks, op.· cit., pp. 91. A similar remark is also made 
by A. H. Prest in his 11A Fiscal Survey of the British Caribbean, 
London 1957, p. 29. 
2. The provisions of the Income Tax concerning these allowances 
are also applicable to the corporations subject to the 
Corporation Tax. 
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capital. With Law No. 205, the Law on the Taxation Procedure, 
dated 19/2/1963, it v1as left to the discretion of the taxpayer 
whose income is assessed on the basis of his balance sheet1 to 
choose between the normal wear and tear allowance and the 
declining balance method of depreciation at a rate2 twice as high 
as the rate vThich would ha-ve been applied under the normal method 
of depreciation. 
Investment allowance is a recently introduced measure in 
Turkey. Since 1963, 3q% of investment expenditure made in commerce 
and industry (including tourism) may be deducted from taxable income, 
provided that the investment projects have gained the approval of 
the S.P.O. This percentage is increased to 4o% in case of agri-
cultural investment and to 5o% in underdeveloped regions. The 
advantages of the allowance are, however, enjoyed only for invest-
ments of at least 250,000 T.L. values (125,000 T.L. in agricul-
tural investments) by the taxpayer whose income is assessed on the 
balance sheet basis, irrespective of the source of investment 
funds, i.e., allov1ance is given for the investments financed by 
bank credit as well as by retained profits. 
1. The assessment of tax liability on the balance sheet basis is 
applied to those taxpayers whose annual purchases are more than 
400,000 T.L. or whose annual sales are above 440,000 T.L. 
2. This rate, however, cannot be higher than 25% p.a. 
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Income Tax offers favourable treatment to the revenue 
from real estate. \ihile only 1,080 T.L. out of the annual income 
of an unmarried wage or salary earner is exempt from the income 
tax, if a real estate provides an annual revenue less than 
5,000 T.L. it is completely exempted from the income tax. }lore-
over, the tax liability on a building arising from the Building 
Tax, can be deducted from the income tax levied on the income of 
the building. Fuxthermore, if a building is enjoying a "tax 
holiday" in the context of the Building Tax, the tax liability on 
the building which would have been due under the Building Tax can 
be deducted from the income tax liability on the revenue from the 
building as if it had been taxed by that amount. This is another 
way of insertil"l..g a "tax holiday" concession into the income tax for 
the revenue from buildings as in the Building Tax where the new 
buildings were until recently exempt from the tax for ten years 
without any regard to the kind of building but at present the ten-
year tax holiday applies only to the houses built for social 
purposes and a five-year exemption to the residential buildings of 
unluxury type and to the construction for tourism. 
The present income tax makes it possible for a taxpayer to 
offset his losses from some activities completely against other 
profits. If, on the balance, he is still in loss he can take the 
advantage of deducting his losses from the following years' profits, 
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provided that the carry-over is completed in five years. 
The gains from the transactions in real estates are sub-
ject to income tax only if they are more than 10,000 T.L. and if 
the realization takes place within the 4 year time span from the 
purchase of the real estate. 
To what extent might these incentive measures lead to an 
increase in the aggregate savings and mitigate the discrimination 
against risky enterprises inherent in any income tax ? It is 
argued that in the period of rising prices the method of writing 
off the capital assets on the basis of book values results in the 
appearance of a part of the capital as profits, and, hence, in 
the transfer of a part of capital to the o\mer of the business, 
1 
the customers, the other productive factors and the government-. 
As a corollary of this argument it is suggested that there will 
not be sufficient funds to replace the capital assets. It is 
not, however, reasonable to suppose that the businessmen would 
determine their policies on the basis of a false picture of 
Also, uthere is no holy writ that replacement of 
1. H. Kizilyalli, op. cit., pp. 85-87. 
2. It is true that the method of depreciation on the original 
cost basis has distorted the investment and pricing policies 
of the S.E.E. and caused the transfer of a part of their 
capital to the private sector through underpricing of commo-
dities, this is due to the failure of the management rather 
than to the depreciation method. 
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capital equipment can only be met from accumulated depreciation 
1" funds • Although the taxable income vlill be enlarged as much as 
the difference between the original and replacement cost, this 
could be considered the taxation of capital gains accruing to the 
firm as its existing assets gradually increase in value in the 
period of rising prices. 
The provision introduced by Law No. 205 allows enterprises 
to write off a greater proportion of a capital asset in the early 
years of its life span. This will, in the first instance, reduce 
the scope for concealed taxation of capital gains, and, secondly, 
postpone some tax liabilities. The former would lead to an 
increase in the aggregate savings only if the reduction in the tax 
revenue is more than offset by the consequent increase in the 
private savings. The latter would influence investment in two 
vrays: first, it increases the ability of firms to expand by 
increasing the liquid assets at their disposal, and second, it 
reduces the risk to the capital investment arising from progressive 
income taxation. Neither of these influences would lead to an 
immediate increase in aggregate savings, though they may lead to an 
1. A. R. Prest, ~Qblic Finance in Practice and Theory, London 1960, 
pp. 310-11. Dr. Prest also there demonstrates how a firm with 
a growing stock of capital may always spare adequate funds for 
replacement unless the outflow due to the price rise is more 
than sufficient to offset the inflow due to net investment. 
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increase in savings through increasing output. But there is no 
reason to believe that the resultant increase in output, and hence 
in savings, would be greater than what it would have been if the 
gover~~ent savings had not been reduced by the accelerated 
depreciation allowance. Noreover, the liquidity influence may 
at times clash with money and credit policies to be followed against 
inflationary pressures. Furthermore, while the small firms are 
more in need of liquidity and of encouragement for risk-taking, the 
accelerated depreciation allowance has in fact been granted to the 
big firms. 
Similar effects of increasing· liquidity and the encourage-
ment for risk-taking would result also from the investment allow-
ances. But the stimulation for risky investments would be greater 
in the case of investment allowances than accelerated depreciation, 
since total wear and tear allowances do not exceed lOo% of cost in 
the latter case whereas they do in the former case. Again, the 
advantages of the investment allowance have been confined to the 
large enterprises while the small firms need them more. From the 
aggregate savings point of view, the investment allowance may 
hardly be expected to exert any positive effect, since the funds 
above 250,000 T.L. would be invested anyway·and the concession is 
not confined to the investments financed by accumulated profits. 
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The provision to offset losses has the same effects, 
but is not restricted to the use of big enterprises only. 
These three incentive measures have important features 
in common. They do not appear to stimulate the aggreg-ate 
savings directly but do appear to influence the allocation of 
investible funds, in the first place, in favour of the private 
sector against the public sector, and, in the second place, in 
favour of relatively more capital-intensive investment. We 
shall return to this point later. 
The treatment of the revenue from real estate as 
described above is, first of all, incompatible v1ith justice, 
secondly, with the priorities of the Plan. It is the favourable 
provisions of the income tax and Building tax that have stimulated 
the flow of more than 6o% of the private investment into the 
construction sector during the 1950's: In view of the 
diminishing share of total investments directed to the con-
struction sector as proposed by the Plan, tax concessions applied 
to revenues from buildings and from transactions in real estate 
1. A. T. Peacock and H. Hauser, Fiscal Policy in South East 
Europe, in the Government Finance and Economic Development 
(ed.) A. T. Peacock, Paris 1965. (A Collection of the papers 
read in a Conference arranged by OECD.) 
·. ~ . 
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must be abolished, except for tenement houses for occupation by 
lower income classes. This may have a considerable revenue 
effect in addition to its favourable effects on social justice 
and allocation of resources. In order to mitigate the pains 
of such a transition to a wider concept of income, Mr. Kalder 
proposes that for some time the gains made on the sale of real 
estate should be taxed fully if the realization is within 4 
years but that afterwards the taxable gain should be reduced by 
10 per cent for each further year for which an asset was held. 1 
B. Taxation of Company Income :- The profits of all 
corporations, limited liability companies, co-operatives and 
state economic enterprices, are subject to the withholding 
income tax and the corporation tax. 
The withholding tax is levied at a flat rate of 20 per 
cent on the taxable income of the company which is arrived at 
by deducting all kind of t~xes paid, reserves and counterpart 
funds, and the losses of previous years from the profits. Thus 
the withholding income tax is levied on the distributable 
profits and is supposed to be paid by the company on behalf of 
the shareholders who are given credit for the tax paid on the 
distributed profits. It seems that the assessment of the whole 
of the profit, distributed as \,•ell as undistributed, to the 
l. N. Kaldo~, Report ...... , op.cit. 
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withholding tax needlessly penalises the ploughing back of 
1 profits of the company. It would, therefore, be more feasible 
to confine the withholding tax to actual divident payments. 
Against this it is maintained that in Turkey most of the 
corporations are closely held family concerns and there are 
various ways of distributing profits to "inside" shareholders 
other than through a formal divident payment. The dangers of 
tax evasion ·w-ould, hov.•ever, be met adequately if a minimum 
part, say, one-third, of the profits is made subject to the 
withholding tax, since most corporations have to plough back a 
considerable share of their profits for expansion purposes. 2 
\vi th this change, it will be necessary to raise the rate of 
withholding income tax, since its present rate of 20 per cent 
is reached as an effective rate in the personal income tax at 
an annual income of 20,00C TL. which is surely below the average 
income of a shareholder in Turkey.3 
Companies' profits are also subject to the corporation 
tax. The rate of corporation tax was raised in 1962 from 10 
per cent to 20 per cent in private companies and to 35 per cent 
in public enterprises. In 1963, 4704 Companies paid 427 million 
1. N. Kaldor, ibid. 
2. For the ratio of undistributed porfits to total profits, 
see page 116. 
3. N. Kaldor, op.cit. 
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TL corporation tax vThich was equal to only 4.9 per cent of total 
tax revenue. The low level of revenue from corporation tax is 
due to two reasons: first, the sectors in which companies 
usually predominate (e.g. hea~v industry) have a relatively small 
share of GNP and second, the number of incorporated businesses 
is relatively smaller inside ~~ given sector. Therefore, to 
achieve an increase in the revenue from this source is, in the 
first place, a matter of structural change which depends on the 
overall development of the econom,y. For an immediate revenue 
increase, however, a higher tax rate as suggested by Mr. Kaldor 
may be considered. In fact, the present rate of 20 per cent on 
the privately owned companies seems extremely low in comparison 
with other countries. The rate of this tax is 52% in the U.S., 
58~b in Israel, 5~~ in France and 45% in Ceylon, and in all these 
countries there is also income tax liability on the personal 
income of shareholders. 1 An increase in the rate of corporation 
tax becomes more necessary particularly in vie'" of the recent 
important tax concessions, in order to offset at least partly 
the revenue loss of the government and to make the incentive 
measures more effective. However, one could doubt if the 
feasible scope for an increase in the tax rate is as great as 
envisaged by r1.r. Kaldor who ·suggested a uniform rate of 40% be 
1. N. Kaldor, ibid. 
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applied to all corporations. The imposition of a non-refundable 
tax on the company profits in addition to a refundable income tax 
is explained by the fact that an incorporated enterprise stands 
as an entity independent of its shareholders. But Turkish 
corporations are mostly family concerns and the burden of cor-
poration tax is felt more strongly by the shareholders than in 
other countries. As a matter of fact, under the existing 
circumstances in Turkey the need for the spread of corporate 
form of business is immense and this requires light taxation of 
company profits in comparison with personal incomes. 
! 
C.· Taxation of Wealth :- We have alreadY pointed to 
the defect in the Turkish tax system regarding taxation of 
capital gains arising from the transfer of real estate, 1 which 
is by far the most important form of \veal th in Turkey. Since 
portfolio investment in shares is relatively rare in Turkey's 
present stage of development, it does not seem necessary to 
extend the tax net to the gains from the sale of stocks and shares. 
There are three main taxes on the value of capital: land 
tax, building tax and inheritance and gift tax. The revenue 
from the first two goes to the local administrations and the 
central goverrunent has a share of revenue from the building tax. 
Both of these taxes are levied on the cadastral value of estates 
1. See : pp. 1 9 0 and 191 of the present chapter. 
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and have therefore been largely eroded. 1 In their present terms 
they can neither contribute significantly to the public sector's 
revenue nor perform their function of supplementing the taxes on 
incomes and profits so as to reduce inequalities. 
The inheritance and gift tax provides ve~- little revenue 
and has so far been applied on account of social justice 
'd t' 2 cons~ era ~ons. The contribution of this tax \·Jas only 0.13 per 
cent of the total expenditure from the General and Annexed Budjets 
in 1960. 3 In 1964 its revenue was l/25th of the revenue from the 
sugar consumption tax. 4 This very low level of revenue is the 
result of various factors. Fi:r:·st, the base of the tax is assessed 
according to the acquisition value which results in the assessment 
of real estates according to the 1936 cad.ostral valuation. 
Consequently, the revenue from this tax has been largely eroded 
owing to the rising prices in the last two decades or so. 
Strangely enoujh, the valuation of all business estates, whether 
tangible or net, for purposes of inheritance and profit tax is 
carried out at their current market value. This creates a harmful 
discrimination against the productive employment of capital and in 
favour of keeping wealth in idle forms. Secondly, it is estimated 
that tax evasion is practiced on a tremendous scale. 5 Thirdly, 
1. See: p.l48 in this chapter 
2. H. Kizilyalli, op.cit., p.ll9 
3. SPO. "Sector Programmes, Taxation", mimeographed & in Turkish, 
Ank 1962, p.l2. 
4. See 11able 29. 
5. H. Kizilyalli, op.cit., and SPO, Vergi, Mimeographed 1962. 
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the tax rates are low and exemption limits are ve~- high. 1 Thus, 
a considerable amount of wealth passes on without. paying any tax. 
IV 
TAXATION OF COMMODITIES AND SERVICES 
The revenue from indirect taxes2 constitutes the major 
part of the total tax revenue, i.e., two-third in recent years. 
As will be seen from Table 29a, the share of indirect taxes in 
the total tax revenue in 1963 and 1964 was 67.4% whereas it was 
61.7% in 1960 and 62.8% in 1956. This is accounted for by the 
enlarged coverage and increased rates of indirect taxes as well 
as by the unsusceptibility of direct taxes to rising national 
income. 
When we look at the structure of indirect taxes, no single 
tax is seen as relatively predominant. 3 The largest revenue 
yielding tax is the production tax, which is an excise tax. 
Tobacco and alcoholic drinks also provide a significant revenue. 
The only mass consumption corr~odity of basic need nature which is 
1. SPO, ibid. 
2. There is no universally agreed criterion to distingwish indirect 
taxes from direct. We adopt here the classification used by the 
Ministry of Finance as shown in Table 29. 
3. This runs counter to the case observed in underdeveloped countries 
For instance, in 1959 Chana raised 25% of its revenue from import 
duties and 38% from export taxes; Ceylon . 30% from the former and 
27% from the latter; I~laya derived 25% of its revenue from export 
taxes. (A. R. Prest, Public Finance in underdeveloped Countries 
pp63 & 66). 
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taxed is sugar. Such services as banking and insurance, P.T.T. 
and transport are also subject to taxation. There is neither a 
general sales tax nor a purchase tax and no multi-stage tax. The 
tax on imports brings in a revenue equal to the one-tenth of total 
tax revenue. Export tax is unknown in Turkey since the end of 
World \1/ar II. 
In order to envisage the role of indirect taxation in 
financing the Plan, let us acquaint ourselves with the important 
taxes on commodities and services. 
Prior to 1956 the taxation of commodities and services 
had a very complex structure with separate tax laws for some 
individual commodities and services. An integration in this 
field i,•as achieved in 1956 with Law No. 6802, which brought 
together various taxes on commodities and services within the 
code of "Taxes on Outgoin~". 1 The La,., comprises two broad 
category taxes: The Production Tax and the Taxes on Services. 
The production tax is levied on the specified commodities 
as they are disposed of. The tax is deducted at source by the 
disposer of the commodity who includes the tax into his price. 
1. In the publications of the Ministry of Finance the title of 
the Law No. 6802 is translated into English as "Expenditure 
Taxes". As this may cause an outsider to confuse it with 
Kaldor's expenditure tax, we prefer here to adopt the 
U.K. Hicks 1 terminology used· in her Development Finance, 
op.cit. 
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If a commodity subject to the tax is used by its owner the tax is 
to be levied in the same way as if it has been trasfered to another 
hand. The taxable commodities are arranged in four tables. The 
first table enumerates the ra'" materials and primary products such 
as cement and bricks, all kind of processed minerals (including 
oil), rubber, paper, glass,textiles, plastics, furs and je\Y"ellery, 
and electricity and gas. The second table contains manufactured 
commodities such as explosives and '1-Ieapens, vehicles, '"atches, 
radios, record-players and tape-recorders, cameras and cine-cameras, 
matches, and ceramics. The third table includes, coffee, cocoa, 
glucose and some alcoholic drinks which are outside the state 
Monopoly Administration. Table 4 lists the imported commodities 
which correspond to those included in other tables. 
As it is easily seen particularly from the content of the 
first table the ultimate usage of the commodities taxed are not 
readily ascertainable. Although, at present, the Turkish 
industries are in the main consumption goods industries, the 
capital goods industries have been gaining importance and hence 
the indirect taxation of capital goods. A tax on investment 
goods may be an anti-inflationary measure and may also have the 
effect of encouraging the use of labour-intensive methods of 
production, both of \vhich are desi:rable from the viewpoint of the 
plan targets. But, in view of the incentive measures mentioned 
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in the last section, there is quite clearly some conflict: a tax 
policy which boosts private capital formation~one hand and 
knocks it down with the other is obviously lacking in consistency. 
Indeed, the Production Tax may have some advantages in favour of 
saving and investment only if capital goods are not subject to 
the tax. 
The Production Tax applies differentiated rates to different 
products on an ad valorem basis td th a few exceptions such as 
petrol and petroluem products, electricity, gas, matches and the 
co1mnodities in the third table which are taxed at specific rates. 
On the rat-J material and primar.t products, the rates vary from 12.5 
per cent on construction material to 30 per cent and over on some 
textiles and to 75 per cent on furs and jewellery. On the 
manufactured commodities it varies between 10% and 40% and in the 
case of imported goods between 10% and 60%. Concerning those 
commodities of which end-usages are ascertainable, the differ-
entiation of rates ;rould certainly accord progressiveness to the 
production tax. For instance, in the case of imported commodities, 
the taxation of textiles at a rate of 12.5 - 18 per cent, as 
against the tax rate on plastics of 35% and on furs and jewellery 
of 60%, could claim to have progressive effects in relation to 
income differences. The same could be said with respect to the 
taxation of manufactured goods. On the other hand it is difficult 
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to explain the lenient taxation of wine and beer in comparison 
to whisky - 0.2, 0.4 and 30 TL per litre, respectively. Although 
·~rhisky may be considered rick peoples' drink, it is hardly 
possible to treat beer and wine as basic necessities. 
As regards the commodities listed in the first table, 
although attempt is made to accord a progressive nature to the 
production tax through differentiated rates, the fact that end-
usages of most commodities included in this table cannot be 
ascertained makes incidence of the tax ambiguous. 
With respect to the differentiation between capital goods 
and consumption goods, the former is taxed at lm·Jer ra.tes than 
the latter in the case of imported commodities. This provides a 
stimulus for the future against the present consumption. But 
if the capital goods are used in the production of consumption 
goods, the effect of this differentiation on the capital formation 
would be limited. In the table of raw materials and primary 
products, some investment goods such as cement, bricks, some iron 
products,and electricity used in production are taxed relatively 
lightly. But the uncertainty regarding end-usage of them makes 
impossible any prediction of their possible effects on capital 
formation and saving in relation to con~umption. 
The taxes on services comprise these three taxes: B~~ing 
and Insurance Transactions Tax, Transportation Tax, and P.T.T. 
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Service Tax. In 1964 they together accounted for less than a% 
of the indirect tax revenue. The banking and insurance tax is 
levied at a rate of 20 per cent on the incomes of banks and 
insurance companies from all of their transactions. T"nis tax 
would make for a higher effective rate of interest which might be 
deemed desirable in view of the necessity of using the scarce 
factor "capi tal 11 in the most economic \vays. 
Let us now examine briefly the excise levied on the mass 
consumption commodities. Of these commodities, tobacco, aloholic 
drinks, tea, salt and sugar are the most important ones. With 
the exception of sugar and some alcoholic drinks, their production 
and distribution are under the monopoly of the State Monopoly 
Administration. The tax on the monopoly products consists of two 
elements: a specific tax called 11 Defence Tax", and profits of the 
Administration. In 1963 the former brought in a revenue of 
477 million TL., and the latter 761 million TL. which comprised 
336 million Tl profit from tobacco, 235 million TL. from drinks, 
171 million TL from tea, 19 million TL. from coffee, l million TL 
from matches and 1 million TL. loss from salt. 
Under the present system, the profits of the Monopoly 
Administration serve not only as a tax but also as a buffer to 
maintain stable prices for the monopoly products against changing 
1. Ministry of Finance, "Budget Revenues Bulletin, 1969 11 , pp. 143 -
144· 
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costs. This is criticised on the ground tha. t it leads to the 
inefficient use of the resources at the disposal of the Administra-
tion, and it is suggested that the monopoly products should be 
charged a predetermined tax and that the MOnopoly Administration 
should be free to apply a monopolistic price policy1 • 
Having a low price-elasticity and a high-income-elasticit,y 
of demand, the monopoly products, except salt, are best suitable 
for excise taxation. Besides, in view of their "non-essential" 
character and of the diseconomies connected with their consumption~ 
the taxation of the monopoly products could hardly provoke any 
argument of regressiveness. These points, however, do not seem 
to have influenced the tax. policy \"lith respect to the "mass 
luxuries" in question. Indeed,the total revenue, i.e., taxes and 
profits, of the State Monopoly Administration rose from 473 million 
T.L. in 1956 to 1248 million T.L. in 1963, recording a rise of only 
164% whereas in the same period the gross national product at 
current prices bas increased by 182%. If account is taken of the 
fact that Changes in the social conditions and the increasing 
monetization of the economy which have taken. place in Turkey during 
1956-1963 must have had the effect of increasing the high income-
1. A. Alaybek and others, "Reform in the Indirect Taxesn, as quoted 
in H. Kizilyalli, op. cit., pp. 78-80. 
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elasticity of demand for the monopoly products, the failure of the 
taxation of these commodities in responding to the increases in 
money incomes will become more conspicuous. The failure is certain-
ly due to the "profit" element in the taxation of the monopoly pro-
ducts. There is therefore a good case to adopt a method of taxing 
these commodities that would ~y the emphasis merely on the revenue 
aspect. Nevertheless, a reservation must be made here with respect 
to the taxation of tea. The domestic production of tea is protec-
ted from foreign competition with a customs duty of over lOo% and a 
plus-value charged by the Monopoly administration on the imported 
tea twice as high as charged on home-produced tea. Although, the 
protection is granted in the national interest, it could hardly be 
maintained that the consumers of tea benefit directly from the 
policy of protection. On the contrary, they are forced to P$Y a 
higher price because of protection. It is then far from reasonable 
to ask these same consumers to hear the extra burden of the excise 
tax on tea. A similar argument may be put forth for the taxation 
of tobacco, which is one of the main sources of foreign currency so 
scarce in Turkey. To the extent that domestic consumption of 
tobacco competes with its export, an additional tax burden on the 
consumers of tobacco may be necessary in order to divert the supply 
of tobacco from home to foreign markets and to make the consumers 
of tobacco pay in taxes the gap between the social and private cost of 
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consumption of tobacco which arises because of the competition of 
domestic consumption with export. 
Apart from such comm.odi ties as clothes and matches which 
are subject to the production te.X there are two widely consumed 
basic-necessities, namely, salt and sugar, which are subject to the 
e~cise taxation. Salt is a state monopoly product. Although the 
Monopoly Administration has in the recent years incurred small 
losses from the sale of salt, these have been more than compensated 
for b,y the defence tax charged on salt at a rate of 67%1 which is 
higher than the tax rates applied to Ill8.llY luxuries within the 
production tax. 
Sugar is very heavily taxed at a specific rate of 0•85 T.L. 
per kgr. for crystal sugar and 1 T.L. per kgr. for cube sugar. At 
present this amounts to the taxation of sugar at a tax rate of more 
than 50% of its cost per kgr. B,y its nature, taxation of sugar is 
heavily regressive and, as a result of high sugar prices, results 
in a significant burden on the low income groups. However, since 
the poor rural population substitute sugar with pekmez {boiled 
grape-juice), it is especially the low-income classes of urban popu-
lation that bear the heavy burden of the taxation of sugar. 
1. B. Kizilyalli, op. cit., p. 120. 
In 196~ the MOnopoly Administration incurred a loss of 1 million 
T.L. from the sales of salt which was 16 million T.L. This shows 
the existence or about 1i million T.L. defence tax on salt. 
(Figures are from the Budget Revenues Bulletin pp. 12~-124). 
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Finally, a glance at the customs duty. In Turkey the 
customs duty is to a great extent used for the protection of infant 
industry as well as for economizing on the meagre foreign currency 
reserves, though to obtain revenue to the Treasury is the main 
purpose. The average rate of duty is low, being 13• 35% in the 
1959-61 period1 • A differentiation of rate is applied, raw 
materials being taxed at a lower rate than manufactured goods, 
capital goods than consumption goods, and necessities than luxuries2• 
Low duties on capital goods, however, induce capital-intensive pro-
duction methods and also prevents the development of capital-goods 
industries at home. So long as the domestic production of 
luxuries is not effectively discouraged, higher duties on imported 
luxuries, on the one hand, and the low duties on imported raw 
materials, which can be used in the production of luxuries as well 
as the necessities, on the other hand, would no doubt provide a 
stimulus for the productive factors to flow into the production of 
luxuries. 
1. S.P.O., "Sector Programmes, Taxation", Ankara 1962 (mimeographed 
and in Turkish), p. 22. The average rate of customs duty is 
calculated on the basis of the value of total imports and of the 
total revenUe from the customs duty. 
2. l\,;.}.. 
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IV 
THE TAXATION POLICY IN THE PLAN !'ERIOD 
The 1962 Interim Programme envisaged a total tax revenue of 
8,000 million T.L. but the actual collection turned out to be 
7,100 million T.L. The actual rate or. growth of G.N.P. in 1962, 
6%, also lagged behind the Prograrmne target or 7%. Since the Deve-
lopment Plan had been drawn up on the assumption that the G.N.P. 
would grow in 1962 by 7% over its 1961 level, it was imperative to 
revise the Plan • s targets according to the actual outcome of the 
1962 Interim Programme. But this necessity had not been realized, 
and the expenditure and revenue targets of the Plan for 196~ in 
absolute amounts were kept intact in the 196~ Annual Programme, 
though the G.N.P. target was stated as 7% higher than the actual 
G.N.P. in 19621• Consequently, the target for tax revenue in the 
196~ Annual Programme, that is, 9,000 million T.L., stood at 
16·2% of the G.N.P. tsset instead of 15·95% as envisaged in the 
Development Plan. At the time of the preparation of the 196~ 
Annual Programme the total tax revenue in 1962 was expected to be 
around 7,~00 million T.L., which necessitated an additional tax 
revenue of 1,700 million T.L. in 196~ in order to reach the target. 
1. S.P.O., 196~ Annual Programme, p. 51. 
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Of' this, 550-600 million T.L. was e:Kpected to come about under the 
existing tax system as a result of' the increases in incomes and 
expenditures, assuming an income elasticity of one in the tax 
system. The rest would be made up by increasing the rates and 
enlarging the coverage of' the existing taxes. In this connection, 
significant increases were expected in the revenues from the income 
tax, the production taX on petroleum products and on domestic 
production, the stamp duty, and the monopoly products. We have 
already pointed to the g:reat failure in the attempt to extend the 
personal income tax to the agricultural incomes. FUrthermore, 
the inclusion of' artisans among the income tax payers, which had 
been expected to provide a revenue of' 50 million T.L. in 1963, was 
postponed. The increases in the tax rates of' indirect taxes 
produced important additional revenue but no indirect tax reached 
the Prog:ramme target except the sugar consumption tax and customs 
duty which both exceeded their targets. The actual tax revenue 
in 1963, therefore, could reach 8,400 million T.L. against the 
target of' 9,000 million T.L. The rate of' realization, 93%, however, 
was hie;ber than. the one attained in 1962, that is, 89%. 
In the 1964 Armu.al Programme the expenditure and revenue 
targets in absolute amounts were taken from the Development Plan, 
adjusting them for the rise in the general price level. Thus, . the 
tax revenue for 1964 was estimated to reach 10,400 million T.L., 
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increasing by 24% over the out-turn o! 1963. o:r the additional 
tax revenue o! 2,000 million T.L., 1,200 million T.L. was expected 
to arise !rom the normal increase in tax yields following the growth 
o! national income1 • This corresponds to an increase in yields o! 
1~, as against a forecast rise in G.N.P. by 7% in real terms. 
Even assuming a certain rise in prices, the implied elasticity o! 
tax yields appears rather high. in comparison to the past experience. 
An additional 800 million T.L. was expected to come !rom new tax 
measures. Direct taxation o! agricultur.al incomes was to be 
enlarged, as already explained above in the section on the taxation 
o! agriculture, so as to yield 200 million T.L. in 1964. Increases 
in various types o! indirect taxes were expected to provide about 
400 million T.L. The government was also plamling to obtain an 
additional 100 million T.L. by improving the tax administration, 
as control and collection o! direct taxes are poor and evasion is 
extensive, especially when the taxes are not withheld at source. 
But the government proposals could get Parliamentary approval only 
after having been circumscribed considerably so that the expected 
yield !rom the new measures in 1964 was reduced to about 440 mil-
lion T.L. 2• In order to avoid a budget deficit, public expenditures 
1. 1964 Annual Programme, p. 268. 
2. O.E.C.D., "Economic Survey, Turkey", Augu.st 1964, p. 30. 
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were cut down which reinforced the tendencies of slowing down of 
economic activity already observed by the end or 1963. The slowing 
down or expansion affected at least the yield or indirect taxes. 
In fact, in spite of the new tax measures, the actual total tax 
revenue in 1964 was only 9,200 million T.L. which was less than 
expected to occur automatically, let alone the additional yield 
from the new measures. The rate or realization was as low as 88%. 
In the 1965 Annual Programme we observe a change in the 
method or determining the tax targets. The tax/income ratio, 
instead of tax revenue in absolute amount, as envisaged by the 
·Development Plan to occur in 1964 was applied to the G.N.P. target 
of the 1965 Annual Programme, that is, 69,840 million T.L. at 1963 
prioes1 • This showed a target of 11·,~00 million T.L. at 1963 
prices for total tax revenue to be obtained in 1965. This would 
require an increase in tax revenue b,y 29% over the 1964 out-turn. 
The 1965 Annual Programme, however, did not deem feasible such an 
increase in tax revenue in view of the fact that. considerable 
increases in tax rates and coverage had already been made in 1963 
2 
and 1964 • It was expected that the existing taxes would yield 
10,800 million T.L., 300 million T.L. of which would result from 
1. s.P.O. , 1965 Annual Programme, pp. 11 and 303. 
2. s.P.o., 1965 Annual Programme, p. 304. 
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the rationalization and improvement of the tax laws and administra-
tion, and that the remaining would be made up by the non-tax revenue 
sources such as the S.E.E. and local administrations and b,y internal 
b . 1 orroWJ.Dg • But the actual tax revenue was only 10,200 million T.L. 
in spite of a rise b,y a% in the wholesale price index. And the 
94% rate of realization seen in the column IV of Table 33 would have 
been reduced to B6%had the additional financing required to bring 
the consolidated budget (General and Annexed Budgets) into balance 
been planned to be met by taxation as had been the case in the 1963 
and 1964 annual programmes. 
It is thus apparent that the taxation policy in 1962-1965 
has not been successful in fulfilling its task of providing the 
required resources for use by the public sector. Before dealing 
with the shortcomings of the taxation policy itself, it seems 
necessary to question the feasibilit,y of the tax revenue targets 
or the annual programmes. The annual programmes adopted as their 
tax revenue targets those set for the relevant years in the Develop-
ment Plan. T.his has paradoxically involved an arbitrariness 
because of the following two reasons. First, the Plan's targets 
for various kinds or public revenue to be obtained in a certain year 
1. Ibid., p. 304. 
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are meaningful only when considered together with the G.N.P. target 
set for that year in the Plan. It would not be reasonable to assume 
that the Planners, when setting the tax target, say, for 1965, meant 
it to be attained regardless of the levels of G.N.P. in that year. 
Secondly, the practice of determining the tax revenue targets in 
the Annual Programmes implies an ignorance on the planners part of 
the close relationship between the composition as well as the level 
of expenditures, both private and public, and that of the ta:x: 
revenue. As it is known, the S.P.O. had proposed a scheme for the 
taxation of the agricultural sector which would have made it 
possible to collect the revenue needed for the Development Plan. 
But the government, which approved the Development Plan, has 
refused to sanction the scheme for financing it1 , and the taSk of 
obtaining the required finance has been left to the annual program-
mes. As we have seen, the annual programmes squeezed every source 
for additional tax revenue but not the agricultur-al incomes2• 
Thus, the tax revenue targets in the annual programmes have been 
set at unduely high levels, and have been intended to be realized 
by concentrating the burden of taxation on the non-agricultural 
sectors. 
1. N. Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Ta:x:, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963·, pp. 410-420. 
2. It is hardly possible to consider as a serious attempt the 
inclusion of agricultural incomes into the personal income tax 
which yielded a revenue of 30 million T.L. in 1963. 
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In a development plan of the Turkish type, which puts great 
emphasis on the induced participation of private initiative, tax 
revenue targets in each year of the plan period should not be 
considered as imperative targets. However, prior estimation of 
required resources, and, hence, tax revenue, is necessary in order 
to have an idea of the magnitude of the task of achieving a success-
ful implementation of the Plan. The refusal by the government of 
the scheme of burdening the agricultural sector according to its 
share in national income made it obvious at the outset that the 
required domestic resources would not be~~6~ng d~ing the plan 
implementation. It would therefore have been more feasible to 
reduce the Plan in size. '!his has not been done. Nor have the 
revenue targets of the Development Plan been adjusted downward when 
they are adopted by the Anmtal Programmes in spite of the fact that 
a host of other targets, including G.N.P. and investment targets, 
have not been fulfilled since the beginning of the 1962 Interim 
Programme. Furthermore, the refusal of the original financing 
scheme should have caused not only a reduction in size of the Plan 
but also a complete alteration in the objectives as well as the 
strategy of the Plan, since there are undeniable "cause-and-effect" 
relations between the comp~sition of investment and that of finan-
cing. It is simply illogical to assume that a considerable part1 
1. In 1963 an additional financing of 1,200 million T.L. was neces-
sary, 1,000 million of which was originally assumed to come from 
the direct taxation of agriculture. 
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of the required financing originally envisaged, to come from the 
agricultural sector could be obtained from the other sectors and, 
at the same time, the Development Plan, with its targets concerning 
the allocation of resources between different sectors and that of 
expenditures between saving and consumption, could be implemented 
successfully as originally forecast. In view of these facts, it 
would perhaps not be an exaggeration if one says that the Turkish 
Development Plan was still-born. 
So much for the faulty choice of tax revenue targets in the 
Annual Programmes. It is now time to search for the shortcomings 
of the taxation policy in 1962-1965 which might have held back the 
growth of the tax revenue. As seen in Table 33, despite the fact 
that the rate of realization has been low, the share of tax revenue 
in the G.N.P. has continuously increased from 12•9% in 1962 to 
14•3% in 1965, recording an increase by 1·~ of G.N.P. This 
implies that the tax system has recently achieved the income-
elastic character which it had lacked in the 1950's. This is 
better observed in the last column of the table, where the income 
elasticity of the tax system, that is, the ratio of the rate of 
increase in tax revenue to that in G.N.P., is seen as 1•33 in 1963, 
1"45 in 1964 and 1·58 in 1965. Indeed, the tax revenue has increased 
in the period 1962-1965 at a rate of 9·7% per annum while the increase 
(contd. at foot of page 215) 
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TABLE 33 
SOME INDICATORS OF THE TAXATION POLICY, 1962-1966 
(000 Million T.L. at current prices) 
Year. 1 Tax Revenue Rate of T/G.N.P ~/AGNP (df/T) G.N.P. Realiza- (%) ~ogramme Actual + tion (%) (AGNP~ ("lm' 
I II III IV v VI VII 
1962 55"2 8·0 7·1 89 12·8 6·6 0•48 
1963 62·7 9·0 8·4 93 13•4 17·3 1·33 
1964 66•8 10•4 9•2 88 13•8 19·5 1·45 
1965 
1966 
71"4 10·8 10•.2 94 14•3 21•8 
76•4 12•2 
- -
16·0 40·0 
1. ~e G.N.P. figures are the realized ones, except 
the 1966 figure, which is the Program Target. 
1•58 
2•80 
Note on the sources: The G.N.P. figures for 1962 and 1963 
were taken from O.E.C.D., "Economic Surveys, Turkey", 
Paris Aug. 1964, p. 43, Table 1; those for the years 
1964 and 1965 from S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 Annual 
Programme, First Draft, mimeographed, p. 64, Table 9. 
T.be latter source gives the 1963 G.N.P. figure which 
exactly corresponds to that given in the for.mer source, 
and this shows that the 1962 figure in the above Table 
has a common method of estimation with the other years' 
figures. The 1965 figure is the first estimate made 
in October 1965. T.he 1966 Annual Programme aims at 
7% growth in G.N.P. over the 1965 out-turn and expresses 
this target as 75,100 million T.L. at 1964 prices·. Our 
figure in the table, 76,400 million T.L., was arrived at 
by increasing the 1965 figure by 7%. T.he estimates of 
G.N.P. by the State Statistical Institute differ from 
the S.P.O. estimates. They are 60,300 million T.L., 
68,490 million T.L., 72,940 million T.L. and 78,983 
million T.L. in 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965, respectively, 
as given in the Ministry of Finance, Budget Proposal 
for the 1966 Fiscal Year, Ankara 1965, in Turkish, 
P• 54, Table 1. 
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Note on the sources of Table ~~ contd. 
The sources for the Programme figures for tax 
revenue are as follows: for 1962 and 1963, S.P.O., 
A Summary of the Progress Report on the Implements tion 
of the 196~ Annual Programme, Ankara July 1964, p. 31, 
Table 26; for 1964, S.P.O., 1964 Annual Programme, 
Ankara November 1963, in Turkish, p. 267, Table 156; 
for 1965 and 1966, S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 Annual 
Programme, first draft and mimeographed, p. 78, 
Table 14. 
The figures for the actual out-turn of tax 
collections have been taken from the following sources: 
the 1962 and 1963 figures from S.P.O., A Summary of the 
Progress Report ••••• , ibid. p. 31, Table 26; the 1964 
figure from S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 Annual programme, 
ibid., p. 64, Table 9; the 1965 figure is the expected 
out-turn calculated by myself by extrapolating the fact 
that the total tax collections of the first eight 
months of 1965 is greater by 11% than that of the 
corresponding period of the previous year. 
The last three columns have been arranged on the 
basis of the first three columns. 
Finally, while the years for G.N.P. figures are 
calendar years, those for tax revenue figures are 
fiscal years, i.e., 1 March- 28th February. 
(contd. from page 213). 
in G.N.P. in the same period was only 6•8% per annum1 , giving an 
income elasticity of 1•3 for the period. This has been possible 
as a result of achieving an incremental tax-income ra tic higher 
than the average tax-income ratio. Columns V and VI of the table 
1. Both rates are compound rates, calculated on the basis of data 
given in Table 33. 
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show comparatively the incremental and average tax-income ratios. 
The portion or the incremental income· .. taken in taxes bad sharply 
increased in 1963 compared with 1962 and has steadily grown larger, 
readhing 21·8% in 1965 as compared with the average tax ratio of 
14• 3% in that year. For the period as a whole the incremental 
tax ratio is 19·1% while the average tax ratio is 13·6%. 
Despite the favourable impression created by the preceding 
paragraPh, one could not expect the same tax trend to continue in 
the near future. The higher average and incremental tax ratios 
have not been produced by a built-in flexibilit,y in the tax system; 
instead, this result has been achieved through the increases in the 
rates and coverage of the tax system. Table 34 below reveals the 
.. 
fact that indirect taxes have played an almost equal part with the 
direct taxes in increasing the total tax revenue during 1963-1965 
whereas the direct taxes are supposed to be more sensitive to the 
increases in national income. If the 1962 ratios as well are 
taken into account, which shows that the increase in the total tax 
revenue was completely due to the increase in the revenue from 
indirect taxes, it appears that the indirect taxes have provided a 
greater part of the increase in total tax revenue. 
Recalling the survey of indirect taxation in Turkey made in 
the last section, it is hardly possible to envisage further increase 
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TABLE 34 
INCREASES IN TOTAL, DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES IN PERCENTAGES 
(Current prices) 
1962 1963 1964 1965 
Tax Revenues 6·2 18•4 9·9 11•1 
a. Direct taxes - 11·0 17·8 9·9 11•8 
b. Indirect taxes 17•3 18·7 9•9 10•7 
Sources: 1962, 1963 and 1964 ratios were taken from S.P.O., 
A Summary of 1966 Annual Programme, P• 62, Table 8. 
1965 ratios were calculated on the basis of collections 
at the end of October, 1965, as given in the Ministry 
of Finance, The Bu.dget Proposal for the 1966 Fiscal year, 
p. 156, Table 8. 
in the indirect tax revenue apart from what could be done as a 
result of the increase in spending&. ~ere are significant limita-
tiona on the possibility of increasing the revenue of the Production 
Tax through raising the tax rates and/or enlarging its coverage. 
First, the approaching of the data of Turkey's joining the E.E.C. 
(European Economic Co~ty) precludes the possibility of increasing 
taxation of imported commodities, and hence, of home-produced import-
substituting commodities. Secondly, since the end-usage of most of 
the raw materials and primary products subject to the Production tax 
cannot be ascertainable, any tax measure regarding these commodities 
is limited with an uncertainty about its incidence. On the other 
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hand, the present state of fiscal administration does not seem 
capable of coping with the complication~ of a sales tax at even 
the wholesale stage. Finally, the Production Tax is not suitable 
for an extensive discrimination against those commodities for 
which demand rises more than proportionately with income. As 
regards the sugar consumption Tax, one might incline not to wake 
up the sleeping dog but certainly no further·increase in the tax 
rates can be suggested. The only promising field of indirect 
taxation, therefore, is non-essential mass-consumption goods such 
as tobacco and alcoholic drinks (mass-luxuries). But the politi-
cal limit of the taxation of such commodities will certainly be 
reached much earlier than the economic limit. 
Once it is agreed that there is not much scope for further 
increases in the indi~ect tax revenue, one has either to be content 
with the present tax/income ratio or to seek the means of increasing 
the direct tax revenue. the direct taxation 
in Turkey in the earlier sections above has made it clear that 
there is an immense tax potential which could be exploited by means 
of direct taxation. The first and foremost reform in the field of 
direct taxation is required in the taxation of agriculture. The 
discussion in Section II above has brought it into ligbt that the 
equal treatment of the equals (horizontal equity) cannot be achieved 
in Turkey so long as the agricultural sector is attempted to be 
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taxed within the personal income tax. And unless this deficiency 
is remedied, the measures taken to increase the tax burden of the 
non-agricultural sectors would only serve to aggravate the 
inequal distribution of tax burden and the misallocation of 
productive resources. Therefore, the suggestions made in this 
dissertation with respect to the changes in the present form of 
the income taxation are only meaningful if accompanied by an 
effective taxation of the agricultural sector. 
In Turkey, the revenue from the direct taxation is held 
back by the influence of the two wrong arguments, which aiili!Zingly 
contradict each other1 . On the one band, it is argued that the 
surplus of income over the minimum subsistence needs of the popu-
lation is so meagre that the proportion of the national income 
which can be taken in taxes is bound to be much smaller than in 
the rich countries. On the other hand, the taxation of incomes 
and profits is furnished with every measure of incentive to the 
high income-classes as if Turkey had large untapped resources at 
her disposal but their activation was prevented by the lack of 
adequate incentives. 
1. For instance, both arguments constitute the skeleton of the 
conference given at the University of Saarland, Germany, by 
Prof. Orban Dilanen, the most influential member of the Taxation 
Reform Commission. It has been published in the Pu.blic Fin-
ance Vol..XIX, No.4 , pp.l·-15, and as a booklet by the Institute 
of Pu.blic Finance of the Istanbul University: Financing of the 
Investments in the Development Plan, Ist.l964, in Turkish. 
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The tax potential of the Turkish econo~ cannot be assessed 
on the basis of the low percapita national income. The study of 
the distribution of income and wealth made in the first chapter 
reveals that those with a surplus over the essential consumption 
have command over a considerable proportion of the national income. 
Although there is no accurate data, it would not be far from the 
truth if one says that the degree of concentration of wealth in 
Turkey is as great as in the advanced countries1 • Moreover, the 
higher share of indirect taxes as compared with the direct taxes, 
that is, a 67/33 ratio of indirect to direct ta~es, means that 
the incidence of taxation in Turkey is far more regressive than in 
the advanced countries. The limited degree of progressiveness 
which could be accorded to the indirect taxation at the present 
stage of development of the Turkish econo~ cannot alter this 
general conclusion. Furthermore, far more of the income tax falls 
. on the wage and salary earners. The share of the wage and salary 
earners and liberal professions in the G.N.P. _was about 1~ in 1963, 
while their share in the total tax revenue was around 52,%2• 
1. According to :Jl.ir~ N. Kaldor, the .share of the national income 
which accrues to property owners of all kinds is probably appre-
ciably larger in countries like Turkey, Mexico, Chile, India or 
Persia than in the U.S. or in Britain. (Will Underdeveloped 
Countries Learn to tax, op. cit.). In fact, the studies of 
income distribution made with respect to India by Mr. S. J. Patel 
and ~S. Kuznet confirm this. (Raja J. Chelliah, op.cit., pp.63-64). 
2. The ratios were calculated on the basis of the data given in the 
Ministry of Finance, Bu.dget Revenues Bu.ll, Ankara 1964, pp.5B-59 
and 138. 
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Whatever allowance is made for the difference in the method of 
classification of the wage and salary earners and liberal profes-
sions in the national income and income tax statistics, the huge 
disparity between the above-mentioned two shares will not be much 
narrowed. These indicators give sufficient support to the 
general argument of this chapter that the tax/income ratio in 
Turkey could be raised far above the present ratio, particularly 
through increases in the direct taxation, without creating a 
social tension. 
Nevertheless, the limitations on the extension of income 
taxation to the middle-income-classes apart from wage and salary 
earners, which arises from the underdeveloped character of the 
economy, necessitates the use of wealth taxes at a greater extent 
as a supplement to the taxation of incomes. Indeed, the taxation 
of the small trader within the personal income tax is as great a 
problem as the taxation of agricultural incomes. The present 
practise of deducting a fixed sum of expenses from the business 
turnover (gross receipts) is not an effective method. To get 
hold of business turnover is as difficult as to assess business 
profits of the small trader. Also, the state of illiteracy and 
of commercial practices compel the acceptance of a high level of 
business turnover as the limit for presumptive method of taxation. 
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On the other hand, an annual tax based on the net value of property 
of the small trader would be both easier to administer and difficult 
to evade. 
It is an element of the strategy for domestic financing of 
the Plan, which has been discussed in Chapter 3, that the savings 
of the private sector are expected to increase at a greater rate 
than the public savings. It follows from this that the tax policy 
should not deter the saving incentives of the private·sector and, 
in any case, avoid increasing the public revenue at the expense of 
the private savings. Putting it differently, the tax instruments 
should be so manipulated as to lead to an increase in the aggregate 
savings and not only in the public savings. In accordance with the 
recommendations of the Tax Reform Commission, the income tax has 
been made less progressive at the high income levels with Law No.202 
and embodied with various incentive measures in.order to encourage 
the accumulation of savings and the capital formation. In view 
of the analysis of the taxation of incomes and profits conducted 
earlier in this chapter, it is hardly possible to regard the 
present incentive measures as contributing to the increased savings. 
First of all, it seems more encouraging for the accumulation of 
savings to maintain a sharp progressiveness with exceptions for 
savings put into desired uses rather than to treat favourably all 
kind of non-consumption through a low rate of progressiveness. 
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Secondly, the present incentive measures, e.g., investment 
allowances, accelerated depreciation, etc., affect the allocation 
of investible funds among different uses rather than that of 
income between consumption and saving. Confinement of the incen-
tives to small savings put into such assets as saving bonds and 
shares and bonds of the public and private corporations operating 
in the fields most conducive to the economic development could do 
much more good for increasing the aggregate savings, as the high 
business incomes would in any case be invested. Nevertheless, 
it is no doubt necessary to use incentive measures to direct the 
investible funds in the hands of high income classes to the 
desired fields. But this policy should be in harmony with the 
general objectives and strategy of the Plan. The present measures 
are inefficient also from this point of view. The right kinds of 
inducement seem to be those encouraging the production methods 
using more of the abundant factor, that is, labour. Finally, the 
clash between the indirect taxation of capital goods and incentive 
measures of the direct taxation requires to be remedied. The 
refund of the Production tax levied on the capital goods of labour-
using character, which are used in the approved industries, might 
have favourable effects on capital formation. 
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The above suggestions may be criticized on the ground that 
they would cause revenue losses for the government. The e:xplana-
tiona referring to the composition of expenditures and investments 
in Chapter I and to the saving behaviour of the private sector in 
Chapter IV have shown that the amount of saving put into the uses 
which may be desirable from the standpoint of the Plan's objectives 
is so small that their exemption from taxation would not lead to 
any significant loss of public revenue. However, the problem 
boils down to that of administrative efficiency as the choice of 
the right kind of exemptions and exceptions and avoidance of the 
creation of loopholes for tax evasion are the crux of the matter. 
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CH.APrER 6 
DEFICIT FINANCING OF THE PLAN 
It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that the Development 
Plan adopts the principle of not resorting to deficit financing. 
We have shown there that the Plan aims at obtaining the additional 
savings required from the public sector through increases in the 
public revenue proper (taxes, the S.E.E.'s surpluses, and borrow-
ing from the public), the limitation of increases in the public 
current expenditures, and foreign aid. As seen in chapter 5, the 
tax targets of the Plan have not been fulfilled, though a consider-
able increase in the tax/income ratio has been achieved. Due to 
the limited scope of this dissertation as well as to the seriously 
incomplete data, it is hardly possible to examine in detail the 
non-tax revenues and current expenditures of the public sector. 
However, an attempt will be made in Section I below to have a 
bird's-eye view of the developments in the public revenues and 
expenditures during the early years of the plan period, that is, 
1962-1965. This will provide the answer to the question whether 
deficit financing has been resorted to in the course of the plan 
implementation. In Section II, the ways and means of financing 
the deficit, if any, will be reviewed, and their repercussions on 
the general equilibrium of the economy will be analysed. 
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I 
Deficit financing may take place in the private as well as 
in the public sector. But it has become a common practice to use 
the term "de!ici t financing" !or the public sector. Nevertheless, 
the definition o! deficit financing o! public capital !ormation 
varies considerably in practice. In the u.s. the term "deficit 
financing" is generally used to mean any expenditure by the 
government that is in excess o! its current revenues. Borrowing 
!rom the public is therefore included in the measurement o! deficit 
in the budset1 • In India, however, only expenditure in excess o! 
current revenues and non-bank borrowings is regarded as "de!ici t 
spending" or "de!ici t !inancing112 • In Turkey, neither the Bu.dget 
Preambles nor the Development Plan and the Annual Programmes adopt 
a certain concept o! deficit financing. In this essay the term 
"deficit financing" will be taken as meaning"the excess o! public 
capital !ormation over any surplus o! genuine government revenue 
left after covering other non-capital government expenditure, due 
adjustment being made !or transfer items3. 
1. R. J. Chelliah, op. cit., p. 150. 
2. Ibid. 
3· H. W. Singer, "Deficit Financing o! Public Capital Formation", 
Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 85. 
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T.he public sector in Turkey may be conceived of at four 
levels: Central Government, the S.E.E.'s,Administration with 
Revolving FUnds, and Local Administrations. The major part of the 
public capital formation takes place in the first two levels, while 
the Administrations with Revolving Funds and Local Administrations 
have only limited funds for investment purposes. 
Table 35 summarizes the available information concerning 
the Central Government's "free" surplus during 1962-1965. Of the 
total current revenue the parts coming from the direct and indirect 
taxes have already been subjected to a critical analysis in chapter 5· 
~. 
It has been shown there that in spite of 1fue considerable increases 
in the total tax revenue/G.N.P. ratio resulting from the tax reform 
attempts since 1962 the revenues from both the direct and indirect 
taxes have fallen short of the tax targets set in the Plan and the 
Annual Programmes. T.he revenue from the Saving Bonds, which is 
included in the item (3) in Table 35 has been dealt with in chapter 
41 • The other public revenues, whiCh are also included in the 
item {3) in Table 35, comprises the Treasury shares taken from some 
imports, the revenue on .the State property", etc. They amounted to 
345 million T.L. in· 1962, 800 million T.L. in 1963 and 725 million 
T.L. in 1964. When they are compared with the targets set in the 
1. See chapter 4, pp. l:?l &.134-1!15. 
(contd. on page 229) 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
5-
6. 
1-
B. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
- 228 -
TABLE 35 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT :BUroETS, 1962-19651 • 
T.L. Million 
Actual Expected~ Pro-
19f)2 1963 1964 gr~ 
1965 1966 
TOTAL CURRENT REVENUE 8,226 10,089 10,921 12,850 14,360 
Direct taxes 2,336 2,752 3,024 3.735 
Indirect taxes 2 5,527 6,945 7,495 10,060 
Annexed budgets 363 392 402 565 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 5,787 6,546 6,785 8,050 9,080 
CURRENT SURPLUS (1-5) 2,439 3.543 4,136 4,800 5,280 
TRANSFERS 1,680 2,536 3,251 3,142 4,202 
Debt repayments 801 799 1,224 
Interest payments 255 308 391 
Other current transfers3 170 304 428 
State Economic Enterprises 240 380 645 760 
Other capital transfers3 214 745 563 
Central Government's 
FREE SuRPLUS (6-7) 759 1,007 885 1,658 1,078 
--
1. Consolidated General and Annexed Budgets. 
2. Includes Saving Bonds and other revenues of the General 
Budget, but excludes Counterpart Funds. . 
3· Includes transfers to municipal and local governments. 
4. Estimated on the basis of the data available in October 1965. 
Sources: O.E.C.D., "Economic Surveys, Turkey 1965/1966 11 , Paris 
Feb. 1966, p. 32; 
S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 Annual Programme, (mimeo-
graphed), pp. 64; 69; 10 and 78. 
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(contd. from page 227). 
Annual Programmes, which are 210 million T.L. and 600 million T.L. 
for 196' and 1964 respectively1, the outcome must be regarded as 
satisfactory. 
The revenue on the Annexed Budgets is expected in the Plan 
to grow at a rate of~ per annum2• The actual revenue was 
'6' million T.L. in 1962 and is expected to be 44' million T.L. in 
1965, giving a rate of increase of 6"8% per annum. Remembering 
that .. the price index has in that period risen, on average, by 
'"7% annually', the growth of the revenue on the Annexed Budgets 
at constant prices has so far lagged behind the Plan targets. '!he 
revenue on the Annexed Budgets has also fallen short of the targets 
of the Annual Programmes, which have envisaged a revenue of 
450 million T.L. on the Annexed Budgets in 196,, 550 million T.L. 
in 1964 and 55' million T.L. in 19654• 
Given the current revenue of the Central Government, the 
size of the current surplus (saving) of the Central Government is 
1. The 1963 Annual Programme, p. 260; The 1964 Annual Programme, 
p. 267. 
2. See chapter '' p.97 , of this essay. 
'· See .chapter 4, p.JlOn, of this essay. 
4· The 196' Annual Programme, p. 260; 19~4 Annual Programme, 267; 
1965 Annual Programme, p. '05. 
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determined by the size of the current expenditures. The Plan's 
projections concerning the public current expenditure were already 
explained in chapter 3, pages 97-98. Table 36 gives the realized 
current expenditure figures as compared with the Programme figures. 
The realization has fallen short of the Annual Programme figures 
throughout the period under consideration. The shortJalls have 
been caused by the failure of the public revenues to reach the 
target figures as well as by impediments in the legislation relating 
to expenditurea1 • However, the growth in the realized current 
expenditures has been in line with the Plan's projections. The 
realized current expenditure was 5,787 million T.L. in 1962 and is 
expected to reach 8,050 million T.L. in 1965, reflecting an average 
rate of growth of 11• &fo per annum. If the rise in the general 
price level i~ the period 1962-65 is taken into account, the average 
rate of annual increase in the realized current expenditure at con-
stant prices appears to be only slightly below the rate envisaged 
by the Plan, which is 8•7% per annum. 
1. S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 Annual Programme, p. 68. It is 
stated there that since such laws as those governing the 
General Accounting, tender and contracts "prefer security 
rather than speed in the State activities, they impede·to 
a certain extent the realization of the public expenditures 
in time even though the equivalent sums are available." 
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TABLE 36 
CUBRENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AS PROGIW1r-1ED & REALIZED, 1962-1965. 
1962 
Programme 6,195 
Realization 5,787 
Shortfall 408 
(At current prices, 
Million T.L.). 
1963 1964 1965 
7,160 7,331 7,800 
6,576 6,785 8,050 
614 546 - 272 
Realization in % 93•4 91·4 92·5 103 
Sources: The realized .figures are .from Table 35 above. 
The Programme .figures .for 1963-1965- are .from 
S.P.O., A Summary o.f 1966 Annual Programme, 
Table 11, p. 69. 
T.he Programme .figure .for 1962 is .from O.E.C.D., 
"Economic Surveys: 
Turkey 1963", Paris May 1963, Table 13, p. 44· 
' 
The biggest increases took place in 1963 and 1965 - 13% and 
18%, respectively - the increase in 1964 being relatively small. 
The growth o.f the current expenditure in 1965 has, however, been 
influenced by the rise in the general price level to a greater 
extent than that in 1963 and 1964. In .fact, the general price 
index has risen by 8% in 1965 over the previous year, while it has 
recorded an increase o.f 4% in 1963 and a .fall o.f about 0·~ in 1964. 
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T.he shortfall in the actual current expenditure in 1962 in 
comparison with the Programme figure was due mainly to the saving 
of 200 million T.L. salaries for unfilled posts and to the special . 
cuts imposed by the authorities1 • T.he actual increase of 
759 million T.L. in the current expenditure in 1963 can partly be 
explained by the special cuts in 1962 and by the effective cost 
(about 400 million T.L.) of the long-delayed l~ rise in the public 
2 
sector salaries and wages • The 1964 forecasts of current expen-
diture were l~ above the 1963 outcome. But the actual increase 
turned out to be about 3•7% because of the government's decision 
in June 1964 to check the increase of current expenditure, which 
had been taken in view of the lower than planned revenue prospects3. 
T.he 1965 Bu.dget had originally foreseen a l~ rise in current 
expenditure over actual 1964 current expenditure, but was subse-
quently amended so as to set the current e:xpendi ture 25% above the 
1964 actual current expenditure, principally to allow higher mili-
tary expenditures4. The latter ratio is, however, unlikely to 
materialize. During the first ten mon_ths of fiscal year 1965 
(March through December), current expenditure was ll% higher than 
l. O.E.C.D., "Economic Surveys, Turkey 196311 , Paris May 1963, p. 43. 
2. Ibid, p. 43; and, O.E.C.D., "Economic Surveys, Turkey 1963-64", 
Paris Aug. 1964, p. 28. 
3. O.E.C.D., 11Econom1c Surveys, Turkey 1965-1966", Paris February 
1966, p. 31. 
4. Ibid. p. 16. 
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in the same period of 19641 • Nevertheless, the S.P.O. estimates 
on the basis of the data available in October 1965 that the 1965 
current expenditure may be realized around 8,050 million T.L., 
18% above the actual 1964 current expenditure (see Table 35). 
As to the pattern of actual current expenditure, it is not yet 
known if the necessary priorities envisaged in the Plan to be 
granted to expenditures on health, education and agriculture have 
been observed or not2• 
With the total current revenue increasing at a greater 
pace on average than the current expenditure, a growing surplus 
has been achieved on the Central Government BUdgets during 1962-
1965. Actually, the current revenue during 1962-1965 has 
increased at an average rate of le% per annum against an average 
increase of 11·~ per annum in the current expenditure3. Conse-
quently, the current surplus of the Central Government went up 
from 2,439 million T.L. in 1962 to· 4,800 million T.L. in 1965, 
increasing at an average rate of 25·~ per annum. The share of 
the current surplus in the current revenue of the consolidated 
General and Annexed Budgets has varied between 30 and 38 percen-
tages during the period 1962-65. However, as seen from Table 35, 
1. O.E.C.D., "Economic Surveys, Turkey 1965/1966", Paris Feb. 1966, 
p. 16. 
2. Ibid., p. 52. 
3. Both rates have been calculated as compound rates on the basis 
of data given in Table 35 above. 
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only a part of the excess of the current revenue over the current 
expenditure is available for investment directly from the General 
and Annexed Budgets if due allowance is made for transfer payments. 
Table 35 shows that the transfer payments of various kinds 
have been a great drain on the savings of the General and Annexed 
Budgets during the plan implementation so far. They swallowed 
up 69% of the current surplus in 1962, 71% in 1963 and 7&% in 1964. 
This rising trend was checked in 1965, when the ratio of the 
transfer payments to the Central Government's surplus was cut down 
to 65%. The major element in the total transfer payments is the 
payments of debt and interest on them,which together amounted to 
43%, 31% and 39% of the current surplus in 1962, 1963 and 1964, 
respectively. The foreign debts, which accumulated in the 1950's 
far exceeded the debt-payment capacity of the econo~1 • The con-
solidation of the foreign debts in 1959 deferred debt payments so 
as to start falling due during the plan period. The Plan's 
projections of the foreign debt payments have turned out to be 
considerably smaller than the actual figures. Excess of the public 
debt over the Plan estimates was 255 million T.L. in 196.3, 469 mil-
1. S.P.o., 1965 Annual Programme, p. 303. The foreign debt pay-
ments of Turkey used up 28·8% in 1960, and 38% in 1963, of her 
export proceeds. {The Ministry of Finance, Budget Preamble 
for the Fiscal Year 1966, p. 135). 
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lion T.L. in 1964 and is expected to be 946 million T.L. in 19651• 
The transfer payments to the S.E.E., local governments and private 
establishments also have accounted for an important portion 
(25 to 4Q%) of the current surplus of the Central Government. 
Contrary to the Plan's projections, the S.E.E. and the local govern-
ments have not yet been able to cater from their own resources for 
their total expenditures. 
Subtracting the total transfer payments (item '7' in 
Table 35) from the excess of the current revenue over the current 
expenditure (that is the item '6' the current surplus) gives the 
Central Government's Free surplus which can be used for capital 
formation purposes by the General and Annexed Budget Administra-
tions. As seen from Table 35, changes in the magnitude of the 
free surplus during the Plan period have not had any definite trend, 
varying in accordance with the changes in the current revenue and 
expenditure and transfer payments. 
Having reviewed the magnitude of the capital funds created 
within the General and Annexed Budgets, we shall now turn to the 
funds generated in the State Economic Enterprises (S.E.E.) during 
the plan implementation. For a number of years (particularly, 
1. S.P.O., 1965, Annual Programme, p. 303. 
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since the early 1950's), these enterprises as a group have not been 
able to finance themselves even their current operations1 • All 
their investment expenditure as well as their operational deficit, 
have therefore had to be financed through short-term borrowing from 
the banks, use of counterpart funds and receipt of surpluses of the 
pensions and social security institutions or, as was the case in 
1958 and 1959, through non-payment of premium on imports and through 
accumulating tax arrears2• 
Despite the increases in 1958 and 1959 in the prices 
charged by these enterprises their financial situation did not 
improve. Their overall deficit in 1960 was 1,200 million T.L., 
including investment expenditure3. The prices of many of the 
products of these enterprises were again raised in 1960. T.he 
following year, most of their outstanding short-term debts to the 
Central Bank (3,900 million T.L.) were consolidated and turned 
over to the Treasury as very long-term claims. Their tax arrears 
(800 million T.L.) were also remitted4• In spite of these important 
1. O.E.C.D., Turkey 1960/61, p. 17. 
2. O.E.C.D., "Turkey 1960/61", Paris 1961' p.;·17. 
3· Ibid. 
4· O.E.C .D., "Turkey 1962/63", Paris 1963, p. 34· 
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measures the financial position of the S.E.E.s did not improve 
sufficiently1 • Although the investible funds created by the S.E.E. 
during the period 1962-1965 have been around the magnitude envisaged 
by the Plan, the ratios of the realized funds to the Annual Pro-
gramme figures have been very low except in 1963. In fact, the 
Development Plan envisaged that the S.E.E.s would create a total 
surplus fund of 3,190 million T.L. in 1962-1965 at 1961 prices 
1. The need for a radical reform of the S.E.E. had been felt for 
some years, and in 1961 a group of foreign experts was invited 
to study the situation and to make proposals for their reform. 
~e general study and the twenty detailed sector studies they 
produced was published by the O.E.C.D. as the "Consolidated 
Report on the S.E.E.s in Turkey11 , Paris, December 1961. 
According to this Report the unhealthy situation of the S.E.E. 
is the outcome of the following factors:-
(a) The pricing policies followed by the Government have in 
too many cases imposed on the Enterprises the burden of 
subsidising consumption items; 
(b) There has been a misuse of resources through misdirected 
or unfinished, or, in some cases, excessive investments; 
(c) there has been no proper cost accounting because fixed 
assets were not adequately valued; 
(d) an important part of investment has been financed out of 
short-term bank credits; 
(e) the lines of command inside the Enterprises and between 
Jthem and the Government are not sufficiently clearly drawn, 
so that the benefits of neither centralization nor 
decentralization are obtained; 
(f) there is a serious staffing problem, partly linked to the 
comparative levels of remunerations. {Ibid., p. 21). 
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TABLE 37 
S~TE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES' OWN RESOURCES, 1962-1966. 
Itillion T.L. 
Revised Pro-Actual Pro-
gramme gramme 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
A. PRODUCTIVE S.E.E.: 
1. Current gross profits 11 
- 5 161 421 -
State Railraods 
- 292 - 366 - 390 - 245 -
Others 303 361 551 666 -
2. Depreciation 568 607 674 746 -
3· Short-term operations 1 - 25 233 - 64 342 -
4· Total cash resources (1+2+3) 554 835 771 1,509 -
5· Direct taxes - 232 - 217 - 196 - 279 -
6. Debt payments 
- 568 - 724 - 577 - 855 -
7- Cash outflow (5+6) - 800 -941 - 773 ~ 1,134 -
8. Net cash position (4-7) - 246 - 106 - 2 375 310 
B. NON-PRODUCTIVE S.E.E.: 
c. 
9. Own resources of non-
prod. S.E.E. 574 982 1,036 1,409 1,484 
Reinvestment 233 399 289 332 201 
Credits to productive 
S.E.E.2 341 583 747 1,077 1,283 
Total own RESOURCES of S.E.E. 
(8+9) 328 876 1,034 1,452 1,_794 
1. Difference in stocks, and payable and receivable accounts. 
2. Credits from State Investment Bank, Pension FUnd and 
Workers Insurance Fund. 
Sources: Re-arranged from Table 13 in·O.E.C.D., "Economic 
Surveys, Turkey 1965/66", p. 31; and Table 1 in 
the Ministry of Finance, :Budget Preamble for the 
1966 Fiscal Year, p. 147. 
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(see Table 21 of this essay). The actual outcome, which is 
3,088 million T.L. at current prices for the period 1962-1965 (see 
Table 38 below), lags behind the Plan's target only to the extent 
of 100 million T.L. if the rise in the price level is neglected. 
But the Annual Programmes have set much higher targets for the 
funds to be created by the S.E.E. than those set by the Develop-
ment Plan. As seen in Table 38, the rate of realization in 
relation to the Annual Programme figures was as low as 71 and 58 
percentages in 1964 and 1965 respectively. 
TABLE 38 
THE S.E.E.s OWN RESOURCES AS PROGRAMMED & REALIZED, 1962-1965. 
(million T.L.) 
1962 1963 1964 1965 
Programme 546 856 1,454 1,4521 
Realization 328 876 1,034 8502 
Shortfall 218 - 20 420 602 
Realization in % 60 102 71 58 
1. It was originally 1,825 million T.L. but reduced to 
1,452 million T.L. in the revised Programme. 
2. the estimate based on the data available in October 1965. 
Sources: The Programme figure for 1962 is from S.P.O. Program 
for the Year 1962, Table 14. 
The Programme figure for 1965 is from Table 37 above. 
The Programme figure for 1963 and 1964 are from· S.P.O., 
A Summary of 1966 Annual Programme Table 12, p. 10. 
The Realization figures for 1962-1964 are from Table 37 
above; that for 1965 is from S.P.O., 1966 Annual 
Programme, p. 10. 
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The productive S.E.E.s as a whole showed only a very small 
profit (11 million T.L.)- in 1962 and a small loss (5 million T.L.) 
in 1963. In 1964 an overall profit o£ 161 million T.L. was 
reported. However, due to inadequate depreciation allowances, the 
real situation may be one o£ annual losses1 • The overall situation, 
however, is misleading. Most o£ the losing Enterprises are in the 
public transportation sector; in particular the deficit of the 
State Railways has increased steadily during 1962-19642• The 
remaining S.E.E.s have improved their profits steadily by raising 
their prices (e.g., coal, iron and textiles)3. 
The stagnation o£ demand during 1961 and 1962 resulted in 
low rates o£ activity and/or large accumulation of stocks in many 
l. 11The depreciation allowances in question are based on nominal 
acquisition values o£ fixed assets; taking into account the 
change in the exchange rate and in the internal price level, 
they represent probably between a third and a hal£ o£ "normal" 
depreciation11 • (O.E.C.D., Turkey 1962/63, Paris, May 1963, 
p. 20). 
2. In Turkey both rail and road transporters are subsidised. 
The licence fees, transportation and fuel taxes paid by vehicle 
owners cover only about hal£ the annual costs o£ maintaining 
the highways; and the net cost to the state seems to be roughly 
equivalent $o the Railway's deficit. Therefore, a general rise 
in road transport taxes may be suggested to permit the Railways 
to adjust their prices accordingly. (O.E.C.D. Turkey 1965/66, 
Paris, February 1966, p. 38). 
3. Ibid., p. 36. 
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state enterprises. Accordingly, the item "short-term operations" 
(changes in stocks, and payable and receivable accounts) in Table 37 
showed a negative change of 25 million T.L. in 1962. As the econo-
mic activit,y became brisk in 1963, the selling off of the stocks 
provided an increase of 233 million T.L. in the current resources. 
The relative stagnation of demand in 1964 again caused an increase 
of 64 million T.L. in stocks. The total cash resources, including 
depreciation allowances, have thus amounted to 554 million T.L. in 
1962, 835 million T.L. in 1963 and 771 million T.L. in 1964. But 
the cash outflow of the productive S.E.E. in the form of direct 
taxes and debt payments has exceeded their total cash resources, 
though this operational deficit has shrunk from 246 million T.L. in 
- 1962 to 2 million T.L. in 1964. 
In contrast to the productive S.E.E., the non-productive 
S.E.E. (Pension Fund, Workers Insurance Fund, State Investment Bank 
which formerly was Amortization and Credit Fund, and the Provinces' 
Bank) have created surplus funds which have far exceeded the 
operational deficits of the productive S.E.E. The consolidated 
resources of the S.E.E. have consequently been of some positive mag-
nitudes, thus contributing to their capital formation expenditures. 
The total own resources of the S.E.E. have increased from 328 mil-
lion T.L. in 1962 to 876 million T.L. in 1963 and to 1,034 million 
T.L. in 1964. Despite a more than three-fold increase during 
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1962-1964, the resources of the S.E.E., as will be seen, have fallen 
considerably short of their investment expenditures. 
The programme for 1965 provides for 1,509 million T.L. of 
gross internal cash resources. Losses of the railways are planned 
to decrease by 145 million T.L. to 245 million T.L., and profits of 
other non-financial (productive) enterprises are expected to reaCh 
666 million T.L. Depreciation allowances will rise to 746 million 
T.L. and short term operations are planned to show a surplus of 
342 million T.L. 
Contrary to the expectations of the Programme for 1965 a 
negative development started in 1965. Although the State Railways 
have been able to reduce their losses approximately by the amount 
1 planned , the tariff adjustments made by the Railways affected 
adversely the Turkish Coal, and Turkish Iron and Steel Companies, 
whose price increases were cancelled by the Government because their 
2 products were basic goods • Moreover, the collective agreements 
signed with the Trade Unions in 1964 and 1965 have also affected 
adversely the capacity of the S.E.E. to generate resources. Further-
more, while the production costs of the Turkish Sugar Factories went 
up because of the rising of beet prices, the sugar prices were not 
1. O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, Paris February 1966, p. 37. 
2. S.P.O., A Summary of 1966 Annual Programme, p. 30. 
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raised. In addition, the sugar production was in excess of consump-
tion, resulting in increased stocks. Apart from these new adverse 
developments, the Turkish Airlines and the State Maritime Bank 
fbo.c.(ll. ... $<!. .. ~ 
continued operating below capacity being unable to compete with 
foreign transportation firms1 • In view of these facts it is not 
surprising that the total own resources of the S.E.E. is expected 
to materialise at 58% of the Programme target. 
Apart from the General and Annexed Bu.dgets and the S.E.E.s, 
there are Local Admini-strations and the Administrations with 
Revolving Funds which also create some investment funds. In the 
Development Plan they are expected to be self-sufficient. The 
available data on their revenues and expenditures are scanty and 
unreliable2• It is therefore not possible here to analyse their 
developments. However, in order to have a complete picture of the 
financing of public capital formation, the O.E.C.D.'s figures for 
the investment and surplus funds of these Administrations are used 
in Table 39· 
As seen from this table, the public savings in 1962-1965 
have fallen well short of the investment undertaken in the same 
period. It is nevertheless remarkable that the shortfall of public 
1. Ibid., p. 31. 
2. I.B.R.D., op. cit., paragraph 381. 
A. 
B. 
c. 
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TABLE 39 
FINANCING PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 1962-1965. 
(million T.L.) 
1962 1963 1964 1965 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT: 4,236 5,142 5,660 6,555 (7•6) (8·2) (8·5) (9•5) 
1. General & Annexed Budgets 2,247 2,835 3,187 3,800 
2. S.E.E.s 1,529 1,617 1,760 1,950 
3· Revolving Funds 118 254 250 286 
4· Local Administration 342 436 463 519 
PUBLIC SAVING: 1,787 2,879 3,180 4,013 
0·2) (4•6) (4•8) (5•7) 
5· Central Government's 
Free Surplus 759 1,007 885 1,658 
6. S.E.E.'s Own Resources 328 876 1,034 850 
1· Transfer to S.E.E.'s 
from the Budget 240 380 645 760 
a. Revolving Funds 118 242 216 286 
9· Local Administrations 342 374 400 519 
~CIT FINANCING: 2,449 2,263 2,480 2,482 
(4•4) (:~·6) 0·7) (3·5) 
Note: · T.he figures inside brackets represent percentages of 
G.N.P. 
Sources: The Public Investment figures ( (1) to (4) ) for 
1962-196t are from O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, 
Table 10, p. 34; 
That for 1965 from S.P.O., 1966 Annual Programme, 
Table 11, p. 65. 
The figures for items (5), (6) and (7) are from 
Tables 35, 31 and .38 of this essay. The figures 
for items (8) and (9) were taken from Table 11 in 
O.E.C.D., ibid., p. 34· 
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savings has been steady around 2,400 million T.L. whereas the public 
investment in 1965 was about 5~ higher than in 1962. This means 
that the proportion of public investments financed with public 
savings has increased during the period 1962-1965. Actually, the 
ratio of the public saving to the public investment was about 4~ 
in 1962 but went up to 56% in 1963 and 1964, and to 62% in 1965. 
This favourable development1 has been the outcome of the fact that 
public savings have increased annually b,y 3i·6%, on average, during 
1962-1965 inclusive, while public investments have in the same 
period increas.ed, on average, at an annual rate of 15"6%. 
II 
The major part of the deficit in public savings during the 
Plan implementation in 1962-1965 has been covered b,y the counter-
part funds of foreign aid (see Table 40 below). In 1962, about 
83% of a total deficit of 2,449 million T.L. was financed with 
counterpart funds and project credits which amounted to 2,023 
million T.L. The foreign financing in 1963 was large enough to 
meet the whole of a 2,263 million T.L. deficit on the saving-
l. This favourable development may be observed in terms of the 
percentages of G.N.P. (see Table 32), while the ratio of public 
investments to G.N.P. was, during 1962-65, increasing, the 
deficit financing as percentage of G.N.P. was declining. 
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TABLE 40 
DEFICIT FINANCING, 1962-1965 
(million T.L.) 
A. 
B. 
c. 
1962 1963 1964 
TOTAL DEFICIT: 2,449 2,263 2,480 
FOREIGN FINANCING: 2,023 2,292 1,507 
Counterpart Funds to 
Central Government. 1,062 1,796 1,303 
Counterpart Funds to S.E.E. 769 229 36 
Project Credits to S.E.E. 192 267 168 
Implied DOMESTIC BORROWING 
(A-B): 426 - 29 913 
Long-term Domestic Borrowing 
- -
200 
Short-tezm Domestic Borrowing 426 
- 113 
Sources: For (A), Table 39 above. 
For (B) and (C), O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, 
-·p~ 34, Table 11. 
1965 
2,482 
1,500 
-
-
-
982 
400 
582 
investment account of the Public Sector. But, in 1964, only about 
65% of the 2,480 million T.L. deficit could be covered by foreign 
financing. The total saving deficit in 1965 is expected to be 
around that in 1964; and the foreign financing, although scheduled 
in the 1965 Programme to reach 2,979 million T.L.1, may also be 
1. O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, p. 34, Table 11. 
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expected to materialize at its 1964 level as its March-December 1965 
magnitude was almost equal to that of the period March-December 19641 • 
What is left after a part of the total saving-gap is covered 
by the forei~ financing must have been made up through domestic 
borrowing. In fact, of the total public investment during the period 
1962-1965, an amount of 426 million T.L. in 1962 and of something 
around l,QOO million T.L. in 1964 and 1965 have been realized as 
being financed by domestic borrowing. Domestic borrowing in 1962 
was completely short-term borrowing while in 1964 and 1965 it was 
p~rtly long-term and partly short-term borrowing from the Central 
. 2 
Bank and Commercial banks • 
In the discussion of the effects of the above-reviewed 
deficit financing it must be mentioned at the outset that the deficits 
on the saving-investment account of public sector shown in Table 40 
are ex-post magnitudes. The ex-post "finance" of the government 
deficit is itself an outcome of the interaction of government deficit 
spending in a given period with other aggregates and propensities in 
the economy. 
The scope for non-inflationary deficit financing is indicated 
by the nature of the balance between the sum total of investment 
1. Ministry of Finance, Budget Preamble for the 1966 Fiscal Year, 
p. 107, Table 61. 
2. The role of these borrowings will be dealt with in due course ::i.n 
the following discussion. 
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projects, including those financed by public deficit, and the sum 
total of what persons and companies would be willing to save at the 
current level of prices1 • If the former sum does not exceed the 
latter at the current level of prices, even the financing by the 
Central Bank of the whole of the deficit required for public works 
will not be inflationary2• 
Intended saving and investment at the current price level 
of the private sector cannot be measured. The figures for the 
private sector's savings and investment whiCh have been referred to 
in this essay are ex-post magnitudes, which themselves have been 
influenced by public deficit spending. Saving and investment ratios 
of the private sector in the pre-plan period cannot also be relied 
on for an estimate of the ex-ante saving and investment of the private 
sector during the Plan period, since the pre-plan period has been 
characterized by extensive deficit financing, strong stabilization 
measures, political instability and, finally, a military revolution. 
In practice, governments may be able to learn about the 
balance between investment and saving by trial and error3. Whether 
1. R. F. Harrod, "Economic Planning and Capital Investment", in 
Capital Formation and Investment in Industry, Istanbul 1963, p.313. 
2. Ibid., p. 313. 
3. R. F. Harrod, op. cit., p. 314. In learning about that balance, 
authorities may rely on various indicators such as price indexes, 
stock changes, interest rates in unorganized money markets. 
- 2~9 ._ 
the Turkish Government has been able to control its deficit spending 
during the Plan implementation b,y means of such a trial and error 
method may be observed from the price indices shown in Table 41. 
Wholesale prices in Turkey present a strong seasonal pattern, 
usually declining from late spring to late summer and rising 
1 throughout the rest of the year • Following the dismantling of 
maoy price controls during 1961 and 1962, the average price level 
rose by 5•7% in 1962 and by 4·2% in 1963. In 1964, wholesale prices 
were stable. But the seasonal upturn in the autumn of 1964 was 
unusually pronounced, and the general index failed to make the 
seasonal down turn during the spring and swnmer of 1965. The 
average price level in the third quarter of 1965 was 12% above the 
same quarter of 1964. The increase in cost-of-living (Istanbul) 
has been relatively less, about &,% in the third quarter of 1965 over 
that of a year earlier. 
The upward trend of wholesale prices and cost-of-living 
during 1961-1965 may be taken as the indicator of the presence of 
excess demand. The price rises, ~awever, have been moderate till 
1965, particularly in comparison with the average rate of 13·~ rise 
per year during 1953-1960. The Government has been successful in 
1. O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66, p. 11. 
TABLE 41 
PRICES AND WAGES, 1961-1965 
1964 1965 
1961 1962 1963 1964 I II III IV I II III 
WHOLESALE PRICES: (1953=100) 
General Index 246 -~-60 271 269 274 270 261 271 286 291 292 
Good 239 260 • 271 266 274 269 255 265 284 289 289 
COST OF LIVING (Istanbul): 
(1953=100) 
General Index 236 245 261 263 264 263 261 266 271 ?,13 278 
Food 242 255 273 272 274 271 269 275 282 284 291 
MONEY \-I AGES ( T. L. ) 15•64 16•52 17·91 18·39 19•46 18•65 
INDEX Ol!, REAL. WAGES1 I 100 101 103 105 lf8 101 
1. Calculated by deflating money wages by the general index of cost-of-living. 
Sources: The price indexes are from O.E.C.D., 'rurkey 1965/66, p. 61. 
Money wages from S.P.O., 1966 Annual Programme, p. 35· 
1\) 
~ 
0 
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maintaining an aggregate investment expenditure during 1962 and 
1963 which was not significantly out of line with what the public 
was prepa~ed to save plus the current account deficits. The 
current account deficits, which amounted to 4•4%.of G.N.P. in 1962 
and 4·~ in 1963, played, of course, an important part in raising 
the supply of total savings towards the level of total investment 
expenditures. 
Following the significant rises in the level of'real 
national income during 1962 and 1963, a slowing down of economic 
activity first showed itself by the end of 1963 and permeated the 
whole economy in the first half of 1964. This could have been 
considered as a sign of the development of a deflationary gap, 
probably due to a lag in the adjustment of the consumption level 
to the exceptionally high level of national income attained in 
1963. In addition, while measures were introduced to curtail 
investment in housebuilding and to curb imports which also led to 
the curtailment of investment in some sectors, no offsetting in-
crease in public investment was undertaken. On the contrary, with 
the purpose of limiting public spending to public revenue, the 
Government cut continually appropriations of current and invest-
ment expenditures during the first half of 1964. 
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T.he stagnation·or economic activity has eventually forced 
the Government to take recourse to deficit financing from July 1964 
on. But the scale of the deficit incurred and the accompanying 
policy of monetary expansion have, as will be seen soon, resulted 
in an excess demand during 1965, causing a rapid and continual 
rise in the general price level. 
T.he rising prices during 1961-1965 have not resulted in 
falling real wages. As shown by Table 41, real wages have 
continually risen till the second half of 1965. Although the 
money wage rates given in the table represent average daily earnings 
of only insured workers, they could, at least, be considered as 
indicating that the real wages have not fallen, if not risenl In 
view of the growing strength of trade unions and the sensitiveness 
or the public against disparities in income distribution, it is 
pretty safe to assume that the rise in money wages would keep up 
with the price rises. This would prevent the price rises from 
effecting substantial shifts in income distribution in favour of 
profit earners. Under these conditions, no increase in the level 
of real savings and investment could be expected to result .rrom 
inflationary deficit financing. If inflationary deficit financing 
is halted, a stability may be attained at a higher level of prices 
without substantial change in savings. 
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A wage-price spiral which looms large for the rest of the 
plan period can occur only if some means are found to finance the 
prevailing scale of production at the higher level of prices and 
1 
costs • The ways of financing public sector's deficit and the 
monetary policy followed so far have provided the public with the 
necessary liquidity. The biggest part of the excess of public 
investment over public saving was financed by the use of counter-
part funds. There is a general belief that increasing public 
investment by the extent of the available counterpart funds is not 
inflationary. 2• As a matter of fact, investment can be stepped 
up without causing inflati.on only to the extent that the volume 
(not value) of consumption of domestic output is curtailed conse-
quent upon the arrival of foreign aid, which creates counterpart 
funds3. A deficit on the balance of current account is due to the 
existence of an excess of ex-ante investment over ex-ante savings. 
1. There is of course some flexibility in the capacity of the 
public to use a given supply of money (changing velocity of 
money "V"). But this flexibility is limited, and the limit 
is quickly approached if prices and wages rise while the 
money supply is unchanged. 
2. This belief' is shared by the S.P.O. and Ministry of Finance as 
understood from the Development Plan and Annual Programmes and 
the Budget Preambles. 
3· This is the reasoning applied b,y R. F. Harred to the assess-
ment of the inflationary effects of the use of counterpart 
funds arising from P.S. 480 Aid. See his Sales Proceed Funds 
and Inflation, in Capital Formation ••••••• , op. cit., pp. 227-
231. 
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However, the excess demand arising from the excessive desired 
investment would have worked itself out through price rises had 
the means to accommodate the current account deficit been unavai·d-
able. The availability of foreign aid may help divert some demand 
from domestic products to imported goods and maintain price stabi-
lity. But there is no reason why the decrease in consumption of 
domestic output must be equal in volume (or in value at existing 
prices) to the foreign aid creating counterpart funds. If this 
is so, it is unlikely that the whole of the currently accruing 
counterpart funds could be used to finance additional investment 
without causing inflation. 
What seems to be an even greater fallacy as regards the 
counterpart funds is that the counterpart funds standing over from 
a previous period could be used to finance additional investment 
without causing inflation. In 1964 and 1965, the counterpart funds 
used by the Central Government and S.E.E. exceeded the total current 
account deficits in those years. Since not all the foreign aid 
1 generates counterpart funds , the public sector must have used the 
outstanding counterpart funds during 1964 and 1965. This is exactly 
similar in its effects to the financing of public deficit through 
l. The counterpart funds account in the Central Ba.nk of Turkey 
is credited with an amount equal to the 90% of the Turkish 
Lira equivalent of the foreign aid received from the U.S.A •• 
The remaining 10% is put into a sight deposit account to be 
used by the Government of the U.S.A. for its expenses in Turkey.', 
(Central Bank of Turkey, Reports of the Board of Directors,l963, 
Ankara 1964, pp. 46-47 and Table 25.). 
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borrowing from the Central Bank, because the opportunity to step 
up the public investment consequent upon the arrival of aid-supplied 
goods must have been either used in the relevant year, or have not 
been used in which case there must have been an increase in under-
and/or un-employment and a loss of domestic output. 
To sum up, whether the use of counterpart funds in financing 
the public deficit will be inflationary or not may be estimated 
according:-
(a) to what extent the consumption of domestic goods will be 
curtailed in consequence of the receipt of aid-supplied 
goods and 
(b) to the excess of what all private sources are prepared 
to save at the existing level of prices over private 
capital formation1 • 
T.he long-term domestic borrowing by the public sector was in 
the form of government bonds sold initially to commercial banks due 
to the absence of a private capital-market. The loans to the 
1. "In Greece and later in Turkey we imported a made-in-America 
Inflation by acquiesci~ in a volume of welfare projects (Greece), 
industrial development ~Turkey), and military spending (both) 
which was quite out of line with what those underdeveloped econo-
mies support. In Britain and Norway, which were pursuing a 
socialist policy of over full employment with a high level of 
investment, the question of using the counterpart for additional 
expenditures never seriously arose. T.hose sophisticated govern-
ments would simply inquire solicitously which of the items in 
their already approved budgets we would most like to tell Con-
~ess had been financed with the counterpart of American aid. 11 
(Harland Cleveland, 11T.he Convalescence of Foreign Aid", American 
Economic Review, May 1959, p. 225). 
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government will increase deposits which will be partly withdrawn in 
the form of currency. And, the larger volume of deposits will com-
pel the ·banks to hold larger reserves. If banks are loaned up 
(having no excess reserves) they can lend to the government only by 
holding down their loans to business, since they cannot get additional 
resources by rediscounting the long-term government bonds at the 
Central Bank. They will be able to reduce their loan portfolios in 
the absence of call loans only gradually as outstanding loans mature. 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the long-term borrowings by the 
Public Sector during 1964 and 1965 have had inflationary effects to 
the extent that banks had some excess reserves and that it took some 
time to contract loans to the private sector. 
In providing the economy with liquidity, which is necessary 
for a wage-price spiral to continue, the third means of covering 
public deficit, that is, short-term borrowing from the Central Bank, 
has undoubtedly been the most effective factor. Central Bank 
credit to the public sector doubled between 1962 and 19631 • During 
the first half of 1964, the increase in Central Bank credit to 
public sector was only about 7% above its level at the end of 1963. 
1. The sources of information in relation to the monetary policy 
which have been referred to in this essay are these: Ministry 
of Finance, Budget Preamble for the 1966 Fiscal Year, pp. 111-
127; O.E.C.D., Turkey 1965/66 pp. 11-15; I.B.R.D., op. cit., 
Annex I. 
\ 
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But, following the raising in the mid-1964 of the credit ceilings 
on Central Bank loans to the Treasury, Soil Products Office and the 
Monopoly Administration, the Central Bank credit to the public 
sector reached by the end of 1964 a level 32.% above that at the end 
of 1963. Public sector borrowing from the Central Bank has 
continued to increase during 1965 and reached by the end of the 
third quarter a level about 2~ higher than year earlier. The 
short-term public borrowing from the commercial banks has also been 
increasing. It rose from 1,332 million T.L. at the end of 1961 to 
1,961 million T.L. at the end of 1964, registering a 5o% increase, 
and to 2,206 million T.L. by the end of the third quarter of 1965 
which is about 14% higher than a year earlier. 
The primary monetary expansion described above has of course 
led to the secondary expansion by the banking system. The ratio 
of currency to money has been around 4o% during 1961-1962. The 
legal reserve ratio maintained b,y banks against deposits was 2o% 
until mid-1964 when it was reduced to lo% for time deposits1 • Apart 
from this, banks maintain a cash/deposit ratio around 8%. Accord-
ingly, the credit multiplier was about 1•75 before mid-1964 and now 
1. Time deposits amount to something around l/5th of the total 
deposits. Consequently, the weighted reserve ratio for after 
mid-1964 is (4 X 20 + 1 X 10)/5 = 15%. 
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is about 1·81 • 
Monetary authorities are unlikely to have any influence on 
changes in currency/money ratio, except for the possibili~ of 
reducing it indirectly in the long run by encouraging an expansion 
of the financial and banking system and changes in payment habits 
and asset preferences. They may, however, influence the multiplier 
by changing legal cash reserve requirements against deposits as they 
did in mid-1964. MOreover, in order to increase the demand for 
credit, they reduced the maximum rate of interest from 10·~ to 9% 
on loans to designated industrial enterprises and increased indivi-
dual rediscounting limits on individual enterprises. 
Accompanying these developments have been a rapid expansion 
of credit and money supply. The consolidated net credit increased 
from 11,247 million T.L. in 1962 to 15,995 million T.L. in 1964, 
rising by 4~, and to 18,487 million T.L. at the end of the third 
quarter of 1965 which is 2~ higher.than a year earlier. Money 
supply in 1964 was 4o% above the 1961 level. By the end of the 
third quarter of 1965, it was 1~ higher than in the corresponding 
1. The credit multiplier is defined as being equal to the recipro-
cal of c + r (1 - c), where c stands :for the ratio of currency 
in circulation to money and r :for the legal or customary reserve 
ratio maintained by banks against deposits. This multiplier 
is usually considered as a fairly stable ex-ante coefficient. 
(J. Ahrensdorf, "Central Bank Policies and Inflation, A case 
study of Four Less Developed Economies", I.M.F. Staff Papers, 
October 1959, pp. 274-302.) · 
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period of the previous year. Part of the increment in the money 
supply during 1961-1965 was used to finance a 2~ increase in 
production. Part of the increment has met the growing need for 
liquidity, which is caused by the growing of the economy more 
complex and by the expansion of the monetized sector. Neverthe-
less, the monetary demand has exceeded, particularly as from the 
end of 1964, domestic supply as indicated by the rising prices, 
though contracting foreign trade deficits have also possibly 
contributed to the rise in p~ices. 
The money supply has increased at a rate of about lo% p.a. 
during 1961-1963 when a rather high rate of growth in G.N.P. was 
achieved at relatively stable prices. Therefore, a lo% increase 
per year may be considered as a rough estimate of the safe limit 
for monetary expansion in Turkey. The increase in the money supply 
during 1965 far exceeded this limit. In December 1965 the authori-
ties proposed three monetary measures to limit the further expansion 
of bank credit and money supply:-
(i) increasing the required reserve ratio from 10 to 20,% 
on the time deposit increases; 
(ii) raising the minimum liquidity ratio against their 
obligations from 5 to lo,% on new increases, and 
(iii) reducing the Central Bank's ceilings on advances it was 
willing to make to individual commercial banks by 10,%. 
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These measures may have some effects on the secondary 
monetary expansion. But in view of the likely development in the 
financing of the public sector in 1966, it seems that the monetary 
authorities would need much more effective measures if they aim at 
curbing the monetary expansion to any significant extent through 
influencing the secondary expansion by the banking system. The 
1966 Annual Programme envisaged a deficit of 1,738 million T.L. on 
the Public Sector account. Of this deficit, about 400 million T.L. 
is estimated to be covered through long-term domestic borrowing and 
the rest through increasing the tax revenue and S.E.E.'s surpluses. 
In the light of the past experience, it is hardly possible to be 
optimistic in respect to the revenue targets. It is therefore 
likely that a substantial increase will take place in the monetary 
liabilities of the Banking system, especially the Central Bank, if 
the Government clings to the 1966 investment programme as scheduled 
in the 1966 Annual Programme. 
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CONCLUSION. 
This dissertation is intended as a study of the efforts of the 
Turkish econo~ to provide that important prerequisite for its First 
Five-Year Plan - its domestic financing. Its primary aim has been to 
provide an appraisal of the efficiency of various financial policies 
in increasing the real investable funds, that is, real savings, and 
suggestions for a successful financing o~ the Plan. Since this is 
an empirical study, a large portion of it was devoted to a description 
of the structure of the econo~ and relevant events. 
We saw that the realization of the level of investment 
required for the attainment of the Plan's main target, that is, a 
1% rate of growth per annum, calls for a su~stantial increase in 
the level of domestic savings. We also saw that this increase 
would have to be ·produced by the joint efforts of the private and. 
public sectors. In spite of the fact that the Plan did not 
specify precise targets in relation to the savings of the private 
and public sectors, the actual saving performance of the private 
sector during the early years of the Plan implementation may be 
regarded as satisfactory with respect to the increase in its level 
both in absolute amount and in relation to G.N.P. On the other 
hand, the actual financial performance of the public sector lagged 
behind the Plan's targets. What is significant, however, is not 
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the comparison of the two sets (planned and realized) of figures, 
but the ~sis of the factors which have cansed the divergency 
of actual developments from intentions, and the lessons as to the 
adequacy of policies. 
It is a well-known empirical observation~} that the short-
term marginal rate of saving is considerably higher than the lang.-
term (marginal and average) rate of saving1 • If this fact applies 
to Turkey, the high rates of private savings during 1962-1964 ms:y 
be regarded as a result of the lag in the adjustment of consumption 
expenditures to the rising private disposable incomes. The same 
rates of growth of the private disposable income as in the period 
of 1962-1964 ~ not have the same effects on the saving behaviour 
of the private sector in the coming years as they did in the 
1962-1964 period following the stagnation years since 19572• We 
therefore believe that the task of raising the private savi:ngs/ 
income ratio in Turkey to the level observed in advanced countries 
1. G. Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory, The Macmillon Co., New York 
1961, pp. 252-266. 
2. As a matter of fact, we ~ assume that if the Plan succeeds in 
maintaining a high rate of growth relative to that attained in 
the immediate pre-Plan years, the Turkish public ~ come to 
regard this rate of growth as "normal and permanent" and, 
accordingly, an upward shift Il1q take place in the consumption 
fUnction of the private sector. 
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requires some structural changes that ~ effect a shift to the 
right in the saving function of the private sector. To this 
effect, we suggested (a) that measures must be taken aga.in.st 
"demonstration effect", (b) that the present static pattem of 
wealth ownership should be so changed that the importance of ~ 
part of wealth which is in the hands of profi t-ea:rn.ers would 
increase at the expense of the part which serves as a source of 
rental income, capital gains or merely prestige, and (c) that 
special saving institutions must be formed to work together with 
commercial banks in inducing and mobilizing small savings. 
Wi tb. respect .:to the savings through Government -the 
financing by the genuine public savings during 1962-1965 of an 
increasing proportion of the public investment, which itself has 
be~ increasing at a.n average rate of 15•ft' p.a., was lDl.doubtedly 
the most significant development achieved in the Plan implementation 
so far. In this development the hie,best credit of course is to go 
to the unprecedented increase in the total tax revenue. It is 
also equallY significant that the coverage of the tax system has 
been extended, and that some attempts have been made to manipulate 
the tax policy with the purpose of inducing capital formation. 
Our appraisal of the taxation policy, nevertheless, was 
very critical in parts, especially with regard to the taxation of 
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the a.gricul tural sector and the incentive measures embodied in 
the tax system. This should not be interpreted to mean that we 
regard the taxation policy of the Plan period so far as a failure. 
In spite of what we considered the errors in the method of 
a.gricul tural taxation adopted by the fiscal authorities and the 
abuses of the technique of incentive taxation, the mere fact of 
the recognition of the need to tackle these problems gives good 
ground for hope that the right methods mq eventually be recog-
nized as well. At the same time, in view of- the inconsistencies 
between the Plan's priorities regarding the allocation of resources 
and the primar,y features of the taxation policy followed, we could 
hardly pass by the warning raised by J. H. Adler• 11A large pro-
portion of the death rate of ambitious development programs has 
been due to the lack of liaison between the planners and the 
authorities in charge of the formulation of fiscal and monetary 
policies111• 
The Plan's dogmatism in rejecting categorically deficit 
spend;ng as a method of financing aroused our opposition. Accord-
ingly, the use of the method of deficit financing in the actual 
1. J. H. Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary Implementation of 
Development Programs", American~Economic Review (Papers and 
Proceedings), MB\Y' 1952. 
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Plan implementatiQn was nQt criticized in this ess~ merely by 
reason o:r its nature. We endeavoured to show tba t a programme 
or deficit financing o:r public capital :ro~tian could be under-
taken without disruptive consequences. At the same time, we 
showed how the :raul ty hypotheses concerning the counterparts or 
foreign aid and long-term domestic borrowing have probably caused 
the deficit financing poliqy to create some inflatianar,y pressures. 
We also showed that, While it was essential to follow an alert 
monetary'policy to prevent a wage-price spiral, the monetary 
authorities seemed w be losing the~~ grip an the liquidity" ot the 
econollzy', particularly since the beginning or 1965, because o:r the 
Government's abuse ot the method of deficit financing. 
The recommendations embodied in this dissertation are 
largely in the nature or guide lines. They point towards a 
general direction rather than 1~ down a detailed programme tor the 
domestic financing ot the Plan. To formulate a proper programme 
would have required much more study and analysis Q! the in.sti tutions 
and facts. However, to the extent that the analyses and proposals 
made here contain some degree or reasonableness, it is hoped that 
this dissertation ~ serve as a guide for further s~. 
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